

## FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS: THE CULTURAL IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION OF *CELE* AND *BATIK* WITHIN MOLUCCAN SCHOLARS IN AMBON

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### ABSTRACT

*Identity is a social construction. The Moluccan people are evident of this structure, especially regarding the policy of the obligation to wear cele (Moluccan traditional garment). This has become a process of identity construction involving culture and ethnicity for Moluccans. This paper discusses how Moluccan scholars who studied in Java understand their position wearing cele in the local context in Maluku. In addition, this paper also discusses the scholars' views on how the process of identity negotiation between localism and nationalism is represented through cele and batik. Information for this study was gathered using a qualitative method with a cultural studies approach. The data were collected using several techniques including interviews, observation, and literature studies to answer research questions and problems. This paper shows that in response to the Moluccan government policy which requires the people to wear cele once a week, most scholars prefer to wear batik instead. One justification is related to cultural and religious aspects, noting cele is more familiar and originates from within the Christian community, while the Islamic community does not recognize cele in their culture. They consider that such policy leads to the construction of cultural identity based on false consciousness.*

**Keywords:** false consciousness, cele, batik, cultural identity construction, Moluccan scholars

### INTRODUCTION

The development of modern society has resulted in local knowledge, generally referred to as culture. Culture is the result of knowledge, where humans learn and claim that culture should be revisited in a certain context and locus either locally or nationally. Culture grows and develops in society in line with the conditions and characteristics, so that cultural diversity appears to reflect its

own uniqueness. At this point, one can find cultural similarities and differences at the local, national, and global levels. Identity is a human need in general but at the same time it is also fundamental (Shils 1975; Berger and Luckman, 1991). Biologically, humans are not born in a complete state, but are in the process of building themselves. Humans can basically function depending on how each social actor has achieved self-development and is manifested in existential life experiences. The identity of an individual has several layers, where its significance is determined by the extent of individual experience in a culture that forms it. Thus, various aspects of a person's multi-layered identity are exposed to the environment through conversation, interaction with various other cultures, and even biologically potential (Greenfeld & Eastwood, 2009).

In a famous work by Jacques Derrida, he notes identities are never quite identical, because they always contain elements that cannot be reduced from various changes (Derrida, 1992, p. 9). The content of identity thus is never singular, having several aspects, differences, and similarities, both internally and externally for any identity (individual or collective). Therefore, 'diversity' or multiple identities overlaps and hangs on one of the characteristics of identity politics (Tully, 2003b). Identity politics consists of three ongoing negotiation processes that interact in complex ways: (1) between members of a group fighting for recognition (2) between themselves and the groups to whom they demand recognition and (3) between the latter group members, whose identity is formed because of the struggle, whether they like it or not (Tully, 2003b). Identity politics is disruptive when norms of mutual recognition are questioned and become the focus of struggles and negotiations for justice and freedom (Tully, 2003b).

Social Identity theory proposes that all interactions with others lie in sustainable interpersonal relations (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). It means that if the related group behavior is personally motivated, it will not be motivated by personal prominence, and vice versa. Self-categorization theory (Swann, 2012) extends this idea by hypothesizing the hydraulic relationship between social environment and individual. Therefore, the social identity approach suggests that the motivational burden for pro-group behavior rests entirely on the shoulders of relevant social identities (Swann et al., 2012). Conversely, when a social identity stands out and group members assert themselves in terms of their social identity, they will "be harmful", seeing themselves and other group members as a social category. This means that group members will see other group members through the lens of their membership in the group, rather than in terms of the personal relationships that they have established with one

another (Swann et al., 2012).

Meanwhile, to understand national identity, one must begin with a preliminary investigation into such questions regarding identity. At the individual level, identity can be understood as part of a person's cognitive map that concerns the configuration and structure of a person regarding a social domain. Cognitive maps are images of social order carried out by social actors and classified into various sub-supporting aspects as a picture of a broader social order, awareness of expectations, behavior, norms, conceptions of morality and justice, etc. Identity is an aspect of the cognitive map because of the inevitable relationship as a component of the cognitive map itself. A person's identity is inseparable from the image of the world, one's ethical appearance, etc. (Greenfeld & Eastwood, 2009).

Identity politics has not only become popular and appropriate at the national and local levels, but also on an individual level through lifestyle. These politics penetrate the center of the economy through the ideology of capitalism. 'Identity politics' emerged into modern discourse in the late twentieth century to describe political struggles occurring with increasing frequency. These came to represent some of the most pressing political issues of our time. Various political activities refer to struggles for legal, political, and constitutional recognition and identity accommodation of individuals, refugees, women, gays, lesbians, languages, ethnic groups, cultural minorities, immigrants, and often, religions that exclude Western culture (Tully, 2003a).

Applying this research framework, Moluccan scholars studying in Java tended to change their appearance and fashion by wearing "*batik*" clothing. This trend not only follows the context of their place of study, but also continues when they return to their place of origin. These scholars prefer to wear *batik* instead of "*cele*" (Moluccan garment) even though the local government has designated "*cele*" as a uniform in public buildings (schools and offices) as a way of increasing local identity consciousness (pursuant to Ambon Mayoral Regulation No. 46 of 2017 concerning Wearing Ambon clothing). However, there is debate among Moluccan scholars about *cele* for several reasons. Among other arguments, is a principle one arguing that *cele* is not rooted in the ideology nor does it contain philosophical values. Additionally, *cele* is not culturally rooted in Islamic regions in Central Maluku. This means that cultural space in Maluku is not all rooted in the *cele* tradition which makes *cele* a Moluccan cultural icon, where wearing it in public space as a feature of identity is still debatable. In fact, people wear *cele* only because there is pressure from authorities, not as a form of consciousness. It also is different than fashion interests such as the *batik* people wear daily. *Cele* is a stranger to

some Moluccan people, on the other hand *batik* has become familiar to the Moluccan society.

This paper aims to discuss the contestation between localism and nationalism among the Moluccan people using their attitude towards *cele* and *batik* as a mechanism for understand. Do Moluccan scholars forgo their identity by wearing *batik*? How much does their identity depend on the symbol of the clothes worn, if at all? Couldn't it be argued that identity is strongly attached to the symbol? These pressing questions makes this topic fascinating to study because the issues of identity and ethnicity are two unified and important things that must be discussed from the perspective of modernity. *Batik* has become a trend for Indonesian society, especially when the government established *batik* as a national garment (Presidential Regulation No. 33 of 2009 informally known as National *Batik* Day, resulting from UNESCO designating *batik* as an Intangible Cultural Heritage item on October 2, 2009). Moreover, various *batik* modification pushes have been driven by designers to present a style that is still suitable for wearing *batik*. *Batik* has become a cultural symbol of Indonesian identity. Since its designation by UNESCO, *batik* has received world recognition and there has been growing reinvention and remodeling of *batik* (Moersid, 2013). *Batik* is not only a mass product, but its existence has become intertwined with Indonesian cultural identity (Trixie, 2020).

### **CELE IN THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF MALUKU**

*Cele* is the garment worn by women who live in Christian villages in Central Maluku and not worn by women who live in Islamic parts of the region. In addition, this traditional garment is not part of a fashion tradition in other areas in Maluku such as in Southeast Maluku and other areas. Rather than a trend, *cele* has become a uniform outfit in Maluku. The discourse about *cele* in the context of Moluccan culture is fascinating because the idea of *cele* as a Moluccan cultural jargon has penetrated the political space. *Cele*, through the Gubernatorial instruction and the Mayoral Decree, has been decreed as the must-wear outfit in schools, campus offices, etc. However, when *cele* is placed in the Moluccan cultural context, it has become an interesting debate. An informant, Y, had the following to say: "The identity consciousness through symbols is lost so that a movement is needed even though it is political in nature to revive the culture, including *cele*. People, including myself, like to follow suit and are always encouraged to wear *cele* but do not know the meaning of the big and small squares, because of the cultural value education process that does not work. This is different from *batik*. In the past, I did not know the meaning and significance of the symbols in *batik* so I did not consider the

moment. However, after having encountered other people (Javanese people) while studying in Yogya, I understood the symbols in *batik*.<sup>1</sup>

The informant's statement shows that *cele* does not have strong ideological roots, but combination of customs and religion have led to it being a collective dress code in Maluku. Hall (Hall, 2021) argues the definition of culture is "the lived practices or practical ideologies which enable a society, group or class to experiences define, interpret, and make sense of its condition of existence". In other words, culture is the implication of people's knowledge of the world through specific actions within a particular context in a specific locality. Thus, centering *cele* as a uniform in the Moluccan local context needs to bring up the philosophical and ideological values that underlie the cultural values of *cele* itself, so that it can be worn as an expression of local identity in the public space. This is because it does not have a philosophy and ideology as the implications of local knowledge that can be expressed through fashion. It does not appear to be ideological and philosophical in the context of *cele* culture. Informant A<sup>2</sup> reported the following: "The ideological process related to *cele* through cultural education does not work, so the significant philosophy of *cele* through the motifs of the big and small squares is unknown, so it seems that *cele* is not rooted in a strong tradition." The informant's statement emphasized that *cele* is not culturally strong as reported by another informant under the initial G that big and small squares are made in industry, therefore the cultural and philosophical dimension of *cele* is a phenomenon.<sup>3</sup>

The rejection of *cele* has strong cultural ground as reported by an informant under the initial F as follows;<sup>4</sup> "Placing *cele* as an icon in the Moluccan cultural arena is not yet final, because they are still looking for a form. In addition, *cele* has yet to be accepted by all Moluccan people who have an Islamic background, and in traditional rituals as well. Emphasis is on the context of customary rituals because that is where localism originates and through these media, we can find cultural traces. *Cele* which is forced to be accepted in the context of localism is a durable process of position and disposition, not yet final and continues to look for a form so that it can be accepted by all levels of society." The informant's account demonstrates in the context of indigenous places in Maluku, *cele* is something that belongs to "the other", not to traditional Islamic regions. Therefore, *cele* is not the identity of traditional Muslim areas. The informant's statement implies two things, namely the existence of an identity debate in which there is a process of coercing other elements to accept *cele* as a

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<sup>1</sup> Interview with Y, 20 January 2017

<sup>2</sup> Interview with A, 7 June 2017

<sup>3</sup> Interview with an informant under the initial G, 3 June 2017

<sup>4</sup> Interview with an informant under the initial F, 6 June 2017

shared culture. This contradicts the idea proposed by Hall, which asserted that identity is inherent and relational. This identity is built vis-à-vis between races, ethnic groups, and religions, so that no identity is built without a dialogical relationship with the others.

### **CELE POLICY: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RELIGIOUS IDENTITY**

*Cele* as a shared uniform or as a culture of uniformity through government instructions and the Ambon Mayoral Decree, in addition to being viewed as a form of symbolic violence, the *cele* policy discriminates against the Moluccan Muslim community and live in Islamic regions. This can be seen from the statement of informant F who reported the following: “Talking about the *cele* culture, multiple parts of this culture are not at a place where all Moluccan people can accept it, especially in regions with Muslim population. In traditional and religious rites in Islamic communities, people do not wear a *cele*, but a white *kebaya* for women and a white shirt for men. This indicates that culturally, *cele* is not accepted among the Moluccan Muslim indigenous community Because of that, discussing *cele* as a Moluccan cultural icon in terms of customs, religious traditions, and fashion has not penetrated the official regional culture, because *cele* is not rooted in cultural identity.<sup>5</sup> Informant F’s statement emphasizes that in customary and religious traditions in Islamic communities, *cele* is something foreign or belonging to “the other”. In addition, this statement shows a rejection of the *cele* policy which does not respect certain customary traditions and religion (Islamic communities) in Maluku. Therefore, making *cele* a collective outfit is detrimental to communities living in customary Muslim communities. As a result, this policy can be seen as a form of discrimination against customs and Islamic traditions in Maluku.

However, the reality is that *cele* has been used as a shared cultural icon and has penetrated the public sphere in Maluku, especially in provincial and city government agencies, schools, and private agencies. From Bourdieu’s perspective, the Gubernatorial and Mayoral decrees embody the symbolic power that is present to suppress the public. Bourdieu (2010, 652-653; 1993: 164) argues symbolic power is invisible power that can only be exercised with the involvement of people who do not realize that they are the target, or exercised themselves. Therefore, the language aspect presented verbally through the Gubernatorial Instruction and the written language are representations of power. The Gubernatorial Instruction and the Mayoral Decree as a representation of symbolic power, have unsuspectingly become a form of symbolic violence or cultural domination of society especially for

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<sup>5</sup> Interview with F, 6 June 2017

Islamic communities in Ambon City, as well as other Christian and Muslim communities in other areas in Maluku. Bourdieu (1993: 168) maintains that symbolic violence is a model of structural and social domination that takes place unconsciously in community life, including acts of discrimination against certain groups, races, ethnicities, and genders.

This phenomenon is a form of denial of the multicultural reality of Maluku, which in fact consists of various ethnic and religious identities which are full of various traditions. Farrely (2004: 43) argues that “multiculturalism is not about difference and identity, but about those that are embedded in and sustained by culture, that is a body of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of people understand themselves and the world and organize their individual and collective lives.” Farrely emphasizes that in a multicultural society, differences in identity are not an issue and/or something that must be debated. However, the concept of multiculturalism appears to provide an understanding that each different identity can understand and interpret cultural differences to live in a common space. In other words, multiculturalism emerges as a response to the fact of diversity in a society (Heywood, 2002: 119). The *cele* policy of the government is a denial of multicultural facts, or an act of unrecognition of the existence of religious identity (Islam) through the symbol of clothing. This is not realized by policy makers in Maluku. Therefore, the informants’ statements above also tend to be a form of rejection of government policies that do not consider aspects of the religious traditions of all religions which are also identities.

### **SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE PRACTICE THROUGH THE CELE POLICY**

Politically and through the means of power, *cele* penetrates public space and eventually *cele* is forced to be accepted as a culture of uniformity as their culture. This context is what Homi K. Bhaba in the Location of Culture (1994) calls hybridity, with the view that there are efforts to transform culture and identity carried out by the dominant culture represented by “*cele*” over other subordinate cultures. The impact of hybridity can be seen from *cele* penetrating the education arena, the offices of both public and government schools, as well as government and private offices. The government has made wearing *cele* obligatory, but the informants clearly state that they did not understand the philosophical values and the meaning of the *cele* motif. It seems that *cele* is forced to become a regional icon as demonstrated in an interview with a different respondent.<sup>6</sup> The *cele* movement in Maluku emerged as a response to instructions from the local government which I think is part of an effort to

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<sup>6</sup> Interview with Y, 6 February 2017

elevate *cele* from a minority position to become synonymous with *batik*. *Cele* is a “forgotten minority identity” and needs to be promoted. It is a representation of an ethnic group that continues to fight for position and recognition and so they can compete with other ethnic groups.

The earlier statement indicates that the informants see the discourse of *cele* as an identity that is now in a neglected minority position and thus the government instruction to wear *cele* is an attempt to elevate local culture in the representation of identity consciousness. From the poststructuralism approach, there are problems with representation through *cele*. The informant stated that the local government policy is an attempt to elevate *cele* from the minority to the majority by claiming *cele* to be typical of Moluccan culture. However, Maluku consists of many local areas each with own characteristics, which are not unilaterally represented by *cele*. Even as the informant said that *cele* is absurd when it comes to identity and symbols. The big and small squares in the *Cele* motif cannot be explained philosophically.

The informant’s statement about the *cele* policy, if viewed from the concept of nationalism, is an approach to building nationalism against the idea of localism or global versus local, the West versus the East, or national versus local. *Batik* has been a representation of the majority and thus a part of nationalism, while *cele* is a representation of a minority, based on localism. However, in the context of *cele* localism as a minority representation, it eventually has become a representation of Moluccan culture, and therefore the dominant narrative. This kind of practice was criticized by Robert Young (2001) in *Postcolonialism* for the use of Western ideas by contemporary thinkers such as Parterejee. Although they tried to develop a reverse culture through an independent concept of life (like of *swadesi*), they were still influenced by the Western socialist utopian thinker and the economic theory of John Ruskin. The term ‘minority’ attached to *cele* is a form of resistance to the dominant culture of *batik*. However, eventually it is trapped in the modern tradition or know in social theory as structuralism (Wacquant & Akçaoğlu, 2017).

The ‘*cele*’ policy cannot be accepted by other informants. Many interviewed claimed that forcing *cele* as Moluccan culture is a process of cultural domination.<sup>7</sup> This is the so-called representation resulting from the practice of symbolic literacy, the invisible power that engages people who do not want to know that they are the target, or that they themselves exercise power (Wacquant & Akçaoğlu, 2017). Most Moluccans do not realize that policies contain representational values or cultural domination that leads to hegemony or as Bourdieu said it is called a form of symbolic violence. The government

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<sup>7</sup>Interview with F, 6 June 2017

may not realize this either. Some Moluccans see the *cele* policy as legitimate because it is associated with a marginalized culture. Therefore, by using the term as a local cultural minority, the government wants to shift the structure and reality of *cele* to integrate with the habitus. This is what Bourdieu means by 'power' - arbitrarily determine the instruments of knowledge and the unconscious expression of social reality. It also means that symbolic power is the power to change and create a reality that must be legally recognized (Wacquant & Akçaoğlu, 2017). The government's effort to make regulations and policies regarding *cele* as a shared culture in Maluku is a form of cultural domination in the cultural context of Maluku. Culture in the local context is an important point in habitus, but this does not mean that the jargon of Moluccan localism should be represented by *cele*. Cultural position and disposition in social reality still exist, thus providing room for the creation of domination structures. By making *cele* a local culture, several questions then arise among the informants, what exactly is local culture? Which *cele* are we talking about? and what is the philosophy of *cele*?<sup>8</sup>

The philosophy of preservation is closely related to traditional values; therefore, tradition will always contain philosophical values that can be understood and explained by the community associated with that tradition. The problem is that Moluccan people who wear *cele* cannot explain the self-philosophy as reported by the informant by saying, "I don't really understand the philosophy of the small or the big squares of the *cele* motif at all, but because my parents wear it, I also wear it without understanding the meaning behind it."<sup>9</sup> This statement shows that Moluccan scholars who mostly have critical awareness of hidden cultural instruments do not know or understand the philosophical values of *cele* even though they wear it. This ignorance is the result of an unsuccessful cultural education process. This is explained by the following thought from an interviewee: "The ideological process regarding cultural education does not work, so that the philosophical value and meaning of the *cele* motif are not understood. Therefore, it seems that the Moluccans do not have tradition related to *cele*. Although *batik* still survives because tradition, crafts, and arts are part of the culture, *cele* is still limited to fashion."<sup>10</sup>

The earlier mentioned statement also provides legitimacy to the claim that *cele* does not have strong philosophical power, nor does it have cultural roots in the context of the Moluccan people. This was later confirmed by informant G (see above). Informant G also made the strong claim local culture and community are suggested and forced, but the Moluccans are not familiar with it and nor

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<sup>8</sup> Interview with S, 12 June 2017

<sup>9</sup> Interview with S, 12 June 2017

<sup>10</sup> Interview with A, 7 June 2017

do they understand it.<sup>11</sup> Informant F also emphasized that the problem of *cele* in the Moluccan localism is not only for people who wear it in Islamic areas, but also those in Christian areas themselves who do not understand it, so *cele* has yet to be formalized: “The city government’s struggle to place *cele* a Moluccan cultural icon has yet to be final; They are still looking for a form and this is important so that it can be accepted by all people, especially Muslim Moluccans, whether it is worn daily or only for rituals. *Cele* worn in the local context is a process of position and disposition that is durable, unfinished, and continues to seek form so that it can be accepted by all.<sup>12</sup>” The statement shows that *cele* is, in fact, something belonging to “the other”, and not Islam. Thus, *cele* is not the identity of the Islamic regions since the culture of these regions do not have *cele* for their rituals. So, for these people, it is something belonging to “the other”. There are two implications for it: first, there is a debate about identity where there is a process of coercing other elements that are forced to be accepted as common property. This contradicts Hall’s opinion (K. Hall & Nilep, 2015). The other implication of Hall’s statement is that *cele* worn as a Moluccan culture is the result of a mental process involving two communities in Maluku --- Muslims and Christians --- as a form of dialogical meeting. As such, there is a form of acceptance and recognition from both communities of the culture. However, this is not the case in Maluku’s cultural sphere, but in the political or power arena which has become an instrument of legitimacy. Thus, in Bourdieu’s terminology, *cele* policy is an instrument of symbolic representation and violence, where representation has caused discrimination, and symbolic violence has become an entry point to worsen conflict and relations. Representation has become stronger due to local government regulations and policies related to the wearing of *cele*, which unwittingly produces a symbolic form of violence against the Muslim communities in Maluku where *cele* is not accepted but they must wear in all their ritual activities. *Cele* is only accepted in Christian areas in Central Maluku, but other Christian areas in Maluku do not recognize *cele* as part of their culture as in the case of Islamic communities in the Moluccan context in general.

Policies are instruments for strengthening the representation process through the educational institutions and workplaces. Through strategic and coordinated actions, it is very easy for the authorities to suppress. This regulation is reinforced by the claim that ‘*cele*’ as a local culture is considered an absolute truth (what Bourdieu called *doxa*) (Zurmailis & Faruk, 2018). *Doxa* is a truth produced unilaterally supported by the interests of the authorities, and ultimately believed to be the same truth. Therefore, it is the people’s obligation

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<sup>11</sup> Interview with G, 3 June 2017

<sup>12</sup> Interview with F, 6 June 2017

to protect and defend it, even though culturally not everyone accepts it as part of their culture. Therefore, the policy regarding *cele* can be regarded as a form of symbolic power which arbitrarily determines the instruments of knowledge and the expression of social reality and is not recognized as valid or legitimate. Symbolic power is the power to shape the things that are given, to make people see and believe, and/or to strengthen or change the way they see and act toward the world. This is how domination and violence are forced so that there are parties that benefit from it while others are opposed to it.

The term '*cele*', well known in the Moluccan context, has transcended mental processes in the form of stories and experiences to be easily accepted as part of the habitus. Habitus is a system of disposition that produces a lifestyle and practice that is in line with the experience and internalization of the agent's processes when interacting with other agents or the objective structures of their environment. The new habitus that develops as a way of introducing a local identity such as *cele* is seen as a culture of uniformity, and eventually people accept it as part of their culture. This context is what Homi K. Bhabha, in his book "Cultural Locations" (Studies et al., 2016), called hybridity with the assumption that there is an attempt to change the culture or identity by the dominant culture represented by *cele*. This hybridity process can also penetrate the educational arena (Ghasemi et al., 2017) and that is the case where every level school from elementary to high school requires students to wear *celes* of pre-determined colors at least once a week. Likewise, in government offices, all employees must wear *cele* on certain days of the week. However, in the cultural arena, there seems to be a resistance to this behavior because society is not equipped with knowledge of the philosophical values of *ceel*. In other words, *cele* is not rooted in culture and society cannot explain it, as stated by the informant under the initial A<sup>13</sup>: "Cultural education doesn't work very well. Education influences the process of cultural ideology. There is no local content in schools that provides space and a portion for local cultural issues. As far as I can remember, local content only talks about food, namely *sago*. Therefore, people know *cele* only through oral tradition, but formally in written form it is not available." The informants viewed schools as an arena for cultural battles but failed in making them a social capacity to be used as content in formal cultural education for the Moluccan generation, rendering the community unable to understand what *cele* is and what philosophy it contains. The informants understand the dominance of the *sago* narrative because local content in schools is always related to this traditional food. This is not the case with *cele*, so in the local context, *cele* is a minority narrative.

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<sup>13</sup> Interview with A, 7 June 2017.

### **BATIK IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF MOLUCCAN SCHOLARS IN JAVA**

*Batik* is a Javanese culture that is full of ideology and philosophy behind every motive and is very easy to understand by other people who are not of Javanese ethnicity. This can be seen from the following interviewee: "I am a Moluccan who studies in Java. At first, I didn't know the meaning behind each *Batik* motif, but as time went on, I could finally understand the meaning behind each *batik* motif so that when I used it, I was able to choose which one fits the context. For example, a *batik* shirt with a flower motif or arrow should be used at what time."<sup>14</sup> This statement shows that *Batik* has succeeded in attracting the attention of non-Javanese people, and the philosophy behind the motif is now well-known. This also shows there is an educational process that has been passed down from generation to generation, so that the identity consciousness through *batik* is realized. This is what Eagleton (2000: 14) meant regarding culture as an implication of knowledge. Based on Berger's theory of the identity construction process, informant Y's statement shows the internalization process in the wearing of *batik*. Berger and Luckman (Dharma, 2018) argue that human internalization of reality changes it from the structure of the objective world into the structure of subjective consciousness. This shows that the statement of the informant in seeing the *batik* is a form of value transformation because of the "dialectification" process that occurs, from externalization and objectification before finally coming to internalization.

Social order begins with the continuous external vanity in humans to the world, both in physical and mental activities. Society as an objective reality implies institutionalization. The process of the correctional institution starts externally, carried out repeatedly so the patterns are seen and understood together, eventually resulting in habituation. The habituation that has taken place eventually led to disposition and tradition (Sulaiman, 2016). The dialectical process through external agents and experienced objectification will eventually enter the internalization process. This then results in an understanding of the meaning of the *batik* in the informant's position, not as part of the society and culture in which *batik* is produced. This dialectical process makes informants understand the values and meanings of various *batik* motifs.

In addition, *batik* also has advantages in terms of fashion because it is very easy to adjust to the context.<sup>15</sup> This informant's statement emphasized that *batik* is one of the items which has a high selling value in the market due to fashion. From the two statements above, it is emphasized that *batik* has dominance

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<sup>14</sup> Interview with Y, 20 January 2017.

<sup>15</sup> Interview with F. 6 June 2017

through social and economic capacity, and it eventually strengthens *batik* culturally. This is what the *cele* culture lacks in the local Moluccan context. People wear it routinely once a week, not for cultural reasons, but due to the Gubernatorial instruction and the Mayoral Decree as a means of legitimacy.

### **CELE AND BATIK AS MEANS OF NEGOTIATION FOR LOCAL IDENTITIES TO BECOME NATIONAL**

A society that is formed into a nation state is always attached to its name, an identity which is no longer particular but collective in nature. This collective identity bond is formed from various localities, unified and are bonded by a term that is often called nationalism. Both localism and nationalism are important for an individual as well as a collective bond, because they are related to identity as illustrated by the following interview result: “Nationalism for me is the border or fence of Indonesian territory, which is the result of construction, so there are similarities. Therefore, for myself *batik* has become part of my national identity, so I am free to wear it in any context and space and time at any time.”<sup>16</sup> The result of the interview above illustrates that even though nationalism is a constructed process, the result is a pillar of guarding a common identity as a national community. It is clear from the above statement that the informant shows the symbol of nationalism through *Batik* in which acceptance is made through a mutual consensus. There is a dimension of flexibility the informants show as an expression of dual identity between localism and nationalism, where awareness as part of the Moluccan localism remains visible, but nationalism as an Indonesian is also manifested. Therefore, the wearing of *batik* has become part of the informant’s identity in the context of Indonesian nationalism.

The same thing was also explained by informant R who stated: “*Batik* and *Cele* have the same portion that describes identity. However, *cele* has only become a local identity, on the other hand, local *batik* has become a national identity. So that *batik* does not have to be claimed as a Javanese identity but a national identity which means there is a shared belonging.”<sup>17</sup> The statement above shows consciousness of the informant as a Moluccan offspring who on one hand understands the position of *batik* and *cele* as a representation of identity, while acknowledging they both have different portions. In Bourdieu’s perspective, it is called the limitation of the arena. Applying this framework, using the cultural arena lens to see *cele* illustrates that it is weak. The battle arena for *cele* culture is only limited to the Moluccan localism. On the other hand, *batik* is

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<sup>16</sup> Interview with F, 6 June 2017.

<sup>17</sup> Interview with R, 15 May 2017

more widespread because of the cultural struggle on the national/Indonesian scale. In other words, the informant realizes that *cele* has a weak position in negotiations to become a national identity, as illustrated by the following arguments: “However, I must be honest that *batik* has greatly benefited from a policy perspective in addition to being populist because it is a joint movement that is also claimed by the state. Here there are political interests at play due to *batik* being deliberately claimed by other countries. Therefore, the *batik* policy is an attempt to claim the Indonesian *batik*.”<sup>18</sup> The informant firmly emphasized politics is a powerful means of negotiation which, in the end, gives an advantage to the position of *batik* as a representation and national cultural jargon. This was also confirmed by informant F who noted the national political process through the government policy that established *Batik* as a national culture in addition to the award from UNESCO placing “*Batik*” as a national identity is stronger than *cele*. The weakness of *cele* in the process of negotiating a local identity to become national results from by several crucial things. One of the weaknesses of *cele* is the inability of the people who wear *cele* to explain the dimensions of the cultural philosophy contained the clothing, and not all the regions where *cele* originates can accept it. Therefore, in the Moluccan localism itself, *cele* is an ongoing debate because not all Moluccan indigenous peoples accept *cele* both in the context of customary practices such as traditional ceremonies, and in fact as a daily habit of the Moluccans, *cele* is not familiar.<sup>19</sup>

In other words, the position of *cele* in the context of negotiation at the local level is weak from a cultural perspective even though it is politically strong, especially when placing “*cele*” in the context of national negotiation. The interview illustrates despite the construction process, nationalism may be a pillar of guarding same identities as the nation’s community. The informants clearly show a symbol of nationalism through *batik*, whose acceptance is through consensus. There is a dimension of flexibility the informants show as an expression of multiple identities, between localism and nationalism. Consciousness of being part of Maluku is still present, but nationalism as an Indonesian also exists. *Batik* represents the informant’s identity in the Indonesian context. The same was stated by informant R as follows: “*Batik* and *cele* represent identity. *Cele* is a local identity while local *batik* has become a national identity. *Batik* cannot be claimed as a Javanese identity but a state identity. This is a shared property.”<sup>20</sup> The statement shows the informant’s consciousness as a Moluccan who understands the position of *batik* and *cele*

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<sup>18</sup> Interview with Y, 20 January 2017

<sup>19</sup> Interview with F, 6 June 2017

<sup>20</sup> Interview with Y, 20 January 2017

as part of his identity, but also that they are different. According to Bourdieu, there is a boundary to the arena.

The battle arena for the *cele* culture is limited to the Moluccan context, while *batik* has a wider scope. In other words, *cele* is in a comparatively weaker position to negotiate to become a national identity, as stated by the informant in the following: “Frankly speaking, *batik* has a better position due to national policies. It is a joint movement supported by the government and the state. There are political interests since *batik* is claimed by other countries, so the policy related to *batik* is an attempt to reclaim *batik* as the original property of Indonesia.”<sup>21</sup> The informant stated that politics is a powerful way of negotiating which ultimately gives *batik* an advantage in its position as a national representation and cultural jargon. Informants A and S also stated that the national political process through government policies declared *batik* as the national culture. Moreover, recognition from UNESCO has further placed *batik* as a national identity over *cele*.

#### **THE POSITION OF BATIK AND CELE IN THE CONTEXT OF INDONESIANNES**

Every society has an identity, both particular and collective, as well as local and national. Every identity, both local and national, appears with its own jargon in various styles and forms. Indonesia is defined by the socio-cultural context of society consisting of various ethnic groups, tribes, and sub-tribes, making the condition of Indonesian localism unique. This uniqueness is closely related to various cultures with jargon, which on the one hand displays wealth as a marker of the identity of each group. But on the other hand, the question stands, will each local identity continue to live and develop when faced with the universal culture of a nation (Indonesia), or will it sink into the rhythm and superiority of universal culture that exceeds the national jargon? This issue is related to the culture of *cele* and *batik*, both of which are claimed to be rooted in local identities (*batik* = Javanese and *cele* = Moluccan). But can both survive in a broader context? Or can they be used as a jargon for national identity? The discussion of *Batik* and *cele* as national and local representations is important here.

Presenting *Batik* and *Cele* in the stage of Indonesian national culture or presenting both as a national cultural jargon from the perspective of Moluccan scholars who have studied in Java and Ambon at the graduate and post-graduate levels has introduced various arguments. One of the arguments

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<sup>21</sup> Interview with A, 7 June 2017

stated:<sup>22</sup> “For the informants it can be affirmed that placing *cele* and *batik* in the context of Indonesian nationalism, both have the same and balanced position in the sense that speaking of identity, as a Moluccan offspring, I would *cele*, in Java I would wear *batik*. It is also my appreciation of diversity. Expressing identity requires strategy and negotiation, for example, when I know the context, when to wear *cele*, and when to wear *batik*. By wearing *batik* or *cele*, both of them define who I am.” From this argument, the way the informant understands the issue of identity represented through *batik* and *cele* is very flexible. *Cele* remains part of a national cultural jargon, though the arena is for Maluku. Similarly, a national cultural jargon *batik*'s arena is Java. On the other hand, the *batik* from the perspective of the informant shows the value of cultural recognition in which there is respect for other cultures as an expression of multicultural reality. (Svetelj, 2013). However, to the informant, wearing *cele* represents a consciousness of identity that is directly related to the state of being a Moluccan. The consciousness of collective identity appears through the symbols of *cele* and *batik*, which for the informant are both means of representing a national identity. The informant's statement shows a process of identity construction, both ethnic (Moluccan) which is attached to the characteristics of *cele* (personal reasons) and *batik* that is attached to the community as an expression of a sense of community and a sense of belonging. This is somewhat in contrast to the opinion of Liliweri (2007), that explains that ethnic groups are defined by same cultural characteristics, i.e., language, customs, cultural behavior, cultural, and historical characteristics. According to him, ethnicity refers to classification and is based on affiliation. If *batik* and *cele* are placed as culture, both are representations of certain ethnic groups which are rooted in aspects of language, customs, and cultural behavior.

The same thing that is expressed by Giddens in (Itulua-Abumere, 2013) who argued that ethnicity refers to *cultural practice and outlooks that distinguish a given community of people*. Giddens explained that members of an ethnic group see themselves as culturally different from other social groups. In addition, he also said that Many different characteristics may serve to distinguish ethnic groups from one another, but the most usual are language, history, or ancestry (real or imagined) religion, and style of dress or adornment. In line with Giddens' thought, Zhang (2019) argued that ethnicity refers to cultural practices and views that distinguish a given community from the others. He explained that members of an ethnic group see themselves as culturally different from other groups. Moreover, many different characteristics can serve to differentiate ethnic groups from one another, but the most common are language, history or ancestry, religion, and style of dress/ adornment.

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22 Interview with Y, 20 January 2017

Between Maluku and Java or *cele* and *batik*, both have different characteristics, and both are means of representation of their respective groups even though in the end *batik* has become a national cultural representation supported by philosophical power that can be properly explained. However, for certain ethnic groups it is understood as cultural domination and hegemony. Like the effort to construct *cele* as part of the Moluccan localism, what has also emerged is cultural representation and domination due to the penetration of the government through the “*cele*” policy which is coercive for the whole society regardless of the diversity aspects that exist. In other words, *cele* in principle does not represent the entire ethnic groups and religions in Maluku, including history, culture, and tradition.

The results of the discussion related to the research on localism versus nationalism among Moluccan scholars who studied in Java show that they have different cultural knowledge and insights about *cele* and *batik*. Different reasons also emerge which state the choice of *batik* and *cele* as a means of bodily expression. In general, wearing *batik* is an option rather than *cele*, for various reasons. The research findings indicate that one of the fundamental reasons is related to the cultural aspect in which *cele* is phenomenal in the Muslim and Christian communities of Maluku. *Cele* is more familiar with Christian locus, although culturally and philosophically they are unable to explain the presence of *cele* in their cultural context. Benedict Anderson writes about this theory, suggesting that this fact can be called false consciousness due to wearing *cele* without understanding its philosophy.

## CONCLUSION

Contestation between local and foreign cultural values can occur in a short period of time between people as interconnectedness has never been prevalent in this area. Dialectics between the *Batik* and the Moluccans, for example, has resulted in new cultural consciousness leading to the *batik* becoming familiar to them. On the other hand, *cele*, which is considered a local culture, has yet to be a habitus for the Moluccans. Therefore, efforts to maintain local tradition of “*cele*” are made through the policy of the “*cele* movement” which has unconsciously perpetuated colonial culture with the tradition of the “*cele*” symbol that represents other cultural entities. Deterministic policies have also influenced the Moluccan people, including Moluccan scholars, regarding *cele* which is worn once a week during their time away from home. They wear *cele* due to instruction not a habitus. Therefore, this movement has resulted in a form of false consciousness. The context of the Moluccan people as a multicultural society, both in terms of religion, culture, language and *adat*

(customary practices), is a necessity. This is an inevitable socio-cultural fact and is not the result of construction. On the other hand, placing *cele* in the context of the Moluccan universality and forcing it to become a shared culture is the result of identity construction born through government intervention and penetration through the use power as a tool. Campus communities, schools, and offices become arenas for identity construction due to penetration and intervention by power. The impact of this policy is that the wearing of *cele* garment is not due to cultural consciousness but pressure from the authorities through policies. Therefore, making *cele* an identity construction tool does not give birth to the consciousness of cultural identity of the Moluccan people whose characteristics are heterogenous.

Particularly in the cultural context, *cele* is not familiar to Muslim communities on the islands of Maluku. The Muslim and Christians Maluccans who come from the Southeast, Buru Island, or outside the Central Moluccan region do not recognize the *cele* culture, regarding it as the identity of “the other”. Therefore, the *cele* movement which in terms of politics and power can penetrate schools and offices is seen as a means of cultural representation, which is at the same time a form of symbolic violence that is domination and hegemony both culturally and religiously. It can be understood that culture is not only limited to performance, but also rooted in ideology and containing philosophy. This is not found in the *cele* tradition in Maluku. People wear it but do not understand its ideological and philosophical values. Therefore, cultural education must be created as a conscious effort in the community for interpreting identity. Learning from the *batik* for the Javanese people, there is a political element to make *batik* a representation of Indonesian nationalism. However, on the other hand, the cultural education process about *batik* is running well, so that the philosophical values of the *batik* can be identified not only by Javanese people where *batik* originates, but also by those from other communities who wear it. Cultural education emphasizes the ideological aspects behind culture so that the philosophical dimensions of that culture can be learned and explained.

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