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THE INVOLVEMENT AND RESISTANCE OF ISLAMIC DEFENSE ACTION (ABI) AT ISLAMIC STUDENT ORGANIZATION IN PONTIANAK CITY

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HIGHLIGHT

- The emergence of ABI action movement in Jakarta and in various regions has led to various main opinions. First, conservative groups have experienced improvement and strengthening in Indonesia. Second, it is not the strengthening of conservative groups but better organization

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ABSTRACT

The phenomena of Islamic Defence Action (ABI) has been raising two argumentations: Firstly, the strengthening of religious conservatism. Secondly, ABI is better organized by conservative group and Muslim middle class such as Muslim student activist. One of the agenda is propagating ABI's ideas at various regions in Indonesia which used to campaign a slogan "It's time for Muslims resurgence", such as in Solo, Aceh, Medan, Yogyakarta, Palembang and other areas. This article argues that ABI at Islamic student activists becomes plasticity as a religious discourse but instability as a common identity to shape a new Islamic social movement agenda in Pontianak. This research focuses on how to understand the forms of engagement and resistance to ABI in context of strengthening pluralism and religious tolerance in Pontianak.

Keyword : *Resistance, Engagement, Islamic Activism, and Islamic Populism*

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A. INTRODUCTION

Various arguments explain the phenomenon of the Islamic Defense Action (ABI) that occurred in Jakarta throughout 2016. Ian Wilson (2017: 39-42) for example highlighted the success of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) organization in moving the ABI due to two things: (1) the government's uncertainty faced an Islamic backlash. (2) the interest of the political elite in the struggle for governor and deputy governor in DKI Jakarta regional election. While at the same time, the governor Basuki Tjahya "Ahok" Purnama carried out many evictions which further caused Jakarta's public disappointment and anger, especially the lower middle class. A different opinion was expressed by Marcus Mietzner (2017) who argued that the success of the ABI movement was caused by mobilization that used religious sentiment when conservative Muslim group felt ostracized by the current government. Another argument is explained by Vedi Hadiz (<http://www.newmandala.org/indonesia-illiberal/>) who argues that the success of Islamic defense action is caused by evolution and the mechanism of conflict that is wider than the interest of the political oligarchic elite.

I will not take part in the polemic about the causes of the success of the ABI movement, but I will focus on the typical acceptance and resistance of university Islamic activists as an impact of the ABI movement that has expanded in various regions through the spirit of Islamic Defensive Action. Some of the actions of the ABI got a lot of support from young campus Islamic activists. Such support seems to be the legitimacy that the ABI is a rational movement is supported by educated Muslim middle class. But the support of the campus Islamic activists has not received in-depth explanation regarding its influence on the perspective and relation in the life of organizational activities. If the ABI has the support of campus Muslim activists, the response to its movement has led to diverse polarization of support. Furthermore, in West Kalimantan, there is a slice that is difficult to separate between the support of campus activists and ethnic organizations and the potential of the ABI's own idea that get reinterpretation in the context of West Kalimantan which is prone to conflict.

On Thursday 12 January 2017, K.H. Tengku Zulkarnain - the deputy secretary general of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) - was going to Sintang, West Kalimantan by used Garuda plane to deliver religious talks at the An-Nur Mosque under the invitation of Regent Sintang Jarot Winarno. However, Zulkarnain was unable to get out of the plane because it was blocked by a group of people on behalf of the Dayak Youth Forum (FPD). FPD entered the runaway area while brandishing Mandau under the ladder of the plane carrying Zulkarnain.

Finally, Zulkarnain decided to return to the Pontianak city with the same plane. Even so, on the following day, on Friday 13 January 2017, Zulkarnain and his entourage managed to land again at Susilo Airport, Sintang Regency without incident like the previous day.

The resistance incident was due to a series of massive movement of Islamic defense movement in Jakarta in which Zulkarnain was actively involved. It is undeniable that Zulkarnain became one of the key figure - in addition to Habib Rizieq Shihab, Zaitun Rasmin and Bachtiar Nasir - the activists of the organization of the National Movement of Fatwa Guards Majelis Ulama Indonesia (GNPF-MUI) which became a symbol of ABI aspiration. This organization was formed in October 2016, shortly after MUI issued religious opinion on 11 October 2017 about the alleged blasphemy carried out by Ahok. GNPF-MUI is a combination of various religious organizations such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Islamic Community Forum (FUI), Parmusi, the Indonesian Intellectual and Young Ulama Council (MIUMI), Wahdah Islamiyah and Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). These groups are very active in organizing street protests with various issues, such as arresting and imprisoning Ahok, "save *ulama*" or "save Alquran". The protest was like a series of telenovela that used a combination of symbols between dates and months and often chose Friday as the performance day. Even though Islam defense Action which was driven by the GNPF-MUI was an association of various religious organizations, the dominance figures are Habib Rizieq Shihab from FPI and Tengku Zulkarnain from MUI. They were more dominated both as an orator in the street and playing an active role on social media.

The resistance to ABI figures also occurred in several other regions. For example, the refusal on 11 April 2017 was driven by the Surabaya Activist Solidarity (SAS) on the arrival of Habib Rizieq who was going to do a grand tabligh at the Ampel Mosque, Surabaya. The same resistance took place on 26 January 2017, which was initiated by the Forum for Religious Harmony and Diversity (FKUBK) at the al-Falah mosque, Surabaya. One of the reasons for this resistance was both Habib Rizieq and Tengku Zulkarnain were symbols of the split in harmony and the destruction of religious tolerance in Indonesia.

The same resistance event occurred for Sobri Lubis - General Chairman of the Islamic Defenders Front - on 5 May 2017 who failed to land at Soepadio Airport, Pontianak due to pressure from the indigenous Dayak society. The aftermath of the incident was on 20 May 2017, a protest known as the Action of Bela Ulama (ABU) 205 was happened, the second Muslim largest action after the 212 action in Jakarta. This ABU was initiated by a Malay ethnic

organization called the Association of Malay (POM). The crowd walked from the Mujahidin Mosque to the West Kalimantan Mapolda. The majority of the participants carried black and white flags with the Tauhid words written similar to the flag of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, as well as several Malay royal symbol in Pontianak. During the trip, participants shouted the prayer and takbir and occasionally shouted the sentence of arrest and killed Cornelis, the governor of West Kalimantan at that time.

This study tries to explain the involvement and resistance of the ABI by identifying problems; First, how does the association of ABI influence the plasticity of religious discourse in activist of Islamic student religious organization in Pontianak? Second, why is involvement and resistance unstable (instability) into a shared identity in forming a new agenda for the Islamic social movement?

Meanwhile, this study used a combination of resistance theory framework popularized by James C. Scott (1990: x-xiii) and the theory of involvement initiated by Ian S. Markham (2003: 48). Referring to Scott's categorization that there are two forms of resistance; open (public transcript) and closed (hidden transcript). Furthermore, the resistance theory framework in this study has undergone modification and adjustment by considering aspects of engagement. Ian S. Markham wrote in his book "A Theology of Engagement" citing three elements of involvement; namely assimilation, resistance and overhearing. If Markham includes resistance as part of the pattern of involvement, I include involvement element in the resistance pattern.

After the Soeharto regime collapsed, the strength of Islamic groups increasingly strengthened, especially with the support from conservative groups in the name of religion. This is what Martin van Bruinessen (2014) calls the return of the power of religious conservatism. However, there are not a few who doubt the argument. Marcus Mieznier, for example, argues that from 2010 to 2016 religious conservatism in the form of intolerance actually showed a decline. For Marcus, when referring to the result of the Jakarta election on 19 April 2017, it shows that conservatism Muslim groups are far better at organizing, funding and political network than before and not escalating violence.. I think ABI is an expression of the growing strength of Islamic orthodoxy among campus Muslim activists in responding to global change and the context of local dynamic. This study sought to contribute to the study about that context.

There are several writings about the phenomenon of Islamic Defense Action. Among other, Greg Fealy's writing entitled "Bigger than Ahok: Explaining the 2 December Mass Rally".. Fealy revised the argument stating that the ABI - especially the 212 action - indicated the victory of hardline Islamic group while simultaneously increasing the strength of religious conservatism in Indonesia. On the contrary, according to Fealy, the issues raised were more oriented to elite interest and marginalized the role of leaders of mainstream religious organizations such as Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.

Even so, it needs to be a serious concern that the success of the ABI in mobilizing Muslim communities is at least a separate challenge regarding the future of religious freedom and political freedom in Indonesia. As Hew Wai Weng argues, ABI has become a topic of discussion especially for progressive Muslim groups in Indonesia who have been spreading inclusive Islam while social injustice and economic disparity appeared. Progressive Muslim groups must struggle to take this role from the control of hardline Islamic groups that will influence the religious attitude of Muslims in Indonesia in the discourse of diversity and inclusive Islam.

The most recent article that specifically reviews ABI is the December 2016 edition of the Al-Maarif Journal entitled "After the Defendation of Islam: Islamic Social Movement, Democratization and Social Justice". This journal questions whether the ABI that happened "suddenly" has changed the map of the face of Indonesian Islam. Furthermore, different perspectives are displayed in the Islamic martial art book published in 2017. For example Anto Sangadji, Eko Prasetyo, Iqra Anugrah and Fathimah Fildzah Izzati explained that mass actions on 4 November 2016 or "411" was racist nuances precisely explaining the relevance with capitalism. (Anton Sangadji, 2017: 6). According to those experts, the action shows that the reality of political Islam in post-reform Indonesia is still dominated by sectarianism by nullifying the class perspective in its movement and discourse. I rather doubt the use of large narratives like this because they tend to rely on a conspirative approach.

The form of this study is a case study with analytic descriptive characteristic. (Earl Babbie, 2011: 329). This study used an anthropological and political approach with a qualitative paradigm. (Norman K. Denzim and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 1994: 109). Data collection is obtained through in-depth interview and observation, while the determination of informants is done purposively, namely by determining individuals who meet the criteria and are considered relevant to answer the problem. (John W. Creswell, 1994: 5-7).

Interviews were carried out on Islamic student activists from the *Da'wah* Campus Institute (LDK) such as As-Salam and As-Syajarah as well as activists from Islamic Student Extra Organization such as HMI, PMII and KAMMI.

The main argument of this article is that ABI among Islamic student activists has become plasticity as a socio-religious discourse but has become unstable (instability) as a shared identity to form a new agenda of the new Islamic social movement in Pontianak City. The focus of this research is how to form the involvement and resistance of ABI in the context of strengthening religious pluralism and tolerance in Pontianak City.

In general, the systematic discussion of this article will describe; ABI, nationalism and religious filter, and ABI: from the symbol of unity to identity politic. Through the sub-discussion will be able to understand the resistance and involvement of ABI among Islamic student activists in the Pontianak city.

B. ABI, Nationalism and Religious Filter

Various flyers circulating on social media, one of ABI's slogans is maintaining the integrity of NKRI. The slogan was to prove to the public that the ABI's agenda was within the framework of the spirit of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). The question is, is that right? Is the national slogan able to attract the involvement of Islamic student activist in Pontianak City?

Musholli (22) - General Leader of Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PMII) from West Kalimantan branch - one of the activists who responded pessimistically to the truth of ABI slogan. According to Musholli, ABI actually shows a movement with narrow vision with the potential that can cause split of sovereignty. There is a doubt from Musholli on the specific agenda of ABI, especially the ABU 205 movement. Musholli as general chairman of PMII joined the Cipayung Plus group of Pontianak City except HMI and KAMMI made a peace declaration in response to ABI movement and its derivatives which appealed: 1) avoiding horizontal conflict, 2) maintaining the stability of social life, and 3) strengthening Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). Does the content of the declaration describe strengthening support for ABI agenda in the form of affirmative action, or resistance?

I think that the emergence of the statement that proposes these three requirements is an indication that ABI is not fully in the spirit of the NKRI framework. Musholli's statement is

an effort to form a community defense system (community defense) in the notion of semi-open resistance action. (Brian Martin, 1993: 4-5). The form is to confront the discourse of nationalism in the face of the support of religious sentiments. For example, Musholli strikes between ABI slogan and the concept of *ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamaah* as a basis for thinking and acting in the context of social life to the level of life of the nation and state. Musholli continued to assert that the NKRI was more important than the defense of ABI agenda.

Even so, the response shown by Musholli is not an organizationally strange attitude. From the beginning, PMII did not support the ABI movement and its derivatives. The same personal and organizational attitude also happened to NU as the "parent organization" of PMII. Both Musholli and others stated that they would not issue an order from an organization that provided support for ABI. If there are members who participate, then it is a private part as a respect for freedom of expression and opinion. Only the next question is whether the response to ABI represents the same attitude as the other ABI agenda? Then, I understand that since the beginning Musholli has provided conditional restriction as a form of semi-open resistance, in particular it must reflect the ideology of Aswaja. I call it conditional religious nationalism. Musholli stressed that the strengthening of Islamic solidarity should be on an Indonesian platform characterized by a spiritual spirit. Quoting his statement:

"If I personally name PMII, I am proud of if we boast that we should be Islam of Indonesian Islam, Christianity of Indonesian Christianity, Catholicism of Indonesian Catholicism and Buddhism of Indonesian Buddhism. Because Indonesian Islam birth in Indonesia and indeed we are Muslim of Indonesia Islam, so it should also be related to that ideology. On the other hand, we are also Islamic students, there is also the ideology of connecting to Indonesia. I am sorry, if we are Arabic Islam, it is natural to establish a khilafah because there is indeed already Islam. Here Islam is Indonesian Islam. And don't forget the NKRI is also important. We may have a different direction, we may have a different religion, maybe we have a different school but we have to share for the sovereignty of NKRI. PMII sees it that way".

Recently, especially since President Jokowi administration, the issue of SARA and religious sentiments has become a popular tool for legitimizing political, economic and social practices. The resonance of his movement has spread to various regions in Indonesia.

A variety of mutually contradictory interest utilize these sentiments for practical political interest. This is called as political populism. (Vedi R. Hadiz, 2016: 33). Political elite who use religious teaching as an engineering to shape people's perception of a particular political goal. (Jan-Werner Müller, 2016: 16). One of them utilize religious term to bring down people with different political view such as labeling infidels, apostates and so on. In fact, it is not uncommon for SARA and religious sentiments to create anarchic and destructive individual and social actions. This fact is a perception that is difficult to refute for some groups of society so that it becomes an excuse for resistance to ABI.

The same thing was expressed by Fachri Albar (20), a young activist from PMII organization and Anshor who argued that ABI had an impact on harmony between ethnic group and religion in the increasingly tenuous in Pontianak city. Fachri concerns for ABI led to his belief that ABI was not a religious activity but a diversified politic. He said:

"It means that I join it not only by the encouragement of Islam. Because I understand that we still cannot make sure that it is the real action or somewhat political movement".

Religious or emotional sentiments give birth to a sense of bondage, the devotion to love for the Muslim community. one of the goals of ABI and other derivative movements is as a continuous effort to awaken and maintain the social sentiment in order to remain bound and awake such as trying to cultify certain figures in the name of scholars or *ulama* to make ABI as a symbol of the history of the resurrection of Muslim. Although these efforts have not shown any result. Another effort was to make the issue of Muslim leadership by rejecting infidels. Some verses from the Qur'an and Hadith are interpreted in the framework of the spirit to create negative sentiment that non-Muslim leader cannot be chosen by Muslim.

Yasin (22) - the general head of HMI from West Kalimantan Branch- argues that under the current socio-religious conditions of Muslim, the emphasis is more on the aspects of Shari'a and heretic, especially on campuses and mosques. Yasin highlighted the impact of ABI with fears of increasing claims of bid'ah, khurafat and kafir. This condition has implication for the emergence of friction and division in community. Even though the polemic is not something strange of the history of Muslim in Indonesia. For me, Yasin's perception generally illustrates the support for the importance of contextualizing the reinterpretation of religious teachings in today's life. Referring to the popular language is the spirit of renewal of

thought in Islam. This attitude later became a religious filter to determine the extent of the acceptance of the presence of a new religious movement.

The unavoidable thing is the presence of religious filter that formed from the results of social contact and adjust to the various changes that are taking place. The religious filter serves to explain the presence of every new idea and the interest of populist political pragmatism. Yasin argued that there was a potential disruption to the traditional order that had been applied if the ABI was adopted as part of a new tradition. The novelty does not only mean techniques that can maintain tradition, but must offer a better perspective. In accordance with the rule "*al-muhafazah 'ala al-qadimi al-shalih wa al-akhzu bi al-jadid al-aslah*" (Maintaining good tradition and taking better change).

Can ABI be called the new Shari'a political movement or is it an ordinary political movement dominated by non-mainstream Islamic groups? It is still unclear. Yasin tries to illustrate the dilemma position with the possibility of the emergence of a new pattern of social movement. For example, the relationship between the Kraton Kadariya of the Sultanate of Pontianak which collaborated with FPI in some support for Islamic defense action. The palace is Malay traditional institution while on the other hand, FPI is an organization of socio-religious propaganda. This collaboration then found a point of contact between the palace's efforts to maintain the existence of its religious legitimacy, while FPI needed the support of cultural legitimacy. Both met in the spirit of fighting for "Malay spirit".

Yasin's guess is in my opinion very reasonable. As mentioned earlier in the discussion that the importance of considering the involvement of Malay ethnic group of ABI movement in Pontianak. Therefore, there are four institutional elements that can be met in ABI forum, namely; ethnic elements of Malay, elements of the palace, FPI and Hizbut Tahrir. The four elements play a very important role in creating the impression of new expectation of Muslim towards ABI. So far, all the elements need each other and support each other, but the Malay element is stronger.

The initial evidence was very easily seen when the ABU 205 action took place. The Sultan of Pontianak was fully involved in using Malay royal symbol. The Sultan, even with confidence, went along with the action group as a manifestation of his seriousness in supporting ABU 205 action. Although the action was without FPI symbol, FPI's involvement was represented by the FPI figures individually but not formally organizational symbol.

It is precisely the symbol similar to HTI flag that dominates during the activity. It shows that there is a symbiotic relationship between the four elements. FPI symbol was not presented to simply explain to Muslims in Pontianak City that ABI was not in the interest of FPI but the interest of Muslims supported by Malay ethnic.

According to Yasin, there were significant differences between the themes in ABI 212 in Jakarta and ABU 205 in Pontianak. If the first theme is the defense of the Qur'an with "save the Quran" slogan while the last is the theme of the defense of the cleric with "save ulama" slogan. So the defense of both actions is also different. According to Yasin, ABU 205 is more directed towards hatred, blasphemy against Cornelis or Ahok and so on. Yasin did not order his members to be directly involved. Even though there are those who are still be involved, he warns not to use organizational symbol. According to Yasin, there are different contexts in understanding those movements.

"If 411 is because Qur'an is abused means that something very important was happened. It is the position for us if there is a clue. Whether you want to read or not, want to be obeyed or not, these are God's words written. The Quran was abused and yesterday's action is considered a defense. Just think that the action is good and peaceful. Unlike the *ulama's* ideas, the cleric was supposed to be wrong because they are still being truly human. But the Qur'an must be correct. So we have to look the context again".

In my opinion, this statement implies the existence of a nationalism and religious filter that was previously mentioned, namely distinguishing between the Qur'an and the *Ulama*. Although in Islamic tradition, cleric or *ulama* has a great contribution in understanding the Qur'an, as contained in the commentaries. According to Yasin, ABU 205 action is not entirely a representation of the *ulama's* defense because the issue presented alludes to ethnic hatred. For him, the prophet Muhammad never taught attitude of hatred among fellow humans just because of ethnic and religious differences. There is ambiguity in the ABU 205 movement, between defending the *ulama* and resistance to the discourse of ethnic hatred.

"I agree If they try to defend the Qur'an but for save *ulama* 205 action -if the context is only to defend *ulama*- it is still okay. But if the utterance or mission is to crush the Dayak or something similiar with it that is not allowed. We will not be able to avenge hatred. The Prophet taught it ".

The question is whether the ABI is not in accordance with the spirit of defense against the theme of Indonesia and nationality? Implicitly, previous statements have corroborated that assumption. In my opinion, this model's resistance is an effort to protect discourse defense as a basis for strengthening previous formed identities. As stated:

"But if you think yes. First, we will be able to see if people are constantly being confined to being heated, then their hearts will become hard. The hard heart effect that we think is not good for the survival of its own Islamic religious life in this country".

Yasin tried to understand the special message from ABI that *da'wah* and actions that carry religious themes need to consider diversity between ethnicities and religions. Action was not only how to voice desires, but also accompanied by the will to create order and peace. For this reason, in the matter of local leadership, Yasin did not really distinguish between non-Muslims and Muslims. He even stated, the standard value of a leader was not his formal religion but his attitude and mentality to be fair.

"For non-Muslims, HMI still considers all Indonesian as brother. Not considering whether they are Muslim or Non-Muslim. Even the non-Muslim governor is fine, which the important thing should be fair. "

C. ABI: from the Symbol of Unity to the Politic of Identity

A different response was stated by Ria (22), a senior Muslimah activist at the Campus *Da'wah* Institution (LDK) as-Salam of IAIN Pontianak. According to her the ABI has encouraged an increase in religious desire, especially among young people to express their religion. For example the increasing trend of hijrah, the recitation of knowledge that is increasingly crowded. I am of the opinion that the social and religious condition that occur are a condition of transitional recognition between adjusting to change and maintaining identity on the other side.

According to Ria, it creates the transformation from not being interested to being interested in learning one's own religion. Hijrah is an important term to describe change in the future of Muslim. This is a way of inward looking towards the forward looking. As stated by Ria:

"Before they were not so interested in religious discussion but they were closer to their own religion. They like to be happy with the mosque, they often go to the mosque. If all this time they have listened to songs that are not Islamic, now they are closer to Allah.

Ria argues that the ABI represents unified group of Muslims. It's just that Ria does not explain more about what and how the procession took place. There are two contexts to explain the word compartmentalization: the political context of non-Muslim leadership and the context of the riot in Sambas from 1998 to 1999. In my opinion, this perception is an identity politic feedback that has been transferred by the Islamic defense movement in many regions. This situation made Ria as a senior in LDK As-Salam organization not discussing ABI's topic with other young member. Therefore, there is a contradiction between the acceptance of ABI as a symbol of the unity of identity politic, but the resistance to discuss formally as organizational. The question is how to explain ABI as a prototype of a social movement about leadership for young Muslim?

It is undeniable that the political power of the success of ABI in winning the pair Anis Baswedan-Sandiaga Uno became the Governor and Deputy Governor of DKI Jakarta. For Ria, it was a portrait of action that brought about the greatness of Islam in the national political arena. Ria hopes that Anis will be able to represent the model of Muslim leader by manifesting religious teaching in political life and democracy in Indonesia. For me, this awareness is a longing that does not appear in practical area. Of course, the teaching of Islam that call for goodness and become the best religion in a doctrinal way have not found evidence in the context of democracy in Indonesia. As a follower of the majority religion, Ria craves that Islam is proven to answer the needs wherever and according to any condition. Did the Anis-Sandi couple succeed in becoming an *epitomé* after the glory of Islam in the past? I think it still takes a long time.

As explained earlier, Ria stated firmly her support for ABI, because of its resonance effect that could unite Muslim. Ria hopes that the success gained in Jakarta will have an impact on the election of the Governor of West Kalimantan later. She stressed:

"Most of Indonesian are Muslim. The reality of its leaders is not Islam and many Muslims are corrupt. From this action, people who had known only held pens or work in offices, were far more sensitive to the current condition of Muslims or current leadership. And it is possible that it is a real political push. But religion and politic, the democratic system with a system of presidency, chooses leader

according to criteria that can improve the quality of our religion. "Anis baswedan also has a sweet smell that is given to the governor of Jakarta".

Meanwhile, the same response was also conveyed by other LDK activists. Bayu (18) is the general chairman of LDK As-Syajarah Faculty of Forestry, University of Tanjung Pura Pontianak. According to him, the condition of Muslim in Indonesia in general is divided and easily rocked, including in Pontianak. Since the action Muslims have received a bad stigma because they are perceived as carrying out the issue of SARA. According to Bayu, ABI has provided changes to the unity of Muslims, precisely the brotherhood of fellow Muslim (*ukhuwah islamiyyah*). Bayu followed ABI using two-wheeled vehicles. During the action, Bayu felt a tense and scared state. Although it does not close the sense of pride, participating is part of Muslims who are defending their religion. On the other side, the action was able to mobilize Muslim solidarity, but got a negative perception.

The same affirmation was also conveyed by Andika (20), General Chair of the National Front of Indonesian Muslim Students (KAMMI) of Pontianak City. According to Andika, the attitude of the KAMMI was stood as neutral organizational but did not prohibit its members from participating to the action. When ABI is held, there are mandatory training activities that must be followed by new members of KAMMI. So, Andika decided that cadre was more important than taking action. This attitude shows that ABI does not fully provide adequate bargaining power to be able to change the orientation or agenda of individual activities and campus *da'wah* organization. According to Andika, ABI has a positive influence in the form of increasingly close emotional relationship among Muslims. The overall act of defending Islam is proof of Islam as a peace-loving religion. It just needs support from outside, namely law enforcement against Cornelis who he considers to have uttered hate speech against Islamic symbols. I am of the opinion that the unity of Islam is not formed by its own teaching but requires stimulus from the social reality of society.

Not much different from other fellow LDK activists that the theme of Islam Defense Action is not too much of a concern for internal discussion of the organization. Even ABI did not affect relation with other Islamic or nationalist organizations both in terms of strengthening and weakening. Nevertheless, the response style is different from other Islamic activists as shown by Syawwa (18) and Ayu (18). Syawwa and Ayu are Pontianak and IAIN students who have a background as religious activists. Syawwa had joined Indonesia Hizbut Tahrir (HTI) organization, she was also a member of LDK As-salam in IAIN Pontianak, while Ayu joined Muslim Student Association (HMI). Syawwa is a typical Islamic activist who

considers the act of defending Islam part of the practical political struggle, so it does not concern her and even tends to avoid the action. As stated:

"For example, there are students asking question. Surely they immediately said they didn't need to discuss it. Just focus to *da'wah*, return to *da'wah*. The LDK is a *da'wah* institution not like that politic. So there are some people who say that LDK is radical because they don't want to join politic. Even though that's not the point. Whereas LDK is the duty to do for *da'wah*.

Syawwa is one of Islamic activists who do not fully support ABI. That is, the act of defending the *ulama* did not become a successful religious doctrine to convince young Islamic activists. Syawwa stated that he loved *ulama* but did not necessarily participate in defending *ulama*. As she said:

"we can choose to not defense *ulama* from this movement. I love Muslim scholars ('*ulama*). Then why I not join? Is it mean i am not loving *ulama*? I don't know. We are the people who judge. They also don't know us. they may join the movement without reason"

In my opinion, this is an expression of anticipatory resistance. Syawwa considers that the expression of *ulama*'s love is through improving the quality of religion and not should to defend *ulama*. The act of defending *ulama* should show that Islam can protect and respect each other and respect other religions. Ayu also pointed out the same anticipatory resistance that the act of defending *ulama* may but must also consider its purpose. They explained the reason because they saw the series of actions that ended with anxiety and tense.

There is a similarity respond reflected of the opinions of other Islamic activists such as the opinions of Waras and Yessi. Waras (18) and Yessi (18) are activists of Islamic Student Family Forum (FKMI) and also administrator of the Student Executive Board (BEM) at the University of Tanjung Pura Pontianak. Both are also usually involved in the action of other Muslims. According to Waras, after ABI, there was a change in the quantity of religion study group on campus and more openly, especially in terms of information dissemination. Usually information about recitation is distributed among members, now the spread is also for students who are not members. Therefore, the presence of Islamic defense action is the driving force for information disclosure and the unity of Muslims who were previously less coordinated between one group and another group.

Although both expressed their support for ABI, but organizationally the act of defending Islam was not a serious and open topic of discussion. The reason is that students who are members of FKMI have diverse organizational backgrounds or movements. Not necessarily all FKMI members agreed to ABI movement. I think that attitude is a form of caution or a middle ground to consider ABI as a valuable lesson in term of the spirit of unity. There is a similar narrative that ABI has the potential for ethnic and religious conflicts. That perception then became a strong reason not to consider ABI as one of the factor of organizational cadre considering that not a few Islamic students came from areas where the majority of the population were non-Muslims. According to both, ABI is the trigger for the rise of Muslims because it has raised personal and social awareness that activities are not organized will be defeated by evil or organized crime. However, both of them assume that ABI is part of the art of success in organizing physically but not in the face of a war of thought.

The trauma of horizontal conflict has created two polarization of ethnic identity in community. First, strengthening identity but on the other hand weakening other identity. This pattern usually occurs in talks between two or more of the same ethnicity. Second, trying to assert one's own identity without undermining other identities. This pattern tends to appear in the talk of one or more people who have different ethnic backgrounds. The first pattern is the hardening of identity and showing a frontal attitude and thinking of the past as the basis for action. While the next pattern intends to be flexible, accommodating and sees the future as an agreement to live together. ABI has strengthened the last pattern.

For this reason, the involvement and resistance of Islamic activists towards ABI has formed their own solidarity. It's just that these attitudes do not directly affect the identity to live together. As explained in the following visualization:

Activist Organization	THE TREND RESPOND ON ABI	
Campus <i>Da'wah</i> Institution	Accept	Intend to happen again
Extra Campus Institution	Neutral	Not Intend to happen again, but there is a positive value

Table 1: The Islamic activists trends in responding to ABI

Is it true that ABI is an affirmation of Islamic political identity? Arfianto Purbolaksono (2016: 10) explaining the Action of Defending Qur'an or 411 action is a portrait of Muslim identity politic in Indonesia today that is politically marginalized. According to Purbolaksono,

this was caused by the failure of Islamic based political parties failing to articulate the interest of Muslim political aspiration. In line with Mike Michael's statement (1996: 2) that identity is strongly influenced by "nonhuman" factors as conceptual space in social constructivism, not merely the concept of religion and modernity. Aaron W. Hughes (2013: 10-11) also believes that identity is constructed based on what happened and should have been in the past, while showing diversity that there is no one authoritative way to achieve that construction. It is difficult to avoid the perception that ABI is not related to Islamic political identity.

D. CONCLUSION

The emergence of ABI action movement in Jakarta and in various regions has led to various main opinions. First, conservative groups have experienced improvement and strengthening in Indonesia. Second, it is not the strengthening of conservative groups but better organization. From a number of informants, this study indicated that the organizing factor is stronger without denying the strengthening of issues of Islamic populism such as the resistance of non-Muslim leaders and the conspiracy of threat from outsiders against Muslims. Nevertheless, all informants were the culmination that resistance to issues and conflicts with SARA nuances and engagement in supporting community unity became a social filter in maintaining pluralism in Pontianak and West Kalimantan in general. Generally, both involvement and resistance can come from personal and organizational or social attitudes. Although in an organization that gives freedom to its members to participate, I think that the support of the involvement of Islamic activists in ABI organizationally and personally is fluid (elasticity). But not to the contrary, resistance to ABI is plasticity in a personal and organizational manner.

The pattern of involvement and resistance is also illustrated by the tendency of perspectives or attitudes revealed by the informants. The attitude of resistance tends to be outward looking. It means that they see the potential that can disrupt the life of pluralism in the community as an excuse to reject the action. On the contrary, those who accept show an inward looking attitude. They accept the movement and ideas, but do not expect the bad potential they cause. I am of the opinion that both resistance and involvement show that the ABI is not fully become a complete perspective among Islamic student activists. The following table is the visualization:

Organisasi Aktifis	Style of Reflection	THE RESISTANCE FORMS ON ABI	
Campus <i>Da'wah</i> Institution	Inward Looking	Semi-Open Manner	ABI is a manifestation of the unity/resurrection of Muslim to prevent division
Extra Campus Institution	Outward Looking		ABI as a potential division. Therefore, the importance of unity

Table 2: Some forms of resistance to ABI

Generally, according to Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2017: 1-4) the pattern of involvement and resistance to an Islamic movement is a common thing in democratic process. The rising populism issue lately has influenced the spirit of pluralism in various countries. For example, the emergence of 2015 red and yellow shirt movements in Malaysia, the appointment of Halimah Yacob as president of Singapore in 2017. Minority and majority relations based on ethnic and religious envy often appear to trigger religious and community tension and sentiment. This situation is not only a challenge to maturity in understanding pluralism but ultimately to improve the quality of democratic development in Indonesia.

In post truth era, populism is a path that is often used to get symbolic legitimacy from the public. Suspected populism role is creating uniformity that capitalizes people's emotions against resistance through the issue of politicizing religion and ethnicity or quoting the term Azyumardi Azra as a religion of political sectarianism. The Post truth prioritized the belief rather than scientific analysis in understanding a change, and populism through religion and ethnicity present ready-made answer to meet the need of that belief. The question is how the response of converts - Chinese and Dayak converts - in response to ABI? How do they place it in a dynamic of identity, religion and social change? To explain this, further research is needed.

In conclusion, this article suggested the establishment of a meeting in the form of ethical and emotional dialogue among the components of society as an effort to strengthen religious tolerance. Dialogue on ethics is the attitude of mutual understanding of differences in argumentation without blaming other people's belief. While emotion is to believe that other people also have their own truth, even though they still need other people as an attitude of wisdom.

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