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WHY INDONESIA PREFERS A MONO-RELIGIOUS EDUCATION MODEL? A DURKHEMIAN PERSPECTIVE[1]

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ABSTRACT

This work aims to investigate the preference of the Indonesian for a specific type of religious education model, and to provide a theoretical understanding of this preference. In particular, this study aims to answer two research questions: How do Indonesian practice mono-religious education model? How should this practice be understood from Durkheim's concept of mechanical solidarity? Three models of ethnographical study were conducted to answer the research questions: Analysing the state's law on education, particularly with regard to religious education, in-depth interviews with school' managers (Kepala Sekolah) and religious education teachers as well as the students. This study found that Indonesia prefers a mono-religious education model, as shown in the State's laws on education and the practice of religious education in schools. Unlike previous studies that mainly describe the practice of certain model of religious education, this study offers conceptual understanding of the practice of religious education by Durkheim's notions of mechanical solidarity. The mono-religious model is a social fact because it consists of the norms and values that are practised by and commonly found in all members of society. Comparative studies on the practice of religious education in Muslim countries might be needed as this mono-religious education model is a common practice by Muslim societies.

Keywords: education; Indonesia; mono-religious; model; solidarity; Durkhemian.

INTRODUCTION

Considering the important role of religion, and particularly religious education, in identity formation in Indonesia (Hefner ed., 2009; Pohl, 2006), there have

been attempts from both Muslim and secular (together with non-Muslim) groups to influence the State's law-making processes concerning religious education[2]. On the hand, Muslim-majority groups fight for their interests to be accommodated by State laws, including those regarding the national education system. On the other hand, secular and non-Muslim groups have enforced the State's position of impartiality towards all religious communities and attempted to secure it from Muslim influence.

The first regulation concerning religious education passed after Indonesia's independence was Law No. 4/1950, Article 20 of which stipulates that "*Religious education is provided in public schools and parents shall decide whether their children attend such instruction.*" Several studies (Hing, 1995; Azra, 2007; Raihani, 2014) have investigated that the implementation of Law No. 4/1950 was suspended due to political instability. In 1954, the State passed Law No. 12/1954 on the implementation of Law No. 4/1950 (*pernyataan berlakunya undang-undang no. 4/1950*), which included additional elucidation of Law No. 4/1950. This law clarifies that:

> "[…] a. *whether or not a school provides religious education is determined by the age and the intellectual level of its students; b. mature students have the right to decide whether or not to attend religious education; c. the nature of religious education and its relative proportion in the curriculum should be regulated in a separate Act of Parliament, relating to different types of schools; d. religious education should not influence the promotion opportunities of a child.*"

This explanation of Article 20 clearly affirms that religious education was an option for students.

How was religious education organised? According to the law, the provision of religious education in public schools was entrusted to the Ministry of Religious Affairs – even as the general administration of public schools was handled by the Ministry of Education and Culture (Murrray, 1988). For religious education, the Ministry of Religious Affairs prepared materials, curricula, and textbooks for religious education. The elucidation of Article 20.2 of Law No. 12/54 mentions that "*How to organize the teaching of religion in State schools is set in regulations enacted by the Ministry of Education and Culture, together with the Ministry of Religious Affairs.*" Kelabora (1979) showed that the State presumed that religious education had something to do with religion, and therefore should be managed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

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[2] There were also some Muslim groups supported secular groups, but their number were quite small.

The early Suharto period, beginning in 1966, was characterised by State attempts to abolish secular and communist ideologies through the use of the *Pancasila* ideology, replacing *Nasakom* (Schröter ed., 2010). The only State law concerning religious education enacted in this period was a decree passed by the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara*, or MPRS), TAP MPRS No. XX, MPRS/1966, concerning religion, education, and culture. Article 1 of the Decree holds that "[…] *religious education is a subject in schools ranging from elementary schools to public universities.*" The Decree eliminated the optional character of religious education provided by Law No. 4/1950. Since then, religious education has been a compulsory subject in public schools.

The government replaced Law No. 4/1950 with Law No. 2/1989 in September 1989. This law introduced three important changes in State policy on religious education. The first concerned the obligation to enforce religious education. According to the 1989 law, religious education should be a compulsory subject for all students, at every study level. While this obligation was first mandated by TAP MPRS No. XX, MPRS/1966, Law No. 2/1989 strengthened it, requiring private and non-religious schools to teach religious education. Article 39.1.b of Law 2/1989 stipulates: "*The curriculum content of basic education consists of materials and subjects of Pancasila education, religious education, civic education* […]" The second change was that the State acknowledged the existence of religious schools in the national system of education, though it did not provide funding for these schools. Article 11.6 stipulates: "*[a] religious school is an institution that prepares students to be able to master specific knowledge about their own religion.*" The third change is related to the aim of national education, "*[…] to develop the intellectual life of the nation and to develop a moral Indonesian human being, namely one who believes in and is devoted to the one and only God; people of immaculate character, blessed with knowledge, skills and personality* […]" (cf. article 4 Law No. 2/1989).

Hefner (2000, 98) and others scholars like Liddle and Baswedan (Liddle, 2000; Baswedan, 2004) have observed that the growing role of Muslim power in law-making, particularly in educational system that began in the last 10 years of President Suharto's administration was triggered by at least two connected events. First, Christians were replaced by Muslims in the State's bureaucracy, which implied a new composition that would benefit Muslim groups in accessing political decision-making processes. Second, since the late 1980s, the Golkar Party – i.e., the government political party – has accommodated Muslim intellectuals, such as alumni of the Muslim Students Association (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*, or HMI). According to Hefner (2000) and

Liddle (1996), HMI alumni are currently found in all political parties, but Golkar is practically dominated and led by them.

Several studies have attempted to understand the practice of religious education in Indonesia post *reformasi* 1998 from political (Eddyono, 2018; Sirozi, 2004) historical (Suwignyo, 2014; Elson, 2009) pedagogical (Azra, 2007; Qodir, 2018; Buchori and Malik, 2004), and sociological (Pohl, 2006; Hefner, 2009; Mujiburrahman, 2019) perspectives. Few studies, however, have attempted to conceptualise the practice of religious education in Indonesia. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the practice of religious education in Indonesia and to understand this practice from conceptual framework. In particular, this study aims to answer two research questions: How do Indonesian practice mono-religious education model? How should this practice be understood from Durkheim's concept of collective solidarity and social fact? Before providing answers for the research questions, in the following discussion is introduced two theoretical concepts, namely mono religious education model and mechanical solidarity.

THE MONO-RELIGIOUS EDUCATION MODEL

We describe the mono-religious model of religious education based on its pedagogical aspects (goal, cognitive, affective, attitudinal, and teaching methods), normative basis, and societal context. The goal of the mono-religious model is to construct a religious identity that is in-line with one's own religion. Through this model, students can grow deeper in their faith and in their sense of belonging to a specific religious community. Cognitively, the mono-religious model provides students with knowledge of, and insight into, their own religion. Although this model focuses primarily on one religion, it does not necessarily imply a complete disregard for other religions. Other religions might be discussed, albeit from the perspective of one's own tradition, and with the aim of affirming that tradition (Sterkens, 2001). Affectively, the mono-religious model aims at increasing students' interest and involvement in a particular religion.

As for the attitudinal aspect, the mono-religious model is meant to encourage students to accept the values and beliefs of their own religion and live in accordance with their own religious values, and to inculcate students with the motivation to participate in religious practices such as prayer. The mono-religious model is also known as the transmission model, because it aims to transmit a particular religious tradition. According to Hermans (2003), 'transmission' means an appropriation of religious values, which implies personal interpretation of the meaning of religious tradition in relation

to students' existing knowledge. The normative basis for this model is the particular religion's claim to absolute truth. According to Sterkens (2001) and Hermans (2003) this truth claim has two variations: exclusivism and inclusivism. Exclusivism perceives other religions positively only if these other religions show similarities with one's own religion, as one's own religion is held to be the only religion that can claim truth (Subagya, 2015; Jackson, 2016). Inclusivism, meanwhile, evaluates other religions positively as long as they display signs of divine revelation; other religions mediate salvation through general grace.

According to Hermans (2003), the mono-religious model is a traditionalist concept in which religions are seen as self-contained phenomena. Each religion has its own rituals, stories, symbols, and customs that are unique. There is no need to contextualise, since context adds nothing to these rituals, stories, and symbols. Sterkens (2001) states that one of the weaknesses of the mono-religious model is its lack of recognition of religious plurality. A mono-religious society is a segmented society, one not yet characterised by religious plurality. This model is found in places in which there is social uniformity and unquestioning acceptance of the exclusive truth claims of a certain religion (Sterkens, 2001). However, as Küng (1991) has indicated, this situation has never existed in a global society.

THE MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY

We begin with Durkheim's concept of society. Durkheim offers a concept of analysing how collectivity works in a society, and the extent to which an individual is bound by said society. He studies how a society affects the way that individual persons perceive the world (Allan, 2011; Jones, 1986). For Durkheim, society is not only a group of individuals who occupy a particular geographic location, but an ensemble of ideas resulting from the fusion of individual consciences and the product of individual interactions (Jones, 1986: 60). What is interesting in Durkheim's concept of society is that his emphasis on the role of collectivity makes his approach different from that of other sociologists, such as Marx and Weber.

The role played by social collectivity in a society is influenced by the social relations between individuals, and the kind of moral influence they have over the individual (Ceri, 1993: 146). Durkheim is considered a social realist because of his belief that society is an objectively real entity that exists independently and autonomously of any particular individual. His notion of objectivity, which underlines the importance of the roles of collective solidarity, has been criticised by other sociologists, such as Giddens (1972)

and Turner (1993), who perceive Durkheim as being anti-individual, leaving no place for the individual or for subjective interpretations of social phenomena. This critique is probably adequate for current modern Western society, where there is strong differentiation of tasks and individuals are more autonomous. In contrast, the specialisation of people in Indonesian society is less dominant, and individuals are less autonomous. Therefore, we think that Durkheim's concepts of objectivity and collective solidarity can help explain the mechanisms of the preference for the mono-religious education model at all levels of Indonesian society: students, politicians, school leaders at religiously-affiliated schools, religious communities, and the government.

Durkheim introduces the concept of 'social fact' to analyse society objectively (Thomson 1985, p. xiv). He aims to study human behaviour through observable cause-and-effect relationships while eliminating subjective bias. In so doing, Durkheim strives to find general laws to measure objectivity in the social sciences that are universally applicable (Allan, 2011: 110). His goal is to find commonalities between different societies and their social facts. Durkheim defines social facts as

> "[…] ways of acting, thinking, and feeling that exist outside individual consciousness, that are diffused widely within a group, and that exert a coercive power over the activities of individuals, recognizable by the resistance that it offers any individual action that would violate it" (Durkheim, 1961: 2).

There are two key points in Durkheim's definition of social fact; a fact is perceived as a social fact because it is *external to* and *coercive of* the individual. According to Jones (1986), Durkheim's concept of social fact is often misunderstood, especially with regard to the externality aspect. Indeed, a social fact is *sui generis,* which means that it is both exterior *and* interior to individuals. Externality, in this case, means interior to individuals other than the individual subject (Jones, 1986: 66). The second important characteristic of social facts is their external coercive power. Social facts can be recognised by the existence of predetermined legal sanction, or – in the case of moral and religious beliefs – by their reaction to those forms of individual belief and action they perceive as threatening (Jones, 1986: 60–61). According to Jones, social facts might not be limited to ways of functioning (e.g. acting, thinking, feeling, etc.), but can also be extended to ways of being (Jones, 1986: 62). Because social facts are a thing, people can never succeed in understanding them except by going outside themselves through observation and experiment.

MONO-RELIGIOUS EDUCATION MODEL AS THE PREFERENCE

Law No. 20/2003 expresses the preference of the Indonesian government for a mono-religious model. Article 12.1.a of the Law stipulates that every student deserves religious education in accordance with his or her own religion, to be imparted by an educator from a similar religious tradition. In fact, Law No. 20/2003 uses the word 'deserve' [*berhak*], referring to the student's rights, which implies an obligation to be fulfilled by the school.[3] However, these are not individual rights, but rather the rights of the community. The State demands that students be committed to their own religious communities by holding and practising similar normative.

The law clearly indicates that Muslim students need only learn Islam; Christians need only study Christianity; and Hindu students need only study Hinduism. In other words, religious education need not provide an opportunity for students to learn about other religions, come to mutual understanding, or have dialogue with other religious believers. Article 2.2 of Government Regulation No. 55/2007 stipulates that: *"Religious education aims to develop the abilities of students to comprehend, embrace and practise religious values […]"* This article lists three important activities involved in studying religion, namely, to comprehend, to embrace, and to practise religion. To comprehend [*memahami*] refers to the cognitive aspect of education. To embrace [*menghayati*, a typical Indonesian term] implies the affective aspect of education. To practise [*mengamalkan*] implies a continuous activity, referring to the attitudinal aspect.[4] According to the State, religion should play a role in building the nation. This can only be achieved if students have knowledge about their own religions, embrace their own religions, and practise their own religious rituals. Religious values should be the foundation of every individual's noble, moral character, as seen in each individual's personal life, family life, and life in society as good citizens, as mandated by Ministry of Religious Affairs Regulation [*Peraturan Menteri Agama*] No. 10/2010 – particularly article 6.c, which states:

> "The standard formulation of the content of religious education stated in Article 5, Verse 1 is: (a) to deepen and to broaden students' knowledge and religious insight; (b) to encourage students to practise their religious learning in daily life; (c) to position religion as the foundation of a noble character in personal life, family life, society, and national life."

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[3] The law stipulates: "Every student at every education unit deserves to receive religious education in accordance with his or her religion, imparted by a teacher from a similar religious background."

[4] Cf. Article 6 of Ministry of Religious Education Regulation No. 16/2010 concerning the formulation of the content of the religious education curriculum.

Religiously-affiliated schools in Indonesia predominantly favour a mono-religious model. Schools expect students to grow into their own religions. Religious education teaches only one religion, with the aim being for each student to interiorise the teachings of his or her own religion and to practise the rituals of that religion. In line with the mono-religious model, religious education is delivered by way of transmission. Students are expected to memorise Holy Scriptures and identify the teachings of their own religions. The curriculum content consists of the teachings, values, and practices of the religion with which each school is related. Some religiously-affiliated schools also admit students with different religious backgrounds. This is the case for Hindu schools in Bali, where Hinduism is the majority religion. It is also the case for Christian schools in Bali, where Christians are a minority group. These schools provide mono-religious education for students with other religious backgrounds.[5]

MONO-RELIGIOUS MODEL AS A SOCIAL FACT

How can one explain this congruence in the preference for the mono-religious model in Indonesian society? We will reflect on this finding using Durkheim's notions of mechanical solidarity, consisting of collective solidarity and social fact. The concept of collective solidarity is discussed extensively by Durkheim in his *Division* (1964), while the social fact concept is explained in *Rules* (1961). In addition to these two major sources, we employ three authoritative interpretations of Durkheim's works, by Jones (1986), Allan (2011), and Turner (1993). We will focus on three questions: (1) How do individuals and groups within society come to think and act in similar ways? (2) To what extent can the concept of social fact help us understand this congruence in the preference for the mono-religious model in Indonesia? (3) What mechanism can explain how certain practices and norms in Indonesian society become social fact?

How does the concept of social fact explain the preference for the mono-religious model in Indonesia? We can understand the mono-religious model as a social fact because it consists of norms and values that are practised by and commonly found in all members of society. In Indonesia, there is clear agreement with regard to the practice of religious education by the policy-making body of the State (politicians, government); the educational system of religiously-affiliated schools (school leaders, teachers); and student ideas on religious education. In our research, we did find some differences in the mono-religious model employed at some religiously-affiliated schools, notably

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[5] This is the case for Hindu schools in Bali, where Hinduism is the majority religion. It is also the case for Christian schools in Bali, where Christians are a minority group. These schools provide mono-religious education for students with other religious backgrounds

where schools introduce students to the teachings of other religions using an outsider's perspective, or the school provides mono-religious education for students not belonging to the religion with which the school is affiliated.

But these differences are within the same social order, or as Durkheim says, "within the narrow limit of variation" (Jones, 1986). They all practise religious education in such a way that students (should) develop knowledge based on their own religion, are committed to their own religion, and become pious and moral persons based on the teachings of their own religion. From the aforementioned framework, this model of religious education can be understood as a social fact not only because it is accepted by the majority of society or *sui generis,* but also because of its relationship with two other social facts: (1) the regulation of behaviour, and (2) religious group attachment (Allan, 2011; Ceri, 1993).

First, the obligation to practise the mono-religious model was stipulated by Law No. 2/1989, passed by the New Order regime in 1989. Durkheim defines the State as the agent of sovereign authority and political society (Vogt, 1993). According to Vogt, Durkheim perceives the State as a representation of society's consciousness, where deliberation takes place regarding the policies with which society needs to comply. The character of the State is determined by the extent to which decision-making is open to and in communication with society. The elucidation of Article 39.2 of Law No. 2/1989 states that *"Religious education is an effort to strengthen religious commitment and religious devotion to the one and only God, according to the religion professed by the student* […]". Moreover, Article 28.2 of this law stipulates that religious education must be taught by a teacher from a similar religious background.[6]

From our theoretical framework, this law shows a preference for the mono-religious model; it is only regulated in the explanatory part of the law. The current State laws on the national education system – Law No. 20/2003 and other regulations – affirm Law No. 2/1989, particularly with regard to the obligation to practise the mono-religious model. For instance, the State formulates manuals and curriculum content for the implementation of the mono-religious model to ensure that schools' practice of the mono-religious model is consistent with State laws.

Second, when parliament members enacted Law No. 20/2003, they represented another social fact – that is, the fact that they were part of their own religious communities. This is illustrated by the fact that the arguments of the parliament members in support of the draft law were very often derived from the teachings of their own religions. Their agreement with Law No. 20/2003 should also be

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[6] Cf. the elucidation of Article 28.2 of Law No. 2/1989.

seen as a form of community loyalty. The Christian community was in favour of the mono-religious model, but disagreed with Islamic parties regarding the need to provide religious education that differed from their Christian religious background and to hire teachers from other religions.

Mulligan and Lederman (1977) observe that a certain practice and norm becomes a social fact when it is brought under the governance of rules and imposed by sanction. In our study, both the State and religious communities have established the mono-religious model as a standard for teaching religion, one imposed by sanction and complied by school policies. The State supports schools through funding, curricula, and textbooks, and sends people to observe religious education in the classroom to ensure that the mono-religious model is implemented consistently with State laws. Schools, thus, can immediately feel the objective influence of the State on the practice of the mono-religious model.

In addition, schools take into account their religious group's attachments, because these schools belong to certain religious communities. In fact, Indonesian religious communities' vision of religious education is similar to that of the State. Sharing the same values as the State in the teaching of religion, they are likely to affirm and strengthen State laws by providing additional time for teaching religion. Religiously-affiliated schools will not contradict the social fact of law (the State) and the practice of their religious community to educate the next generation in the teachings and moral character of their own tradition.

According to Allan (2011) and Jones (1986), Durkheim distinguishes between material and non-material social fact. In our study, material facts might include the curriculum content and textbooks from the State and from the religious community, as well as the inspections and financial support from both the State and the religious community. School headmasters – who represent the religious community in the school – formulate school policies on religious education through discussions with the State's apparatus, who inspect the implementation of the mono-religious model. Teachers in religious education produce their syllabi within the framework of the mono-religious model based on the State's curriculum and preferences of their religious community. Also, the school conducts examinations, which aim to ensure that students' knowledge and moral character are in accordance with the objectives set by the State and the religious community.

The non-material facts are the normative teachings themselves, as well as the values that are inherent in the mono-religious model. Religious education aims to enhance knowledge of their own religion and create pious students

based on the teachings of their own religion to ensure students construct a religious identity based on their own religion. Students are expected not only to understand the way religion is practised in accordance with certain normative teachings, but also encouraged to practise religious rituals often. According to Durkheim, religious rituals should be repeated in order to reaffirm the collective unity of a society. Religious rituals are important in maintaining social cohesion and preventing conflict. Religious rituals might serve "[…] to sustain the vitality of [common] beliefs, to keep them from being effaced from memory, and in sum, to revivify the most essential elements of the collective consciousness. Through it, the group periodically renews the sentiments which it has of itself and of its unity; at the same time, individuals are strengthened in their social natures" (Durkheim, 1965, p. 420). Indeed, when schools oblige students to practise religious rituals, this expresses the importance of the fact that students are members of the State and of the religious community.

One of the most critical issues for teaching religion in school is the transmission of values. Through socialisation processes, schools promote certain normative values to their students and ensures that students appropriate them. Students behave in accordance with the directives supported by the school. For students, mono-religious education is a social fact. Students do not question, for instance, why they only learn their own religion; why they have to pray before class begins; what the reasons are for certain religious instructions; and what are the meanings of every religious practice (e.g. why do they pray this way, and not the 'other' way). For students, the continuous religious education in school practices is a social fact (Durkheim, 1961). By which mechanism is this congruence of social facts created? Using Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity, we might perceive that religiously-affiliated schools in Indonesia, particularly in the practice of religious education, are likely to be considered to belong to the mechanical solidarity model. Unlike organic solidarity, where the distinction between social and individual differences produced by the division of labour is obvious, mechanical solidarity is based on likeness. Society is characterised by a weak division of labour; or rather, homogeneity, where sentiments and beliefs are shared in common, where individualisation is minimal, and collective thinking is maximal (Ceri, 1993). Of course, this might only be the case in the matter of religious education; in other issues, there might be different examples. In this type of solidarity, we assume three important characteristics: (1) Individuals are related by collective consciousness; (2) People are joined by common beliefs and sentiment; (3) Punitive law is applied more often than restitutive law (Allan, 2011).

First, individuals are directly related to the collective consciousness. In the mechanical model, society is built on the foundation of shared values, and people are emotionally bound to their society (Allan, 2011). Individuals are immediately related to the collective consciousness by being part of their group. This is the case when members of parliament produce laws on the national education system. They are directly integrated in the collective consciousness of their own religious community, and they feel obliged to convey the intentions of the religious community in State law. Similarly, when a teacher employs the mono-religious model, he or she does it as a part of the collective consciousness of the religious community. Teachers perceive the practice of the mono-religious model as being obedience to the norms of the State and of their own religious community.

Students are also not able to choose a certain model of religious education. They follow the mono-religious model of education and take this model for granted. According to Allan (2011), collective consciousness is an important element in the mechanical solidarity model. Individual consciousness does exist, of course, but individual consciousnesses are actually very similar to one another (Allan, 2011). Through the collective consciousness that is created by the State and socialised by religiously-affiliated schools through the mono-religious model of religious education, individuals become aware of themselves being part of a bigger social fact (e.g. a religious community, and the State).

For Durkheim, the aim of education is to create social beings connected to their society. Durkheim sees the education system as a good mechanism for establishing social facts. Education is a continuous effort to socialise students' ways of seeing, feeling, and acting, which do not come spontaneously (Thomson, 1985). It may be claimed that educational institutions should allow students to act in freedom and develop themselves as responsible, autonomous persons, but the social facts in Indonesia are different.

Second, individuals are bound by common beliefs and sentiments. People have an emotional sense of something greater than themselves. This feeling is what underlies morality. According to Allen, when Durkheim discusses morality, he does not refer to something that people might think of as being good. A group is moral if its behaviours, beliefs, feelings, and so forth are controlled by a strong group of norms and are viewed in terms of right and wrong (Allan, 2011).

In the mechanical solidarity model, people act socially because others do, and because it is moral to do so. While they can always give reasons for their actions – especially social actions – they generally occur because of feelings of

responsibility. It is because, as Durkheim believes, human beings are not purely rational. Durkheim considers humans to be emotional creatures (Durkheim, 1961). According to him, at the heart of morality is a central moral authority that commands the individual to follow the moral instructions of the collective. Through this central authority, the individual feels an external constraint to conform to his or her society's moral code. Therefore, for Durkheim, obligation is a fundamental element of morality.

Third, the punishment is punitive, rather than restitutive. The function of punitive law is not to correct; rather, its purpose is expiation, making atonement. Punitive law deals with moral outrage and clarifies moral boundaries. In punishing deviances, it aims to draw a clear line that demarks those who are in the group from those who are outside the group. Although punishment proceeds from a totally mechanical reaction, from passionate emotions that are largely unconscious, this does not prevent it from playing a useful role. However, this role is not the one that people ordinarily perceive. Its real function is to maintain social cohesion by preserving the vitality of the collective solidarity. According to Durkheim, regulations are enforced because upholding them is considered a duty. Duty means the imposition of behavioural regularity, the adoption of impersonal codes of behaviour. It follows that deviants do not do their duty: they set themselves outside morality (Durkhiem, 1961). Durkheim analyses the autonomy of will as a function of the moral order, as moral order means duty and duty means obedience to norms. Thus, individual autonomy cannot negate duty. Individual autonomy should be perceived as voluntary and self-conscious acceptance of duty (Ceri, 1993).

According to this framework, schools that do not implement the mono-religious model might potentially be socially isolated and experience social resistance as an indirect sanction, even if the State does not execute its powers directly. However, this situation does not exist in Indonesia. Sterkens (2015) have investigated that even the Catholic school that offers a different type of religious education (i.e., uses the inter-religious model) is not considered totally deviant. Even though students are not studying their own religion and not growing into their own religious traditions, the fact that teachers do not teach a religion different from the students' own indicates that the school does not break the law.

CONCLUSION

This article aimed to answer two research questions: How do Indonesian

practice mono-religious education model? How should this practice be understood from Durkheim's concept of collective solidarity and social fact? The results confirm that Indonesian society prefers a mono-religious education model. Using Durkheim's framework on a mechanical solidarity model, we might argue that mono-religious education is a social fact because it consists of the norms and values that are practised by and commonly found in all members of society. In Indonesia, there is clear agreement with regard to the practice of religious education by the policy-making bodies of the State (politicians, government); the educational systems of religiously-affiliated schools (school leaders, teachers); and students' ideas of religious education.

However, the practice of the mono-religious model contradicts the fact that Indonesia is a religiously pluralistic country. According to many scholars, the mono-religious model has at least two weaknesses: (1) its recognition of the dynamics of religious interpretation, and (2) its recognition of religious plurality (Sterkens, 2001; Hermans, 2003; Ziebertz, 2007). First, with the mono-religious model there is no need to contextualise, because context does not add anything to the teaching of religion (e.g. rituals, stories, etc.) (Sterkens, 2001). In some religious traditions, contextuality in religion is perceived as imperfection and as deviation from mainstream traditions. For instance, ideas of religious purification confirm religious communities' resistance to new ideas and insights.[7] This idea is reflected in the aims of the mono-religious model, where the identity of each new generation is perceived as a repetition of what is considered to be the 'original' religious identity.

Second, with regard to the recognition of religious plurality, the mono-religious model does not provide students with the opportunity to learn about different religions and from other religious believers. Students are only able to enhance their knowledge of their own religion while pretending to live in a mono-religious situation that does not actually exist in our global society (Küng, 1991). Recognition of other religious traditions is a problem for the mono-religious model, as it does not approach other religions in terms of their own self-understanding. Other religions are interpreted and evaluated entirely from an outsider's perspective, i.e. from the seeker's own frame of reference.

There is a possibility that the mono-religious model could lead to ethnocentrism or religiocentrism (Anthony et al., 2005). The model runs the risk of strengthening positive in-group attitudes and negative attitudes towards religious out-groups. As predicted by contact theory, a consequence

7 The jargon 'Back to the Qur'an and the Prophet's tradition' leads to the understanding that the only sources of truth are those written in the old traditions. People are imagined to have lived in a 'golden era' during the time of the Prophet Muhammad.

of religiocentrism is that students trust only those who share their religious identity. As a result, they may potentially refuse to have more than minimal social contact with persons from other religions and even claim absolute religious truth (Putnam, 2007).

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