

# AL-ALBAB

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## RELIGION AND DIPLOMACY: THE DYNAMICS OF INDONESIAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS DURING PRESIDENT JOKO WIDODO GOVERNMENT

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### ABSTRACT

*This study aims to analyze the dynamics of relations between Indonesia and Afghanistan during the reign of Joko Widodo before and after the Afghan coup by the transnational Islamic movement of the Taliban. Even though the Taliban is back in power in Afghanistan, relations between Indonesia and the Afghan government are still going well. This research is a qualitative descriptive study using the concept of multitrack diplomacy to answer the problem of this research. The method to collect data by literature study, the journals used as references are reputable journals randomly obtained from several publishers such as Taylor & Francis Online and Sage. In addition, researchers also use Harzing publish or Perish. When searching for articles, the primary key used by the authors in Harzing is Indonesia Afghanistan, Indonesia-Afghanistan relations, Jokowi Afghanistan, Indonesia's response to Afghanistan. The authors also used an open knowledge map from 2014-to 2021 to complete the data source. The authors imported the article into Mendeley in the next stage and then used Vosviewer software to determine clusters and research gaps. The authors found that Indonesia and Afghanistan have an excellent relationship, as seen by the contribution of Indonesia, which is actively involved in responding to Afghanistan's internal conflict with the Taliban in efforts to handle Afghan refugees and the involvement of non-governmental organizations. There was also a shift in the focus of issues in Indonesia's relations with Afghanistan. Before the Taliban coup in Afghanistan, the Indonesian government was more focused on the topic of refugees.*

**Keywords:** Dynamic; Indonesian and Afghanistan Relation; Joko Widodo Government



## INTRODUCTION

Since the nine-eleven incident at the World Trade Center building in the United States in 2001, the transnational Islamic movement has increasingly become a global conversation. One of which is because the international Islamic movement involving Al-Qaeda and the Taliban is considered the mastermind behind the attacks in the United States (Gul, 2010). The attack attracted international attention, so since then, America has declared war and terrorism, and Muslims worldwide have a terrible image after the bombings (Alfonseca, 2021). In fact, in 2014, cases of terrorism that occurred in the world increased to 17,000 attacks (Smith & Zeigler, 2017). It causes the transnational Islamic movement Al Qaeda and the Taliban to be considered the main actors in these cases.

Among the issues of interest are the issue of terrorism and Afghanistan; government power that occurs in Afghanistan is always associated with one of the transnational Islamic movements, namely the Taliban. The Taliban is one of the global Islamic movements originating from the Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan and is commonly referred to as fundamentalist Islam because its existence aims to make Afghanistan an Islamic state using a more powerful way than just doing da'wah, such as: banning watching movies, watching television, listening to music and even banning girls from getting an education after the age of 10 (Official, 2021). The Taliban in 1996-2001 succeeded in carrying out a coup against the Afghan government and managed to control 90% of the Afghan state (Laub & Writer, 2014).

However, in August 2021, the Taliban could retake the Afghan government (Lindsay Maizland, 2021). The Taliban succeeded in carrying out a coup against Afghanistan because of its increasing strength since 2018, both in terms of military power and through well-established funding; the Taliban military operates with its expertise, namely with very disciplined combat troops (Giustozzi, 2014). In addition, the withdrawal of US military forces from Afghanistan makes the Taliban easily control several essential areas in Afghanistan, including the capital area (Behuria, 2019). The Taliban is trying to take the reins of power held by the central government with acts of terrorism and violence capable of destabilizing the country. It can be seen when the Taliban returned to power that terrorism in Afghanistan increased, the spread of various prohibited economic activities, security threats, problems in the economy, humanitarian violations, and the difficulty of Afghanistan to achieve stability so that Indonesia built relations with Afghanistan to achieve peace in the country with the Taliban's transnational Islamic movement (Siagian, 2018).

This study examines the relationship between the Indonesian government and Afghanistan during Joko Widodo. After the Taliban coup in 2021, Afghanistan is difficult to achieve peace, and an increasing number of refugees in Indonesia are trying to seek asylum in Indonesia (Aziz, 2016). In December 2020, there were 8000 Afghan refugees in Indonesia based on United Nations data (Khamoosh, 2021). Afghan people support peace efforts in the Taliban coup (Ali et al., 2016). The existence of peace efforts assisted by Indonesia shows that the relations between the Indonesian government and Afghanistan are cooperative. Good ties that have lasted for a long time have made Indonesia more active in resolving conflict to achieve peace. This conflict resolution effort has provided an opportunity for the Taliban government and the Afghan government to discuss the peace process. Indonesia is also trying to increase capacity building by holding several workgroups attended by Afghan officials who will discuss infrastructure and the development of the Afghan state (Farizan & Heryadi, 2021). This study focuses on the Jokowi administration due to the increasing relationship between Afghanistan and Indonesia despite regime changes before and after the reign of the Taliban in Afghanistan, as evidenced by Jokowi's efforts to resolve internal conflicts in the country that have been described in the Summit, one of which is the Conference High Level (Summit) Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) (Ghita Intan, 2021).

There are several previous studies regarding the dynamics of Indonesia's relations with Afghanistan during the Joko Widodo administration. According to Sugara (2021), connections and links between Indonesia and Afghanistan can be seen in the efforts made by the Indonesian government to overcome internal conflicts related to the Taliban. Even Indonesia is seeking forms of development cooperation and government capacity to build the people of Afghanistan (Sugara, 2021). Meanwhile, according to Joshua & Natalia (2021), relations between Indonesia and Afghanistan are not only seen from the ministerial-level meeting. Bilateral meetings will undoubtedly be held for countries that have, but diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Afghanistan are not only strengthened by various internal conflicts. What happened in Afghanistan was related to gender, refugees, etc. Still, the relationship formed since 1954 was supported by President Joko Widodo in dealing with the case of Afghan refugees as outlined in Presidential Regulation number 125/2016 (Joshua & Natalia, 2021).

Clayton (2021) found that the dynamics of the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan began when the United States withdrew from the Taliban. This became a golden opportunity for the Taliban. Since then, the Taliban started their attacks by occupying several areas in Afghanistan and even being able

to control +- 200 /400 districts and capitals in Afghanistan. The power of the Taliban is so strong that Afghanistan quickly takes control of Afghanistan (Thomas, 2021). Emharis (2021) argues that the relationship between Indonesia and Afghanistan can be seen in 2020 when President Jokowi formed the Women Solidarity Network (AISWN), which was successfully inaugurated in Afghanistan related to the vital role of women and ulama in achieving peace in Afghanistan. According to Emharis, Islamic organizations can attract international attention making Indonesia also involves Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in achieving peace (Pritama & Mada, 2021). According to Irvan (2021), precisely in Jakarta, Indonesia and Afghanistan held a diplomatic meeting resulting in the Afghan Nahdlatul Ulama, which aims to achieve peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government (Mahfudin, 2021). Meanwhile, according to Arief (2020), Indonesia-Afghanistan relations are ideal, considering that Indonesia during the Jokowi administration was active in fighting for peace in Afghanistan, both through the attitude seen when Jokowi and Afghanistan together formed MOWA and Women's Empowerment and Child Protection (KPPPA) and this collaboration. It also resulted in an MoU between the two parties (Rachman et al., nd).

Ali (2020) mentions that the relationship between Indonesia and Afghanistan is supported by the principle of Indonesia's foreign policy, which is free and active. President Jokowi and Afghanistan often hold meetings to discuss internal issues and peace in Afghanistan. According to Ali, the relationship between the two can be seen when the Indonesian state assists, such as infrastructure assistance, education, investment, and training held by the Indonesian state 50 times, specifically for Afghanistan and the government (Age, 2020).

According to Febian & Dudy (2020), since Afghanistan's return to the hands of the Taliban in 2021, under President Jokowi's administration, Indonesia has been more aggressive in reducing the conflict in Afghanistan. Indonesia eliminated various forms of human rights violations in Afghanistan when the Taliban did not want to enter into negotiations with the Taliban. The Afghan government is where Indonesia's response to the internal conflict in the country is increasingly visible when Indonesia is increasingly optimistic about negotiating and becoming a mediator between the Taliban and the Afghan government (Farizan et al., 2020). According to Parwis, Ida, and Oekan (2019), in responding to the transition in Afghanistan, it is necessary to provide training assistance, knowledge, and experience related to conducting peace mediation in Afghanistan (Mosamim et al., 2020). Meanwhile, according to Taraf (2020), in addition to this way, Indonesia also strengthens its relationship


with the country through grants that are given to improve welfare and peace (Kurniadi, 2020). Apart from these responses, according to Taraf, Indonesia has long established a task force consisting of Muslim leaders whose aim is to fight the ideas spread by radical groups (Pankaj, 2006).

Research on transnational Islamic movements related to the Taliban has been dominated by research related to Indonesia-Afghanistan relations associated with ASEAN, where the cluster can be seen from data visualization using VosViewer software. Various existing studies do not realize that research on connections between Indonesia and Afghanistan Regarding Afghan refugees in Indonesia, the role of non-governmental organizations is fundamental because the relationship between the two has been going on for a long time. Another exciting thing is to see Indonesia's relations after the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2021 that relations between the two countries will continue to improve despite the concerns of the Indonesian state regarding radicalism.

Regarding the Taliban, international researcher Thomas H. Johnson found that the purpose of the presence of the Taliban is to change the government in Afghanistan to be more effective. The characteristics of the transnational Islamic movement of the Taliban in achieving its goals tend to use various tactics that have been used in previous conflicts, such as conflicts in Pakistan, Iraq, etc. The Taliban has become a movement that is adept and understands bombs and explosive devices. Some strategic adaptations and innovations can be seen when the rate of killings carried out by the Taliban is increasing (Johnson, 2013). Regarding the Taliban, D'Souza said that along the way, the Taliban put forward a code of ethics known as Lahey, which contained a statement that all people would be killed if they provided a place for the enemies, namely America and the apostate Afghan government. The Taliban also seems sensitive to the existence of rules in the code of ethics related to the death penalty. Therefore, the Taliban tend to be strict in implementing their code of ethics (D'Souza, 2018). In addition, Giustozzi found that the Taliban is a transnational Islamic movement that is referred to as an insurgent by many countries. Since 2002, their attitude has tended to change drastically. The Taliban could also carry out general elections by establishing two commandos spread throughout Afghanistan. (Giustozzi, 2016).

This work is based on research using the concept of multitrack diplomacy. The data collection employs literature studies on published materials including reputable journals randomly obtained from several publishers such as Taylor & Francis Online and Sage. In addition, Harzing to publish or perish is also used. The authors also used an open knowledge map from 2014-to 2021 to complete the data source. In the next stage, the authors entered the article into

Mendeley, which is then processed using Vosviewer software to determine clusters.



## THE CONCEPT OF MULTITRACK DIPLOMACY

Multitrack diplomacy is a concept that consists of nine tracks that aim to create world peace, this concept mixes and matches the role of government and diplomacy because this concept uses a soft power strategy in creating peace, be it by building relationships with other countries. The nine tracks include: Track 1, the leading actor in track 1 is the government, where the government is essential in building peace through diplomacy. Track 2, namely non-government, where the main actors in track 2 are professional people trusted to resolve a conflict through communication and dialogue with non-state actors. In creating peace, track 3, namely business, can be done through trade routes that focus on economic aspects. Track 4, namely Private Citizen, is a track that involves NGOs and other interest groups in creating world peace. Track 5 is a step to realizing peace through education, training, etc. Track 6 is the realization of peace through activists.

Track 7 is religion, where this multitrack diplomacy believes that religion can create harmony through religious activities and beliefs. Track 8 is funding related to the provision of assets in building peace. The last is the Communication and media track, where good media and communication create harmony. Track 5 is a step to realizing peace through education, training, etc. Track 6 is the realization of peace through activists. Track 7 is religion, where this multitrack diplomacy believes that religion can create harmony through religious activities and beliefs. Track 8 is funding related to the provision of assets in building peace. Last is the Communication and media track, where good media and communication are believed to make harmony. Track 5 is a step to realizing peace through education, training, etc. Track 6 is the realization of peace through activists. Track 7 is religion, where this multitrack diplomacy believes that religion can create harmony



through religious activities and beliefs. Moreover, Track 8 is funding related to the provision of assets in building peace. The last is the Communication and media track, where good media and communication create harmony (Saputra, 2019).

The concept of multitrack diplomacy was initially introduced in 1981, which was first introduced by Joseph Montville, who wrote about foreign relations and even created track one because he considered that conflict resolution requires the role of government. Louise Diamond and McDonald continued Joseph Montville's thinking to create track two aimed at creating peace by involving non-government actors. This concept was present because many conflicts had to be resolved at that time, and the originators thought that peace would be able to be created through soft power (John W. McDonald, 2002).

In this study, we used track one and track two to describe the relationship between Indonesia and Afghanistan; the relationship between the two is getting closer when Indonesia tries to resolve the internal conflict in Afghanistan involving the Taliban. Track one consists of the government resolving a dispute with soft power. In Afghanistan's internal war involving the Taliban, President Joko Widodo is to achieve peace in Afghanistan through diplomacy (Walsh, 2019).

#### **BEFORE THE AFGHANISTAN COUP BY THE TALIBAN (2014-2021)**

The most visible thing in the relationship between Indonesia and Afghanistan before the 2021 Taliban coup was the involvement of non-governmental actors such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama and the dominance of issues related to the refugee issue. Nonetheless, The relationship that exists between Indonesia and Afghanistan has been started with the signing of an amicable agreement between the two, namely a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on April 24, 1955, to build an Islamic Center located in Kabul to prevent Afghanistan from the impact caused by the presence of the Taliban in the country. In this regard, the bilateral relationship between the two is increasingly cooperative from year to year. The relationship between the two was even closer when there was an Indonesian mission to create peace in Afghanistan to anticipate the return of the Taliban to power. During Joko Widodo, the relationship between the two was increasingly visible when Indonesia became a facilitator in eradicating violence (DPR RI, 2016).

In achieving peace in Afghanistan, Indonesia emphasizes diplomatic efforts by negotiating to solve problems, both with Soft diplomacy and shuttle diplomacy; namely, Indonesia sends mediators to carry out intra-Afghan

communication. Apart from diplomacy, Indonesia is also trying to build peace by training all those who occupy the formal sector, the military, civil society, diplomats, police, and other security forces. Another approach taken is in the infrastructure sector, namely by holding international workshops related to infrastructure development attended by Afghan policymakers to improve infrastructure in Afghanistan (Ali et al., 2016).

In 2017 President Jokowi attended a summit in Saudi Arabia to discuss peace in Afghanistan and the Taliban. Relations between Indonesia and Afghanistan are based not only on Indonesia's free-active foreign policy but also on the 1945 constitution related to the realization of world peace based on freedom, eternal peace, and social justice as the foundation of relations with Afghanistan. In addition, the approach taken by the Indonesian state was seen when the Indonesian state became a mediator in the ceasefire agreement attended by representatives of the Taliban and representatives of Afghanistan. (Rachman, 2020).

The relationship between the two was also seen when there were 31 meetings at the ministerial level with several countries in the world to discuss Afghanistan's internal issues and their involvement in several programs, such as Neonatal and Child Health Service Group Training on agribusiness, higher education in the field of Public Health Training on Maternal, Training On Empowering Women Through, Social Economic and Culture. Jokowi also attended the High Peace Council for Afghanistan in 2017 on a peace mission. Indonesia actively collaborated with the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MOWA) and the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection (KPPPA) well as the establishment of Afghanistan Indonesia Women Solidarity (AISWN) for the empowerment of women starting in December 2013. President Jokowi also used Tree End, including ending various forms of women's economic inequality, ending violence against women, and trafficking in people. Indonesia considers that commitment to achieving peace in Afghanistan is essential in strengthening Indonesia's relations with Afghanistan. (Rachman et al., 2020.).

In addition, in 2019-2020, Indonesia became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the fourth time. Before the rule of the Taliban for the second time in Afghanistan, Indonesia played an active role as a non-permanent member because Indonesia is considered capable of realizing peace given the mild political conditions of democracy. Even Indonesia is regarded as a neutral country in various situations. In 2019-2020, Indonesia became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council led by President Jokowi by prioritizing several things, including Indonesia promoting a peaceful settlement of the Afghanistan dispute through Indonesian partnerships.

Moreover, Indonesia is also concerned on contributing to strengthening the ecosystem and geopolitics of peace. Indonesia is building peace, increasing the role of women in achieving the mission of peace and sustainable development. In addition to these things, Indonesia has expanded the Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which all members have approved by the UN security council. UNAMA aims to create peace by upholding gender equality, human rights, child protection, and women's empowerment which are challenging to achieve in the country. Indonesia's success in the Afghanistan issue was seen when the UN security council issued resolution 2513 regarding UNAMA, which had been mutually agreed upon before child protection. Women's empowerment is challenging to achieve in this country. Indonesia's success in the Afghanistan issue was seen when the UN security council issued resolution 2513 regarding UNAMA, which had been mutually agreed upon before child protection and women's empowerment were challenging to achieve in this country. Indonesia's success in the Afghanistan issue was seen when the UN security council issued resolution 2513 regarding UNAMA, which had been mutually agreed upon before (Budiman, 2021).

Regarding the actors involved, as we know that religious organizations play an essential role in achieving peace in a country, and even Indonesian religious organizations play an active role in the dynamics of Afghanistan, one of which is Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) can be interpreted as an organization that aims to spread religion and Islamic values in accordance with the Qur'an and Hadith that are moderate, characterized by tolerance and even Nahdlatul Ulama has an extensive range of motion and can respond to various issues not only in Indonesia but in other countries, like Afghanistan (Haris et al., 2020).

In the case of Afghanistan, Nahdlatul Ulama is involved in achieving peace. Nahdlatul Ulama took a step to achieve peace in Afghanistan by motivating people based on religious beliefs. The beginning of Nahdlatul Ulama's involvement in peacekeeping missions was when Nahdlatul Ulama organized a meeting with a consultation forum for Afghanistan peace in Jakarta by bringing together Indonesian and Afghan religious actors. The conference can become a medium of communication between religious actors to discuss alternative solutions to achieve peace. In this meeting, several things were agreed upon by Indonesia and Afghanistan, including ending the conflict in Afghanistan and Islam based on the principles of *i'tidal*. NU and Muhammadiyah often hold meetings with Afghanistan by introducing moderate views of Islam (Mahfudin, 2021).

The involvement of religious actors is critical because Islam in foreign policy

is the main factor in decision-making. Nahdlatul Ulama plays an active role in various government agendas. For example, in 2017, NU hosted a visit to the Afghan Security Council, and in 2018, it joined the trilateral Ulama Conference by introducing Islam Wasathiyah. The output produced is a policy to form the Afghanistan Women's Solidarity Network Indonesia (AISWN). Afghan scholars also have great sympathy for Nahdlatul Ulama. It was proven when Afghan religious leaders visited the Nahdlatul Ulama headquarters, and even Afghanistan also established an NU called NUA (Nahdlatul Ulama Afghanistan) (Pritama & Mada, 2021).

As for the issues discussed, the Jokowi government emphasizes solving problems of radicalism and terrorism. The various internal conflicts strengthened diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Afghanistan. However, the relationship that has been formed since 1954 has been supported by the actions taken by the Indonesian government in dealing with the case of Afghan refugees in Indonesia, and even foreign policy regarding refugees has also been stated in Presidential Regulation number 125/2016 where the law was issued. Used as the norm in dealing with Afghan refugees, Indonesia has also signed a general declaration of human rights related to the 1951 Convention regarding the protection and rights that must be given to refugees as fundamental rights that humans must possess. Therefore Indonesia positions itself as a country. Recipients who have the right to host Afghan refugees. The findings produced by Joshua & Natalia (2021) Tobe are many as 55% of refugees in Indonesia come from Afghanistan. The number of refugees who come cannot be separated from the internal upheaval involving the Taliban in that country and even refugees who are widely accepted by Indonesian state are classified as stateless persons or those who no longer have citizenship. During President Jokowi, Indonesia accommodated 13,000 Afghan refugees from the Hazara ethnic group and was Shia. Indonesia also issued a policy to establish an informal school called CRLC, located in Cisarua. Even in 2013, this informal school began to hold often various forms of meetings (Missbach, 2019).

In assessing the Indonesian state's role in overcoming Afghanistan's internal conflict with the Taliban, Indonesia will play several essential functions, especially for refugees. Indonesia is concerned about the human rights of all Afghan refugees to get legal protection. It carries out an evacuation strategy for all Afghans trying to escape from their country to stay safe. This strategy is discussed with the United Nations (UN), and Indonesia also plans to pressure Australia to speed up the regulatory process for refugees from Afghanistan. (Amalia, 2021). In addition, regarding Indonesian law, it has plans to ratify

international conventions related to refugee status, which aims to reduce the suicide rate of Afghan refugees and fulfil the rights of refugees in Indonesia. Indonesia continues to be active in resolving internal conflicts related to the Taliban (Nailin Saroh, 2021).

#### **AFTER THE AFGHANISTAN COUP BY THE TALIBAN (2021-2022)**

After the success of the Taliban in controlling Afghanistan, it was seen that there was a shift in the focus of issues in Indonesia. Previously Indonesia focused on dealing with refugee issues and the role of non-governmental organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama religious organizations in achieving peace in Afghanistan. However, after the Taliban controlled Afghanistan, Indonesia focused on issues compared to before, focusing on radicalism problems and empowerment of women's rights.

#### ***Efforts to Prevent the Spread of Radicalism in Indonesia***

Regarding the issue of radicalism, the relationship between Indonesia and Afghanistan after the reinstatement of the Taliban in 2021 did not have much effect on diplomatic relations between the two countries. Even the president of Indonesia and his deputy Jusuf Kalla, who was a spokesman for peace between Indonesia and Afghanistan, said that Indonesia would maintain relations even though Afghanistan is led by the Taliban (Mandasari, 2021). The vice president of Indonesia also added that the diplomatic relations between the two were still improving until now because there are several reasons. The diplomatic relations between the two countries have been going on for a long time (Wardah, 2021).

However, internally some concerns are felt by the Indonesian state as a country with the most significant Muslim majority in the world regarding the widespread understanding of radicalism in Indonesia so that the efforts made by President Jokowi in 2021 are to strengthen the function of the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT). One step is to reinforce the values of nationalism and nationality. In addition to these things, BNPT is trying to enhance religious values because the Taliban is one of the transnational Islamic movements whose vision and mission is to make Afghanistan an Islamic state. Therefore, according to BNPT, it is also capable of overcoming by strengthening religious values (CNN official, 2021).

In addition, a spokesman for the Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency stated that the return of the Taliban government in Afghanistan could endanger Indonesia because of the efforts of extremist groups in



campaigning for a caliphate in Indonesia. Even the victory of the Taliban was able to inspire radicalism and terrorism groups in fighting for an Islamic state in Indonesia (Yamin, 2021). Indonesia's concern about the spread of radicalism and terrorism can be seen in Indonesia's meeting and commitment to Australia in tackling the spread of radicalism in Indonesia. Even Indonesia and Australia visited Jakarta, which was attended by the Indonesian foreign minister Retno Marsudi with Senator Marise Payne Australia, to discuss the critical situation of the spread of terrorism and radicalism after the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The concerns experienced by the Indonesian state were seen when Indonesia had renewed several bilateral agreements and signed agreements related to security, resistance to radicalism and terrorism (Barker, 2021).

The concerns experienced by the Indonesian state cannot be separated from the return of the Taliban to lead Afghanistan. Therefore, the Indonesia considered being able to provide new energy for militants in Indonesia, such as the excellent reception given by the Syariah congregation led by the son of Abu Bakar Bashir. He thinks that the Taliban's victory is also a victory for the Muslim community, and even the FPI and the 212 movements welcome the Taliban's victory in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Jamaah Islamiyah benefited the most from the Taliban's victory in Afghanistan. Even the Indonesian National Intelligence Agency found that the accused of terrorism and radicalism connected to the Taliban was inspired by a suicide bombing at Kabul airport that was then attempted in Indonesia.

### ***Women's Rights Empowerment Issues***

As for the issue of women's empowerment, since the return of the Taliban to the Afghan government, Indonesia has changed the focus of the problems in relations between Indonesia and Afghanistan, which was initially active in handling refugee issues and non-government roles, but since August 2021 Indonesia has been involved in contributing to the empowerment of rights. Women in Afghanistan were conveyed by President Jokowi and Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi. As we know that women are one of the victims of violence that always occurs in Afghanistan, and therefore Indonesia has formed several policies to overcome these problems (Agustina, 2003).

Indonesia's involvement in the dynamics of Afghanistan is seen when Indonesia is involved in the United Nations. In contrast, Indonesia's policy is seen when Indonesia, along with other countries, is active in the commission on the status of women, which aims to create peace in Afghanistan. Indonesia's involvement in achieving peace in Afghanistan, namely by attending the High

Peace Council for Afghanistan in 2017, basically the issue of women did not become a fundamental issue in Indonesia before the rule of the Taliban. Still, this issue will become important in 2021 because Indonesia is concerned about inequality. Women's rights in Afghanistan and not only that, but Indonesia is also actively collaborating with the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MOWA) and the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection (KPPPA), and the establishment of Afghanistan Indonesia Women Solidarity (AISWN) for women's empowerment. Indonesia's policy to create peace in Afghanistan can also be seen from the Tree End, including ending various forms of women's economic inequality, ending violence against women, and ending trafficking in humans and women (Rachman et al., nd).

In Indonesia's meeting with the United Nations, Jokowi mentioned the importance of women's issues in the dynamics of Indonesia's relations with Afghanistan. Indonesia considers that there has been a lot of marginalization and violence against women. Therefore, the rights for women must be upheld. In his meeting with Afghan leaders, the Indonesian foreign minister emphasized that Indonesia will provide educational funding assistance for Afghan women to fulfil their rights (Jesus, 2021).

## CONCLUSION

The relation between Indonesia and Afghanistan under the Taliban has been running quite harmonious. However, the events of the Taliban coup in 2021 has caused a shift in the issue of cooperation between the two countries. Before the coming of the "new" Taliban, the collaboration between the two countries focused on the topic of refugees as Indonesian government under President Jokowi accepted Afghanistan refugees. In addition, Indonesia is a transit point for Afghanistan refugees before heading to Australia. In the cooperation between the two countries, non-governmental actors also have important roles in reducing Afghanistan's internal conflict. Two most influential Islamic non-organisations in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, have been actively getting involved in the relation buildings of the two countries. However, since the reinstatement of the Taliban in 2021, Indonesia has focused more on the issue of women's rights and radicalism as preventive efforts against the spread of radicalism in Indonesia.

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