

## RESISTANCE OF TRADITIONALIST ISLAM TO THE INFLUENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN CAMPUS ENVIRONMENT

**Ilyya Muhsin**

*Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Salatiga*

Email: [ilyya\\_muhsin@uinsalatiga.ac.id](mailto:ilyya_muhsin@uinsalatiga.ac.id)

**Miftahuddin**

*Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Salatiga*

Email: [miftahuddin@uinsalatiga.ac.id](mailto:miftahuddin@uinsalatiga.ac.id)

**Muhammad Chairul Huda**

*Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Salatiga*

Email: [choirulhuda@uinsalatiga.ac.id](mailto:choirulhuda@uinsalatiga.ac.id)

**Sukron Ma'mun**

*Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Salatiga*

Email: [sukron.mn@uinsalatiga.ac.id](mailto:sukron.mn@uinsalatiga.ac.id)

**Roma Wijaya**

*Ankara University, Ankara, Türkiye*

Email: [rwijaya@ankara.edu.tr](mailto:rwijaya@ankara.edu.tr)

### ABSTRACT

*This study aims to analyze the efforts of traditionalist Islamic groups within Indonesian universities to counter the growing influence of transnational Islamic movements. Employing a qualitative research methodology, the study provides a comprehensive examination of the dynamics between transnational movements -such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Jamaah Tarbiyah, and Jamaah Salafi- and traditional Islamic organizations, notably Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PMII), within the context of the University of Yogyakarta. The findings reveal that transnational Islamic movements have strategically utilized existing campus infrastructure to expand their influence. The ideological contestation is accompanied by movement-based tensions, as traditionalist groups actively resist the growing presence of these transnational actors. The study concludes that universities play a critical role in mitigating radicalism by engaging constructively with the ideological frameworks of transnational Islamic movements.*

**Keywords:** Traditionalist Islam; Transnational Movements; Higher Education Environment

## INTRODUCTION

Campus radicalism remains a persistent concern in Indonesia (Harahap, et. al., 2018). Several violent incidents have highlighted how radical ideologies have infiltrated university environments. On June 3, 2019, a suicide bombing in Surakarta was carried out by Rofik Ansharuddin, a university student, who had previously declared allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi via social media (Antara, 2017). Later that year, on November 13, Rabbial Muslim Nasution detonated a bomb at the Medan Police Headquarters, killing himself and six others; Nasution was just 11 years old and still in school (BNPT Media Centre for Peace). These cases underscore the role educational institutions may play in fostering or failing to prevent radicalization.

Empirical data reinforce these concerns. According to a survey by the Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), 39% of students in 15 provinces expressed sympathy for radical ideologies (Antara, 2017). Similarly, the State Intelligence Agency confirmed that 39% of students at public universities (Perguruan Tinggi Negeri/PTN) showed signs of extremist leanings (UNUSIA, 2010). The Setara Institute further identified ten Indonesian universities as particularly vulnerable to radical influences. President Joko Widodo has also acknowledged the infiltration of radical ideas into educational institutions, including universities.

Scholars have extensively examined the role of transnational Islamic movements in shaping campus radicalism. Research by LPPM UNUSIA (2010) indicates the political dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan al-Muslimin*) in universities across Central Java and Yogyakarta, while Salafi-jihadist groups focus more on religious propaganda. Tahir (2015) highlights that students are often recruited by religious figures lacking formal theological education, using ideological indoctrination that leads to radical behavior and violence. Khamid (2016) emphasizes that radical Islamic violence is often justified through selective and literal interpretations of scripture, particularly targeting university youth. Rijal (2011) traces the roots of Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) to transnational Islamic actors who disseminated their ideology through campus da'wah institutions, notably at ITB and IPB. Adiwilaga (2017) warns that puritan movements such as these not only undermine the Indonesian state ideology of Pancasila but also foster intolerance and exclusivism.

Building on these studies, this research focuses on the University of Yogyakarta (UY), a historically significant and nationally respected state university (Andries, 2012), as a case study for understanding the contemporary dynamics of campus radicalism. This article investigates how transnational Islamic movements at UY pursue their ideological agendas and how traditional

Islamic actors respond in efforts to resist radicalism and uphold inclusive religious practices. The choice of UY is deliberate, as it serves as a microcosm of broader national trends in the intersection between transnational Islamic movements and student activism.

This study adopts a qualitative research design, utilizing interviews, document analysis, and field observations (Andries, 2012). Participants were identified using purposive and snowball sampling, targeting student activists affiliated with transnational Islamic movements. One challenge in data collection stemmed from the disbandment of HTI in 2017, which forced affiliated student groups like Gema Liberation to operate clandestinely (Prasetio, 2020). Nevertheless, insights were gathered from both primary sources, including interviews and organizational documents, and secondary literature, such as academic books and journal articles.

For analysis, this research employs the triangulation method developed by Miles et al. (2014 and 1994), which involves an iterative cycle of data collection, reduction, display, and verification to ensure reliability and validity. The triangulation process allows for the systematic interpretation of patterns in how transnational Islamic groups operate within university environments.

This study underscores the urgency of examining radicalization among transnational Islamic groups on university campuses. These groups view students as key targets for recruitment, considering them future leaders and opinion shapers (Aper & Hinkle, 1991). If left unchecked, the spread of radical ideologies among university students may pose a serious threat to Indonesia's national integrity and social cohesion (Singh, 2004). Understanding the mechanisms by which transnational Islamic movements mobilize resources and influence student bodies is crucial for designing effective counter-radicalization strategies. In this context, moderate Islamic groups must develop a nuanced understanding of these movements to offer viable ideological alternatives and promote tolerance on campus.

## **TRANSNATIONAL ISLAM IN THE THEORY OF MOBILIZATION**

Wahid (2009) defines transnational Islam as Indonesian Islamic religious movements controlled by transnational networks. Their presence threatens the nation and state because he divides the community with Islamism. Islamism is an Islamic movement that governs all aspects of human life, including economic, legal, social, political, and state administration (Berman, 2003). The transnational Islamic movement views Islam as a political ideology rather than a religious movement with the goal of establishing an Islamic state (Roy,

1998). This ideology is textual, scriptural, fundamentalist, and intolerant.

Islamic symbols are used to stir up religious fundamentalism with slogans like “*syar’i*” and “*hijrah*” This radicalism encourages violence and destruction in the name of religion, kills people in the name of God’s verses, and doesn’t believe other Muslims. This movement aims to purify Islam’s teachings and eliminate Indonesia’s moderate Islam. Parts of Islam in Indonesia that fit with customs, traditions, culture, and “*volkgeist*” are called superstition by Islamists. Moderate Islamic practices in Indonesia, like *slametan*, *tahlilan*, *manaqiban*, and grave pilgrimages, are shirk.

A number of transnational Islamic movements, including the HTI, the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaah Islamiyah, Wahhabis, and Salafi Jihadists from Iraq and Afghanistan, have made their way into Indonesia (Fox, 2004; Suharto, 2014). Despite their distinct historical backgrounds, these organizations are all on the same spectrum when it comes to establishing a caliphate and enforcing Islamic Sharia law. Because it has the largest Muslim population in the world, Indonesia is a prime target for Islamists and other types of radicals. Islamism was introduced to Indonesia in the 1980s by graduates of Indonesian universities who had studied in the Middle East. In the beginning, it made use of underground movements to disseminate propaganda to students attending public universities. University campuses became production centers for congregations and regeneration centers following the overthrow of the Suharto regime (van Bruinessen, 2002) and the growth of democracy in Indonesia.

Congregations of an Islamist student group can be found on most campuses. Students from the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unit (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI), which is a wing of the Islamic Movement (Ikhwanul Muslimin, IM), Gema Liberation (Gerakan Pembebasan, GP), which is a wing of the Holy Trinity Institute (HTI), and Salafi Jihadist students who lead cultural movements in campus mosques. This wing organization’s goals include the establishment of student congregations and the rectification of Islam. After the reforms in Indonesian higher education, this Islamic student organization flourished there. The student wing of the transnational Islamic movement will be analyzed through the lens of social movement theory by the researcher.

According to Locher (2002), social movement theory can be categorized into four main approaches: mass society theory, relative deprivation theory, political process theory, and resource mobilization theory. Mass society theory posits that social movements arise from the alienation of individuals from established social structures, particularly in contexts of rapid social change or modernization (Kornhauser & Horowitz, 2017). Relative deprivation theory,

on the other hand, emphasizes the perceived sense of injustice experienced when social expectations exceed actual conditions (Davies, 1962).

Political process theory conceptualizes social movements as outcomes of the interaction between political opportunity structures, organizational capacity, and cognitive readiness among participants (McAdam, 1999). Shifts in political power dynamics are seen as enabling conditions for collective mobilization. Resource mobilization theory, initially developed by Oberschall (1973), focuses on the strategic and organizational capabilities of movements to mobilize and utilize resources such as funding, networks, information, and leadership. This framework was later refined by McCarthy & Zald (2012), who introduced the concept of social movement organizations (SMOs) as key actors in sustaining mobilization. Among these perspectives, resource mobilization theory is regarded as the most influential in contemporary social movement research, offering a robust and practical analytical lens through which to examine movement dynamics and longevity.

#### **TRANSNATIONAL ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON UNIVERSITY OF YOGYAKARTA**

We typically rejoice at the toppling of oppressive governments. The hope for greater freedom and democracy following the collapse of the previous regime created the illusion of surplus. It offers a fresh premise on which to build the democratic success of a nation (Huntington, 2005). That occurred on May 28, 1998, when President Soeharto's New Order regime finally fell after 32 years in power (Romli, 2006). Since then, many facets of Indonesian society have undergone rapid transformations as a direct result of the widespread turning on of the democracy faucet. Even within the Muslim community, there are currently active religious groups or movements with clear missions and recognizable symbols. Some members of the Islamic movement seek to establish an Islamic caliphate and base their fight on Islamic law. In other words, the rise of radical Islamic movements like the Transnational Islamic Movement followed the fall of the New Order.

Several months prior to Suharto's resignation, on February 14, 1998, the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah, FKAWJ) was established in Solo. The organization operates from the Ihya' as-Sunnah Islamic Boarding School, located on Kaliurang Street, approximately 15 kilometers from Degolan, Pakem, Sleman, Yogyakarta (Nashir, 2007; Shaleh, 2001). FKAWJ was founded by Ja'far Umar Thalib, a prominent Indonesian Salafi leader. The movement was significantly influenced by the practical application of Wahhabi teachings (Yusanto, 2003a).

The Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah (FKAWJ) was founded by Ja'far Umar Thalib in 1998 in response to what he perceived as widespread misunderstanding of Islamic teachings and the growing influence of democratic ideas (Yusanto, 2003b). Rooted in Salafism, FKAWJ rejects independent interpretation (*ijtihad*) and traditional religious practices (Amal & Panggabean, 2004). Amid Indonesia's political and economic turmoil in 1998, Thalib established Laskar Jihad as FKAWJ's militant wing, gaining notoriety through its involvement in the Maluku conflict. After witnessing sectarian violence in Ambon, Thalib issued a three-month ultimatum to the government before mobilizing Laskar Jihad to the region. On 8 January 2001, local Islamic organizations in Maluku declared the enforcement of Islamic law at the Al-Fattah Mosque (Yusanto, 2003b). A controversial incident followed on 27 March 2001, when a Laskar Jihad member, Abdullah, was stoned to death for adultery in Ahuru Village, reportedly with his consent. Thalib was later arrested on 4 May 2001 in connection with the case. Laskar Jihad was officially disbanded three days after the 2002 Bali bombings.

Members of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) include *ulama*, *dai*, and *habaib* within the Islamic community. The organization was founded in 1998 at the Al-Umm Islamic Boarding School in Ciputat, South Jakarta (Ngatawi, 2006). According to Al-Zastrouw's historical account, the FPI was established to uphold the Islamic principle of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (promoting good and preventing evil). It operates as a nationwide private organisation, claiming a membership of up to five million across 17 provinces, according to its leader, Habib Rizieq (Tempo, 26 November 2000). The group's paramilitary wing, *Laskar Pembela Islam*, functions in a quasi-militaristic capacity, often described as enforcing a form of religious morality, leading to the group being labelled by some as a "sharia police". Rather than institutional reform, the FPI prioritizes a movement-based approach aimed at eradicating perceived moral deviance. As noted by FPI Secretary General Ahmad Sabri Lubis in an interview with Al-Zastrouw, the organization values its mission over formal organisational structures, which are seen as contingent upon specific times and contexts.

The Indonesian Mujahideen Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) was established following the First Mujahidin Congress held in Yogyakarta on 7 August 2000. During this congress, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was appointed as *Amir Mujahidin* (the top leader), marking the formal inception of the movement. In 2003, Irfan Suryahadi Awwas was subsequently elected as Chairman of the *Lajnah Tanfidziyah* (Executive Committee).

The first Mujahideen Congress was held in the Mandala Bhakti Wanitatama



Building in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, from August 5-7, 2000, and was attended by over 1,800 people from a wide range of Islamic and political groups, including Laskar Santri, Laskar Jundullah, Badr Company, Taliban Brigade, Mujahidin Command, and the Islamic Party. At the conference, participants talked about caliphate, imamate, and jihad (Afadlal et al., 2005). For instance, the majority Muslim population in Indonesia was validated and acknowledged as having the right to practice and enforce Islamic law at this first meeting of the Yogyakarta Charter. Islamic law is seen as the only solution to all social and humanitarian crises. According to a 2004 report (Amal & Panggabean, 2004), the main recommendations for enforcing Islamic law in Indonesia came from the 1st Mujahideen Congress. According to this document (Awwas, 2001), efforts should be made to strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic law should be implemented, and a secular state should be rejected. The document also encourages Muslims to cultivate a spirit of *tasamuh* (tolerance) and to work toward the establishment of Islamic law.

On 26 March 2001, at Istora Senayan in Jakarta, radical Islamic leaders formally declared the establishment of the Indonesian Mujahideen Council (MMI). The organization aims to incorporate Islamic law into Indonesia's legal system through constitutional reform, drawing inspiration from the Yogyakarta Charter. MMI asserts that the country's ongoing multidimensional crisis can only be resolved through the implementation of Islamic law (Amal & Panggabean, 2004). Yogyakarta is considered a central hub for the radical Islamic movement in Indonesia, coinciding with the emergence of more structured and institutionalized transnational Islamic groups, including Jamaah Tarbiyah, Hizb al-Tahrir (HT), Jamaah Tabligh, and the Salafi movement.

In this context, the Salafi movement occupies a peripheral position within university life, with its adherents often establishing mosques in residential areas beyond the immediate proximity of university campuses. These mosques serve as strategic bases for disseminating their ideology and garnering support. This trend has emerged as a widespread phenomenon across Indonesia, including in Yogyakarta. The nature and content of the teachings promoted by the Salafi movement significantly influence the religious literacy of young people who are still in the formative stages of understanding their faith. Consequently, the Salafi movement, exemplified by the figure of Ja'far Umar Thalib, can be seen as a prominent representation of Islamic activism in Yogyakarta.

The Tablighi Jamaat has a significant presence in Yogyakarta, which has emerged as one of the movement's key centers of activity and religious study. Yogyakarta also serves as a hub for its publication efforts, with institutions

such as Al-Thaha and Pustaka Illahi, located in Doha near Islamic University of Yogyakarta, actively disseminating Tablighi literature. According to a Shura Council expert from the Jami Kebon Jeruk Mosque—who oversees Tablighi Jamaat activities nationally, including its publishing—these initiatives reflect the group’s strategic role in the region (Ichwan & Shaleh, 2019). In addition to Tablighi Jamaat, Yogyakarta is home to a number of other Islamic groups, such as GPSI (Gerakan Pemuda Surga Indonesia), the Kaaba Youth Movement, the Anti-Drug Movement (Gerakan Anti Narkoba or “Grenades”), Laskar Sabilillah, Laskar Jundullah, and the Mosque Youth Gathering Forum. These groups have been particularly active in campaigns against gambling, alcohol, drugs, and prostitution. Moreover, the Islamic Community Forum (FUI) and the Islamic Jihad Front (FJI) are notably prominent in defending Islamic values in Yogyakarta.

If the radical Islamic movement in Yogyakarta aligns with the characterization often attributed to it, it seeks to establish Islamic law, or even an Islamic state, within Indonesia. The potential influence of such movements on students at UY is therefore significant, especially considering the geographical proximity of various radical Islamic groups. For example, the Al-Jihad Mosque—associated with the Tablighi Jamaat—is located just north of the campus, adjacent to the Al-Ridha Mosque (MPR), which functions as a Salafi base. Additional Salafi-affiliated centers, such as the MPD and other MPR mosques, are also situated off-campus near Public Hospital. Yogyakarta is also a notable base for Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), having played a central role in the movement’s early development. Key figures such as Ismail Yusanto (HTI’s Secretary General), Dwi Condro (one of the early prominent members), Rasyid, Yoyok Tindyo Prasetyo, and Bukhari were instrumental in establishing HTI’s presence in the region. Dwi Condro, an alumnus of both UII and UGM Yogyakarta, was particularly influential. Hizb al-Tahrir was first introduced in Yogyakarta in 1992, and its presence later expanded to other regions, including Bogor, after a decade.

Hizb al-Tahrir (HT) established its presence in Yogyakarta through a student group led by Rasyid, known *own as Santer (Flying Santri)*. This group served as a forum for students from institutions such as UY who sought deeper religious knowledge but had limited access to it. These students perceived the religious education offered at university as insufficient. In response, HTI initiated *Santer* in 1986 as a platform dedicated to the study of Islamic religious teachings (Muhsin, 2007).

Rasyid (Chairman of DPD I HTI Yogyakarta), Dwi Condro (lecturer at STIE Hamfara Yogyakarta and PhD in Economics from Malaysia), Abu Hanif



(STM Development educator), and Dr Andang (lecturer at UY), along with Abu Haliya, Aris, and Karnadi, emerged as key figures in the leadership of Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in Yogyakarta. In 1992, twelve leaders from the *Santer* group, who were then HTI cadres but not full members, underwent formal ideological training, marking the formation of HTI's regional leadership in Yogyakarta. These twelve individuals played a significant role in disseminating HTI's ideology, particularly within UY, highlighting a strong link between HTI's growth and its presence on the UY campus. This connection has significantly influenced student activities at UY. Transnational Islamic movements such as HTI, Tarbiyah, Salafi Jamaat, and Tablighi Jamaat have established a notable presence at UY. Despite UY's formal identity as a public institution, it has increasingly become a central hub for transnational Islamic movements in both Yogyakarta and Indonesia.

Undoubtedly, this movement has continued to expand, particularly after 2021 and in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, as this study is limited to the period prior to 2020, the researcher did not incorporate post-pandemic developments. Nevertheless, the analysis presented above offers a comprehensive overview of how the involvement of various Islamic *Tarbiyah* movements has shaped the dynamics of control and influence exercised by *Tarbiyah*-oriented groups.

## TRANSNATIONAL ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS AND COUNTER-RADICALISM CONTESTATION

Any movement, including transnational Islamic movements, must consider its available resources when seeking influence on campus. Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Jamaah Tarbiyah are able to mobilize effectively due to their strong internal consolidation and highly structured, systematic, and sometimes militant organizational frameworks (Chaqoqo & Ma'mun, 2022). In contrast, Salafi Jamaat and Tablighi Jamaat exhibit less formal organizational structures but operate through influential religious figures. Key Salafi leaders such as Ja'far Umar Thalib, Abu Nida, Abdul Qadir Jawwas, Khalid Basalamah, Syafiq Riza Basalamah, and Firanda play pivotal roles in coordinating their movement. Meanwhile, Tablighi Jamaat functions as an enclave-orientated group, with strategic guidance from its Shura Council based in Jakarta (Mamun, 2019). These distinctions highlight the organizational diversity among transnational Islamic movements: HTI and Jamaah Tarbiyah rely on formalized structures, while Salafi Jamaat and Tablighi Jamaat depend on charismatic leadership and decentralized networks. These differences underscore the varying capacities for resource mobilization among the four movements.

The theory of resource mobilization was first introduced by Anthony Oberschall in his 1973 critique of the dominant Mass Society Theory. Oberschall's formulation addressed the limitations of earlier research by offering a new perspective on collective action (cited in Locher, 2002). He, along with other scholars, challenged the assumption that actors involved in collective mobilization are necessarily socially alienated or motivated by psychological tension. Instead, the resource mobilization paradigm posits that modern social movements require sophisticated communication networks and organizational structures (Singh, 2010). The theory emphasizes the formation of groups that strategically mobilize resources to achieve collective goals (Oberschall, 1973).

Collective goals cannot be achieved without the presence of groups, associations, or organizations. Resource mobilization theory posits that individual frustration, effort, or conviction is insufficient in the absence of structured organization and leadership. While protests or uprisings may occur spontaneously, sustained and meaningful change requires the strategic mobilization of resources (Locher, 2002). As Salafi Jamaat and Tablighi Jamaat are not structurally organized movements, this analysis of transnational Islamic resource mobilization will focus solely on Jamaah Tarbiyah and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). The influence of Salafi and Tablighi groups on campus is minimal, as they operate largely on the periphery. In examining resource mobilization within transnational Islamic movements, this study will analyze the cases of Jamaah Tarbiyah and HTI across three research campuses, considering their mobilization of moral, cultural, socio-organizational, human, and material resources (McCarthy & Zald, 2012).

Collective goals cannot be achieved without the presence of organized groups, associations, or institutions. Resource mobilization theory argues that individual frustration, effort, or perceived truth is insufficient without effective organization and leadership. While protests or uprisings may occur, lasting change depends on how well movements mobilize and structure their resources (Locher, 2002). Given that the Salafi Jamaat and Tablighi Jamaat are not formally organized, analysis of transnational Islamic movements' resource mobilization will focus on Jamaah Tarbiyah and HTI. Furthermore, as Salafi and Tablighi groups operate largely on the periphery of campus life, they are less relevant to discussions of campus contestation (Mamun, 2019). In this context, the study examines how Jamaah Tarbiyah and HTI mobilize moral, cultural, socio-organizational, human, and material resources across three research campuses (McCarthy & Zald, 2012).

Moral resources, such as legitimacy, solidarity, public sympathy, and

endorsement by prominent figures, are central to resource mobilization, with legitimacy receiving the most scholarly attention due to its role in linking cultural contexts to organizational processes. Cultural resources include knowledge of protest legality, organizing press conferences and meetings, and forming associations. Socio-organizational resources are either intentionally formed for movements or appropriated from existing organizations, enabling access to networks, volunteers, and communication channels. Human resources—skills, labor, and leadership—are essential, as are material resources, particularly financial support, which remains critical regardless of other resource types (McCarthy & Zald, 2012).

The resource mobilization approach examines the variety of resources a social movement must mobilize, the interrelationships between social movements and other groups, the social movement's dependence on external support to succeed, and the tactics used by authorities to control or carry out social movements (McCarthy & Zald, 2012). The movement's success depends on how many people join, how determined they are, what sacrifices they make, and how their opponents react (Locher, 2002). The theory of resource mobilization is relevant when looking at transnational Islamic groups and their opponents on campus.

### **Moral Resources**

Organizations require moral resources, particularly legitimacy gained from influential figures, patrons, or institutions. At UY, the Jamaah Tarbiyah movement—through KAMMI—has built a strong legitimacy network supported by urban Muslim communities and sympathetic campus elites. Fatih, KAMMI UY's newly elected Chair, notes that the group was founded by Fahri Hamzah in 1998 in Malang (personal communication, October 1, 2020). Since then, KAMMI has systematically mapped and mobilized support from external networks, faculty, and university bureaucrats aligned with its cause. This legitimacy has bolstered the group's influence, enabling its members to secure the student body presidency (Presiden Mahasiswa) six times in the past decade (Rahman, personal communication, September 30, 2020). In contrast, HTI also cultivates legitimacy at UY but adopts a more exclusive and hierarchical approach, with internal structures kept deliberately opaque—even to lower-level members—to maintain organizational secrecy and control (Aris, personal communication, October 4, 2020; Fatih, personal communication, October 1, 2020).

### **Cultural Resources**

Culture plays a pivotal role in supporting social movements, particularly within Jamaah Tarbiyah, which has developed mature stakeholders, dynamics, and challenges. The movement is well-organized, with KAMMI UY's leadership recruiting students from elementary schools as cultural resources. Jamaah Tarbiyah runs Islamic schools at both the elementary and high school levels, while in public schools, Rohis (Rohani Islam) organizes Islamic studies that introduce the Tarbiyah manhaj and movement, thereby fostering future supporters of KAMMI (Rahman, personal communication, September 30, 2020). Cultural mobilization in Jamaah Tarbiyah began with the establishment of schools as key institutions for spreading its message. Rohis initiated Tarbiyah da'wah, a sentiment echoed by Imaduddin Fadlurrahman from UY.

Similarly, HTI boasts significant cultural resources, bolstered by prominent social media figures like Felix Siau, who propagate HTI's ideology across Indonesia. Yogyakarta hosts key HTI leaders, including Ismail Yusanto, Dwi Condro, Rasyid, Yoyok Tindyo Prasetyo, and Bukhari, who played instrumental roles in founding HTI and spreading its influence within UY. The "Santer" movement, initiated by Rasyid and Condro, served as a cultural gateway for HTI's expansion, with prominent leaders such as Dr. Andang—an influential "Santer"—instilling HTI's philosophy within UY. Despite HTI's strong cultural presence, identifying the movement's cultural resources remains complex, as it operates discreetly and strategically (Aris, personal communication, October 4, 2020; Dullah, personal communication, October 10, 2020). Key members such as Aris and Dullah play crucial roles within HTI and Gema Liberation, contributing to the movement's quiet mobilization.

### **Socio-Organisational Resources**

According to Edwards and McCarthy (2007), social resources refer to organizations structured to achieve movement goals. Snow (2004) further categorizes socio-organizational resources into infrastructure, social networks, and formal organizations. These components are instrumental in facilitating transnational Islamic movements on campuses. At Universitas Yogyakarta (UY), Jamaah Tarbiyah effectively utilizes its socio-organizational resources through the Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK), Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI), and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), which functions as a platform for political engagement (Cahyono, personal communication, October 2, 2020). Despite its denial of formal affiliation, KAMMI is considered an extension of PKS, alongside other groups such as Garda Keadilan, Indonesian Muslim Students' Action Union (Kesatuan Aksi

Pelajar Muslim Indonesia, KAPMI, and Asia-Pacific Youth and Students Foundation (Yayasan Pemuda dan Pelajar Asia Pasifik, YPPAP) (Ilyasin & Ridho, 2021). These organizations help disseminate Jamaah Tarbiyah's ideological framework (manhaj) across the student body (Muhsin et al., 2019).

Jamaah Tarbiyah strategically utilizes “appropriable social organizations” to advance its agenda, notably through student orientation programs (Open Recruitment, Oprek), introductory Islamic courses (Assistensi Agama Islam, AAI), and targeted residential networks designed to consolidate its ideological influence. During the 2010s, the UY administration intervened to reassert control over OPREK and AAI, recognizing the depth of Jamaah Tarbiyah's institutional embeddedness.

Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), while structurally different, shares a comparable reliance on organizational resources. At UY, HTI operates through tightly knit cell systems that obscure their hierarchy and operational structures. This clandestine approach has made it difficult for researchers to identify specific individuals and gather data. Interviews with UY's Gema Liberation members, such as Dullah and Aris, suggest that even members lack knowledge of the full organizational structure, knowing only their immediate mentors (Aris, personal communication, October 4, 2020; Dullah, personal communication, October 10, 2020). HTI's organizational strategy is centered on promoting a global Islamic caliphate governed by Sharia law, rooted in the teachings of its founder, Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani (Nashir, 2007).

HTI views the application of Sharia as encompassing all human actions—from faith and worship to societal interactions and legal sanctions (Yusanto, 2003a). It perceives the modern absence of the caliphate as the root of Muslim societal decline following the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924. Consequently, HTI refuses to separate its resources from its political vision, linking its ideology, Sharia, and the caliphate as an indivisible triad.

To advance this agenda, HTI collaborates with student groups like Gema Liberation, reinforcing its influence within university spaces. Despite HTI's formal disbandment by the Indonesian government, its network remains operational in a subdued form, continuing to engage with students and propagate its ideological goals.

### **Human Resources**

Human resource management plays a vital role in the success of social movement organisations. Edward and McCarthy (2007) highlight the significance of actors' skills, expertise, and experience as part of human resources, crucial

to advancing a social movement. Transnational Islamic groups, particularly Jamaah Tarbiyah, have effectively utilized this understanding to consolidate their presence in Indonesian state universities, including UY. To ensure sustainability, Jamaah Tarbiyah strategically mobilizes human resources through a structured framework of da'wah, referred to as "*da'wah ilallah*", which includes 21 core principles. One central principle is the importance of a correct and comprehensive understanding (*al-fahmu*), which forms the basis of right action. Hasan Al-Banna emphasized this in his ranking of *arkanul bai'ah*, placing *al-fahmu* at the top, describing it as the belief in a solid Islamic worldview based on twenty guiding principles (Parman & Badawi, 2006).

Jamaah Tarbiyah specifically targets university students for several reasons: campuses serve as youth hubs, students hold social prestige, universities are centers of knowledge, and campus da'wah is strategic for cadre development and leadership cultivation (Abdillah, 2012). Since the 1980s, Jamaah Tarbiyah has established a stronghold in elite state universities across Indonesia. The movement starts its regeneration as early as primary and secondary school, continuing into university, where incoming students are welcomed through initiatives like registration assistance, free Islamic boarding recommendations, and orientation programs (AAI). Furthermore, campus mosques are leveraged for Tarbiyah's activities, facilitating mass recruitment annually.

Once on campus, new members undergo systematic cadre development categorized into four levels: beginner, young, intermediate, and mature. Each stage involves *halaqah* sessions covering themes such as Islamic fundamentals, personal development, Islamic thought, and societal engagement. *Halaqah* and *liqa'* have become synonymous with Jamaah Tarbiyah's presence in campuses. This structured HR approach has enabled Jamaah Tarbiyah to dominate UY's social-political landscape. For example, UY Student President Sultan Fafa revealed that Tarbiyah-aligned groups held strategic positions at UY six times in the past decade (personal communication, July 23, 2020).

Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), though similar in structure to Jamaah Tarbiyah, could not achieve the same dominance due to Tarbiyah's earlier establishment. HTI uses a cell system in which members remain unaware of leadership hierarchies above their immediate mentors. The HTI cadre formation begins with recruitment efforts using OPREK and continues with attempts to penetrate student organizations like BEM, DEMAS, and LDK. After HTI's dissolution by the Indonesian government in 2017, the group reverted to clandestine operations under the guise of Gema Liberation. Despite this, HTI continues to influence UY by operating through informal channels.

HTI's human resource development follows three key stages: cadre recruitment



and education (*marhalah tatsqif*), public interaction (*marhalah tafa'ul ma'a al-ummah*), and eventually, political takeover. The first phase includes intensive ideological education via *halaqah* systems. At UY, *halaqah 'am*, general halaqah sessions, serve as introductory platforms. Weekly meetings cover Islamic belief systems, law, history, politics, and the obligation to restore the Islamic caliphate. Each member must attend these sessions, which are designed to identify and develop new potential cadres. The more advanced stages, like *halaqah Aris* and *halaqah hizb*, require members to study foundational HT texts such as *Nizhamul Islam*, *Takattul Hizbiy*, and *Mafahim Hizb ut-Tahrir*.

The cadre development process within Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) places strong emphasis on adherence to Islamic teachings and organizational discipline. Members who violate the principles of HT or Shari'a norms may be deemed morally compromised (Arifin, 2005). Recruitment and ideological indoctrination are designed to ensure that individuals are deeply committed to the movement's objectives. Even following HTI's official disbandment, these ideological bonds have sustained the group's continuity through covert networks such as Gema Liberation.

In the second phase of human resource mobilization—public engagement—HTI seeks to disseminate its ideology to a broader audience by framing discourse around Islamic law and the caliphate, employing both direct action and media outreach. Although public activities have declined following the ban, online platforms continue to serve as vital tools for ideological propagation. If successful, this phase aims to culminate in the final stage: securing political control (Rahmat, 2005).

Before its dissolution, HTI had effectively mobilized human resources at UY by embedding sympathizers within student government, campus mosques, and student organizations. Despite the ban, these individuals continue to operate discreetly. Gema Liberation, while formally separate, remains ideologically aligned with HTI and functions as its clandestine campus extension. Their continued presence suggests that HTI's human resource strategy remains potent in sustaining its influence within UY's socio-political landscape.

### ***Material Resources***

Social movements rely heavily on material resources. Given the scale of mobilization and the diversity of interests involved, sustaining a movement requires substantial financial support. Ideally, this funding is generated independently, depending on how effectively the movement manages its human resources and organizational structure. Jamaah Tarbiyah, for instance,

funds its activities at UY through self-reliant means. According to Fajar Cahyono, cadre training is supported through modest member contributions, with each individual contributing approximately Rp. 1,000 per week (personal communication, October 2, 2020). Recruiting 100–200 students thus provide a significant fundraising base. Additional funds are generated through large religious gatherings, during which donations are collected via charity boxes to support the movement's operational needs.

**Table. 1. Comparison of Resource Mobilization**

Resource Type	Jamaah Tarbiyah	Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)
Moral Resources	Legitimacy from campus elites, support from urban Muslim networks, frequent wins in student leadership elections (KAMMI).	Legitimacy through exclusivist, hierarchical networks; secrecy and control through closed structures.
Cultural Resources	Islamic schooling system (elementary to high school), use of Rohis, early cadre building, structured da'wah through schools and campus.	Cultural propagation via public figures (e.g. Felix Siauw); key founders and 'Santer' movement influence at UY.
Socio-Organizational Resources	Leverages KAMMI, LDK, and PKS; operates through OPREK, AAI, and structured residential networks.	Operates via cell-based clandestine structures; uses Gema Liberation; opaque hierarchy even to members.
Human Resources	Structured cadre system ( <i>halaqah</i> ), from elementary to university; systematic recruitment; influence in campus leadership.	Three-stage cadre development: education ( <i>halaqah</i> ), public engagement, and political takeover; covert mobilization post-ban.
Material Resources	Weekly member contributions (Rp. 1,000), donations from large events, financial self-reliance to support movement.	Member-driven support before disbandment; ongoing discreet financial contributions through Gema Liberation.

## COUNTER RADICALISM AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS

Islamic Religious Assistance (AAI) is under strict control as part of a counter-radicalism strategy against transnational Islamic movements, with the goal of making AAI a monopoly not only for Islamic religious subjects but also for other religions taught in Indonesia. UY and other subjects in need of help are examples of this (Muhsin, 2020). According to Asnawi, the university is now in charge of PPSMB activities, which were previously under the control of student bodies. Under the control of the university, all first-year students are gathered in one location (personal communication, August 7, 2020). The

National Character Strengthening Movement was introduced to them there. In the last decade, UY has implemented the principle of strengthening the national character. Student Creativity Programme (Program Kreativitas Mahasiswa, PKM) in five fields is a programme that encourages students to be productive in their areas of expertise to love and defend the country, such as information technology and appropriate technology. Students will no longer have time to keep up with various movements, including the transnational Islamic movement, because of the plan. One of the biggest concerns for the campus, however, is that the campus mosque serves as a gateway for the transnational Islamic movement to exert its influence on the campus. For example, the Campus Mosque in Balaisiswa and the Al-Ridla Mosque, which is close to the Public General Hospital, are both important symbols of religious life at UY.

Hadipro laid the first stone on the Balaisiswa Campus Mosque on May 21, 1998 (personal communication, Oktober 2020). The mosque construction committee started with IDR 60 million. Thanks to the committee's persistence and the donations of various donors, the funds collected were enough to build a magnificent and representative campus mosque to fulfil the ideal concept of a mosque. After spending Rp 9.5 billion, the UY Campus Mosque opened on December 4, 1999, five days before 1 Ramadan 1420 H. The mosque's first and second floors and courtyard can hold 10,000 worshippers (Kemenag, 2020). Asnawi says this mosque was originally owned by a foundation that collected funds from the community and campus residents, not the campus. The mosque became part of the university's infrastructure in 2017, so it must be in line with the university's vision and mission. The *takmir* manages this mosque, and BPM is written above it (Massage Management Agency). This BPM will maintain all campus mosques according to the university's vision and mission. Certain flags shouldn't use this mosque.

Efforts have been made to safeguard the UY campus mosque from the influence of transnational Islamic movements. Prior to 2017, the mosque was frequently utilized by groups such as HTI, Salafi, and Tarbiyah for research and da'wah activities, often involving external participants, according to M. Nur, the mosque's Imam. Although permits were issued, they did not authorize any specific organizational affiliation. Over time, however, the mosque became associated with radical Islamic activity.

Since 2018, the Al-Ridla Mosque has undergone significant renovations, completed in mid-2020, as part of UY's initiative to reposition it as the university's Islamic Centre. Previously dominated by Salafi-Wahhabi influence, the mosque was a key hub for their gatherings. The renovation aligns with

UY's national and populist vision, aiming to foster a moderate and inclusive religious environment. The newly redefined mosque is intended to support progressive Islamic thought and equip students with essential skills relevant to the digital and technological era.

In response to the presence of transnational Islamic extremist groups, UY has undertaken a deradicalization strategy aimed at reclaiming control over its campus mosques. Deradicalisation seeks to reduce the spread of radical ideologies that may lead to violence, terrorism, or other threats to humanity (Arifin & Bachtiar, 2013). However, this approach has faced internal resistance. Asnawi, for example, opposed the involvement of external actors such as the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), arguing that UY is an autonomous academic space and should remain free from such interventions (Asnawi, personal communication, August 7, 2020). He warned that external deradicalization efforts might contradict university policies and create friction.

Nevertheless, moderate student groups have largely supported UY's internal deradicalization initiatives, viewing them as opportunities to influence and shape the university's socio-political landscape. Organizations such as the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, PMII) and the Nahdlatul Ulama Student Family (Keluarga Mahasiswa Nahdlatul Ulama, KMNU) have increasingly engaged in extra-campus activities. Similarly, the Indonesian National Student Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, GMNI) has reasserted its presence within extra-campus organizations (Interview with Asnawi). Notably, in 2020, a moderate student affiliated with GMNI was elected President of the Student Executive Board, marking the end of a decade-long dominance by KAMMI, a student organization aligned with the Tarbiyah movement. This shift is emblematic of UY's broader institutional identity as a "university of struggle", "a university for the people", and a "cultural center". All campus policies, including those addressing radicalism, are informed by this foundational ethos.

Further deradicalization measures have also been implemented by UY. According to discussions with Asnawi, several concrete steps have been taken. First, Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and anti-NKRI groups have been prohibited from using the UY mosque for cadre formation, a privilege they previously enjoyed without restriction. Second, permission is no longer granted to Wahhabi-affiliated groups, whose sermons often denounce other Islamic groups. Previously, Salafi-Wahhabi activists conducted weekly sermons every Sunday morning at the UY mosque, drawing followers from Yogyakarta and surrounding areas. Third, preachers for Friday prayers and Islamic holiday

commemorations at the UY mosque are now selected from moderate Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Finally, a small mosque owned by UY and previously used as a center for Jamaah Tabligh activities is now directly managed by the university. A lecturer affiliated with NU has been appointed as the head of the *takmir* (mosque management board), while other members are drawn from NU and Muhammadiyah circles. Religious events at the mosque are now consistently led by moderate religious figures.

## CONCLUSION

This study has examined how transnational Islamic movements strategically mobilize moral, cultural, socio-organizational, human, and material resources to influence student life at the University of Yogyakarta (UY). Focusing on Jamaah Tarbiyah and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the research reveals that these movements adopt highly structured and ideologically driven mobilization strategies to penetrate campus institutions and cultivate future cadres. In contrast, moderate Islamic actors—primarily rooted in traditionalist organizations—have begun to counter these influences through internal deradicalization programs and the reinforcement of inclusive religious values. By applying the resource mobilization theory, this study demonstrates that ideological contestation on university campuses is not only a battle of beliefs but also a contest of organizational capacity and strategic resource use. The findings underscore the importance of campus-based interventions that support moderate Islamic frameworks and safeguard pluralism. As transnational movements continue to adapt, universities must actively reclaim their educational and religious spaces to prevent the entrenchment of exclusivist ideologies. Ultimately, the study highlights the university's dual role as both a target of ideological contestation and a critical actor in shaping counter-radicalism strategies in Indonesia's higher education landscape.

## DISCLAIMER

*To protect the privacy of research participants and the institution, the names of individuals and the university discussed in this article are presented using pseudonyms.*

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

- Abdillah, A. (2012). *Paradigma Baru Da'wah Kampus: Strategi Sukses Mengelola Da'wah Kampus di Era Baru*. Adil Media.
- Adiwilaga, R. (2017). Puritanisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Islam Transnasional serta Implikasinya terhadap Pancasila sebagai Ideologi Bangsa. *Journal of Governance*, 2(1). <https://doi.org/10.31506/jog.v2i1.2124>
- Afadlal, Irewati, A., Zaenuddin, D., Purwoko, D., Turmudi, E., Hisyam, M., & Sihbudi, R. (2005). *Islam dan radikalisme di Indonesia*. Yayasan Obor Indonesia.
- Amal, T. A., & Panggabean, S. R. (2004). *Politik Syariat Islam: Dari Indonesia hingga Nigeria*. Pustaka Alvabet.
- Andries, F. F. (2012). Gerakan Masjid Kampus UGM dan UIN Sunan Kalijaga dalam Memahami Politik Nasional. *Jurnal Analisa*, 19(1), 137–145.
- Antara, L. (2017, July 26). Antara. *Antara*.
- Aper, J. P., & Hinkle, D. E. (1991). State Policies for Assessing Student Outcomes: A Case Study with Implications for State and Institutional Authorities. *The Journal of Higher Education*, 62(5), 539–555. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00221546.1991.11774151>
- Arifin, S. (2005). *Ideologi dan praksis gerakan sosial kaum fundamentalis: Pengalaman Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia* (Ed. 1, cet. 1). Penerbitan Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang. <https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1130000794275191040>
- Arifin, S., & Bachtiar, H. (2013). Deradikalisasi Ideologi Gerakan Islam Transnasional Radikal. *Harmoni*, 12(3), Article 3.
- Awwas, I. S., & Kongres Mujahidin dan Penegakan Syariah Islam (1st : 2000 : Yogyakarta, I. (2001). *Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syariah Islam* (Cet. 1). Wihdah Press. <https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1130000795440275712>
- Berman, S. (2003). Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society. *Perspective on Politics*, 1(02), 257–272. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592703000197>
- Cahyono, F. (2020, October 2). *Murobbi Liqa' UY* [Personal communication].
- Chaqqoq, S. G. N., & Ma'mun, S. (2022). The Islamic Discourses of Indonesian Islamist Organizations. *El Harakah: Jurnal Budaya Islam*, 24(1), Article 1. <https://doi.org/10.18860/eh.v24i1.16616>



- Aris, A. (2020, October 4). *Anggota Gema Pembebasan HTI UY* [Personal communication].
- Davies, J. C. (1962). Toward a Theory of Revolution. *American Sociological Review*, 27(1), 5–19. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2089714>
- Edwards, B., & McCarthy, J. D. (2007). Resources and Social Movement Mobilization. In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (pp. 116–152). Blackwell Publishing Ltd. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470999103.ch6>
- Dullah, D. (2020, October 10). *Anggota Gema Pembebasan HTI UY* [Personal communication].
- Rahman, I. (2020, September 30). *Anggota Liqa' Jamaah Tarbiyah UY* [Personal communication].
- Fatih. (2020, October 1). *Ketua KAMMI UY* [Personal communication].
- Fafa, S. (2020, July 23). *Presiden Mahasiswa UY 2020* [Personal communication].
- Fox, J. (2004). *Currents in contemporary Islam in Indonesia*. <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Currents-in-contemporary-Islam-in-Indonesia-Fox/14a2706a53a312960864cba5dab9c2f2b79c2ee0>
- Huntington, S. P. (2005). *Benturan Antar peradaban dan Masa Depan Politik Dunia: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Qalam. <https://simpus.mkri.id/opac/detail-opac?id=4410>
- Ichwan, M. N., & Shaleh, A. Q. (2019). *Gerakan Terjemahan dan Pemikiran Keislaman Kontemporer di Yogyakarta: Komunitas, Jejaring, dan Diseminasi Ideologis, Tren Pemikiran Islam di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru*.
- Ilyasin, M., & Ridho, M. (2021). Islamic Student Organizations' Strategy of Communicating and Maintaining Islamist Ideology Among University Students in East Kalimantan. *Balagh: Jurnal Dakwah Dan Komunikasi*, 6(2), 357–384.
- Kemenag. (2020). *Data Masjid dan Mushalla Tersedia di Aplikasi SIMAS*. <https://kemenag.go.id>. <https://kemenag.go.id/nasional/data-masjid-dan-mushalla-tersedia-di-aplikasi-simas-4b1qfj>
- Khamid, N. (2016). Bahaya Radikalisme terhadap NKRI. *Millati: Journal of Islamic Studies and Humanities*, 1(1), Article 1. <https://doi.org/10.18326/mlt.v1i1.123-152>
- Kornhauser, W., & Horowitz, I. L. (2017). *The Politics of Mass Society* (1st ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315133980>

- Locher, D. A. (2002). *Collective Behavior*. Prentice Hall.
- Mamun, S. (2019). Tablighi Jamaat, An Islamic Revivalist Movement and Radicalism Issues. *Islam Realitas: Journal of Islamic and Social Studies*, 5(2), Article 2. [https://doi.org/10.30983/islam\\_realitas.v5i2.1098](https://doi.org/10.30983/islam_realitas.v5i2.1098)
- McAdam, D. (1999). *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970* (2d edition, Ed.). University of Chicago Press. <https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo5939918.html>
- McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. (2012). Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. *American Journal of Sociology*, 82(6), 1212–1241.
- Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). *Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook, 2nd ed* (pp. xiv, 338). Sage Publications, Inc.
- Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., & Saldaña, J. (2014). *Qualitative data analysis: A methods sourcebook* (Third edition). SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Muhsin, I. (2007). *Gerakan penegakan Syariat Islam: Studi tentang gerakan sosial Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia di DIY* [Universitas Gadjah Mada]. <https://etd.repository.ugm.ac.id/penelitian/detail/36204>
- Muhsin, I. (2020). *Fundamentalisme & Radikalisme di Kampus Negeri*. Ar-Ruzz. <https://kubuku.id/detail/fundamentalisme---radikalisme-di-kampus-negeri/71173>
- Muhsin, I., Rochmawati, N., & Huda, M. C. (2019). Revolution of Islamic Proselytizing Organization: From Islamism to Moderate. *QIJS (Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies)*, 7(1), Article 1. <https://doi.org/10.21043/qijis.v7i1.5076>
- Nashir, H. (2007). *Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia*. PSAP Muhammadiyah. <https://www.belbuk.com/islam-syariat-reproduksi-salafiyah-ideologis-di-indonesia/produk/32551>
- Ngatawi, A.-Z. (2006). *Gerakan Islam Simbolik; Politik Kepentingan FPI*. Lkis Pelangi Aksara.
- Oberschall, A. (with Internet Archive). (1973). *Social conflict and social movements*. -. Englewood Cliffs., N.J.: Prentice-Hall. <http://archive.org/details/socialconflictso0000ober>
- Parman, H., & Badawi, M. (2006). *Teladan tarbiyah: Dalam Bingkai Arkan-ul Bai'ah* (Solo). AULIYA PRESS. [http://www.perpustakaanasyahrilzaenab.com%2Findex.php%3Fp%3Dshow\\_detail%26id%3D426](http://www.perpustakaanasyahrilzaenab.com%2Findex.php%3Fp%3Dshow_detail%26id%3D426)

- Prasetio, B. (2020). Pembubaran Hizbut Tahrir di Indonesia dalam Perspektif Sosial Politik. *Analisis: Jurnal Studi Keislaman*, 19(2), 251–264. <https://doi.org/10.24042/ajsk.v19i2.3371>
- Prasojo, H. (2020, Oktober). *Chancellor of University* [Personal communication].
- Rahmat, M. I. (2005). *Arus baru Islam radikal: Transmisi revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah ke Indonesia*. Erlangga.
- Rijal, S. (2011). *Perkembangan Paham Kegamaan Transnasional di Indonesia*. Balitbang Kemenag RI.
- Romli, L. (2006). *Islam Yes, Partai Islam Yes: Sejarah Perkembangan Partai-Partai Islam di Indonesia*. Pustaka Pelajar.
- Roy, O. (1998). *The Failure of Political Islam*. Harvard University Press. <https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674291416>
- Asnawi, S. (2020, August 7). *Takmir Masjid Kampus UY* [Personal communication].
- Shaleh, A. Q. (2001). Selayang Pandang FKAWJ: FKAWJ Lahir untuk Izzul Islam? *Majalah Mahasiswa Advokasia Fakultas Syariah IAIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta*, 7(8), 15–16.
- Singh, B. (2004). The challenge of militant Islam and terrorism in Indonesia. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 58(1), 47–68.
- Singh, R. (2010). *Gerakan Sosial Baru*. Resist Books. <https://bukuprogresif.com/product/gerakan-sosial-baru-rajendra-singh/>
- Snow, A. D. (2004). *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movement*. Blackwell Publishing.
- Suharto, T. (2014). Gagasan Pendidikan Muhammadiyah dan NU sebagai Potret Pendidikan Islam Moderat di Indonesia. *Islamica: Jurnal Studi Keislaman*, 9(1), Article 1. <https://doi.org/10.15642/islamica.2014.9.1.81-109>
- Tahir, M. (2015). *Wacana Fikih Kebangsaan dalam Penanggulangan dan Pencegahan Radikalisme di Lingkungan Kampus di NTB*. 49(2), 298–314.
- UNUSIA, L. (2010). *Islam Eksklusif Transnasional Merebak di Kampus Negeri di Jateng dan Yogyakarta*. LPPM UNUSIA. <http://syiarnusantara.id/2019/06/26/lppm-unusia-islam-eksklusif-transnasional-merebak-di-kampus-negeri-di-jateng-dan-yogyakarta/>

- van Bruinessen, M. (2002). Genealogies of Islamic radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia. *South East Asia Research*, 10(2), 117–154.
- Wahid, A. (2009). *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia*. The Wahid Institute.
- Yusanto, M. I. (2003a). *Gerakan Islam Militan di Indonesia dan Asia Tenggara*. The Ridep Institute dan Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES).
- Yusanto, M. I. (2003b). Selamatkan Indonesia Dengan Syariat Islam. In *Syariat Islam: Pandangan Islam Liberal*. Jaringan Islam Liberal.