POLITICAL SYSTEM INFLUENCES WITHIN THE INDONESIAN ISLAMIC DA'WAH INSTITUTE (LDII) AND THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (IM)

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the dynamic interactions between religious movements and state authorities by comparing two distinct Islamic organizations: the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Institute (Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia, LDII) in Indonesia and the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin, IM) in Egypt. Both organizations, rooted in Islamic principles, have forged complex relationships with their respective states, yet their paths reflect divergent approaches shaped by unique national contexts. LDII, operating within Indonesia's pluralistic democracy, which Pancasila underpins, has strategically adapted to national norms. Despite past controversies, LDII has embraced a pragmatic approach, emphasizing Quran and Hadith-based teachings, actively participating in socio-economic initiatives, formalizing its organizational structure, and collaborating with government programs. This demonstrates a flexible alignment with Indonesia's emphasis on national unity and religious moderation. In stark contrast, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, once a dominant political force, faced an existential threat following the 2013 military coup. Forced into exile, the IM has largely maintained an ideologically rigid stance in opposition to the state. By analyzing these two cases, this study highlights how contextual factors, ranging from political systems and state ideologies to historical trajectories and internal organizational dynamics, profoundly shape the strategies employed by religious movements to survive and thrive within state-religion frameworks.

Keywords: Political System Influences; Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Institute (LDII); Muslim Brotherhood (IM)

INTRODUCTION

This article examines the response of two Islamic groups, the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Institute (*Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia*-LDII) in Indonesia and the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwanul Muslimin*-IM) in Egypt, to the dynamics

of the relationship between religious movements and state power. Although both are based on Islamic principles, their national political contexts differ, shaping their approaches in distinct ways. LDII, which functions under the Pancasila democratic system in Indonesia, is highly adaptive (Muhammadiyah, 2015). Although LDII was once viewed as a deviant sect (Masud, 2009), it has legitimized its presence by adopting a cooperative strategy: accepting the state ideology, refraining from participation in practical politics, and actively engaging in social and educational life. By harmonizing its Islamic teachings with national and pluralistic values, LDII has established itself as a state partner in ensuring social stability (Rokhim et al., 2025). Conversely, the Muslim Brotherhood has been harshly suppressed after the 2013 military coup in Egypt (Mustonen, 2024; Ardovini, 2022; Hamzawy, 2018). The Muslim Brotherhood, once a significant political force, became a disorganized and marginalized organization that operated in exile and faced a dilemma between preserving its ideological values and taking practical steps. It failed to adjust to a repressive power structure, lost political space, and declined considerably (Abou El Zalaf 2023; Yaghi & Ranko, 2022). This comparison demonstrates that the sustainability of Islamic movements is highly dependent on their capacity to read and react to the national political environment.

The adaptation of Islamic movements in their interactions with the state has been extensively examined. For instance, Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) by McCarthy and Zald (1977) highlights the role of movements in mobilizing organizational resources, such as networks, funding, and ideological cohesion, to address political pressures. Then, Political Opportunity Structure (POS) by McAdam (1996) emphasizes how differences in political environments (such as democratic Indonesia and authoritarian Egypt) shape movement strategies, including collaboration and resistance. In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, researchers such as Wickham (2013) and Tadros (2012) have demonstrated that the group was forced to alternate between opposition and survival strategies by successive Egyptian regimes, including the introduction of community-based welfare programs. Prior research on LDII has focused on its contribution to Islamic education and moral reform, avoiding overt political activism (Ichwan, 2006). However, few studies have systematically compared these two movements, particularly in the context of how differing national environments, Pancasila democracy in Indonesia versus a secular-authoritarian regime in Egypt, shape their religio-political strategies.

This study addresses a research gap by comparing LDII and the Muslim Brotherhood with respect to adaptive strategies. By formulating three questions: How do LDII and the Muslim Brotherhood adapt to different political

contexts? Why do political structures and ideological legacies lead to different paths? What are the strategic consequences of seeking state legitimacy versus facing political repression? By answering these three questions, it is hoped that this will contribute to an understanding of how Islamic organizations apply these strategies in carrying out their movements. This discussion is expected to enrich the existing discourse on these two organizations. In addition, this research employed a comparative qualitative design using case studies of LDII and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to examine their adaptive strategies in the religion-state relationship. The comparative method was selected to explore the varying trends in each organization's response to political pressures, given the pluralist environment of Indonesia and the authoritarian environment of Egypt.

To reinforce the above view, this study is based on three basic assumptions. First, the authors argue that the sustainability of a religious organization does not depend on dogmatism but rather on a mature strategy for observing and interpreting a country's political conditions. Second, differences in the political landscape across countries significantly influence strategy determination. Therefore, cross-country comparisons are essential to reveal as an addition to academic discourse. Third, the choice of strategy in religious organizations is undoubtedly closely related to the implications for their sustainability. Therefore, the authors consider that discussion and debate on the consequences adopted by these two organizations is crucial. Thus, in the future, these strategies can be replicated by external organizations that have or experience similar conditions.

THE EVOLUTION OF LDII FROM THE NEW ORDER TO THE REFORM ERA

The Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Institute (LDII), which has its origins in the *Darul Hadith* movement, is highly adaptable to political changes in Indonesia during the New Order and Reform periods. Under the New Order, LDII was suspected by the state because of its puritan Salafi orientation and closed internal organization (Ichwan, 2006). Nevertheless, LDII did not adopt a confrontational approach as other Islamist organizations did; instead, it pursued a pragmatic survival strategy by focusing on religious education, moral development, and allegiance to the Pancasila ideology (Machmudi, 2008). The depoliticization policy of the New Order forced LDII to distance itself from political activism and to focus on socio-religious roles (Hefner, 2011). Entering the Reform era, LDII capitalized on opportunities arising from decentralization and political openness without engaging in partisan politics.

Its commitment to Pancasila and support for government programs, such as religious moderation and interfaith dialogue, have strengthened its position as a state-recognized Islamic organization accepted within Indonesia's pluralistic society (Azra, 2006).

This adaptation reflects a process of institutional isomorphism, in which LDII aligns itself with state discourses and structures to maintain its existence within a democratic system. Pancasila functions both as a constraint and a strategic opportunity: it limits aspirations for the formalization of sharia, yet provides space for building legitimacy. Particularly during President Jokowi's administration, LDII's non-confrontational approach and its focus on social service have enabled the organization to effectively utilize Indonesia's relatively inclusive Political Opportunity Structure (McAdam et al., 2001). Consequently, LDII has not only succeeded in avoiding repression but has also grown rapidly to become one of the most prominent Islamic organizations in Indonesia. LDII develops its organizational resilience on three interconnected pillars: moral-based religious education, non-political da'wah, and strategic cooperation with the state.

Political pressure during the New Order era led LDII to concentrate on building a system of *Pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) that focused on memorizing the Quran (*tahfiz*), moral behavior (*akhlaq*), and mastering hadith as a symbolic defense against state repression (Ichwan, 2006; Machmudi, 2008). This approach was developed in the post-Reform period, when the story of religious moderation was incorporated into the policy of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and LDII became an instrument of social stability during political changes (Fealy, 2016). LDII never engages in electoral politics or confrontational ideology in the area of da'wah. By replacing the discourse of sharia struggle with Pancasila internalization and nationalism training grounded in tolerance and civic responsibility, LDII has been able to protect itself against radical infiltration and gain state legitimacy (Azra, 2006; Menchik, 2016). According to Bush (2015), this strategy leads to a kind of quiet politics, which is a successful strategy that expands the cultural influence of LDII at the grassroots without directly confronting the state authority (Hefner, 2011).

LDII's partnership with the state indicates its advanced adaptation to the political opportunity structure. LDII is able to align itself with government agendas through institutional isomorphism and through resource mobilization strategies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983); it is able to access resources and enhance its institutional networks. The three pillars are a strong base of the resilience, growth, and influence of LDII in the dynamic political and social environment of Indonesia (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). They further demonstrate their

resilience and relevance in the contemporary era through the implementation of a triadic strategy: moderate education, intelligent depoliticization, and pragmatic collaboration. In the health sector, LDII has actively partnered with the Ministry of Health, establishing thousands of halal vaccination sites and deploying religiously trained volunteers during the COVID-19 pandemic, while also managing Integrated Health Service Posts (*Posyandu*), which are incorporated into Community Health Centers (*Puskesmas*) for stunting prevention and elderly care (DPW LDII, 2023, 2024, 2025; IKP, 2024).

This combined strategy has changed the image of LDII. This group was initially seen with suspicion by the New Order regime as a strategic state partner in social governance. This approach to faith-based social services, rather than confrontational politics, has enabled LDII to escape state repression, grow substantially, with internal membership reportedly reaching over 30 million by 2024 (DKPP RI, 2023), and to shape public policy through cooperative action. This trend demonstrates the effectiveness of a religious movement model that is sensitive to the political environment in Indonesia. This system embraces those who cooperate and excludes those who challenge (Hefner, 2011).

THE IM: FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE POST-2011 REVOLUTION

The Muslim Brotherhood (IM) began as a religious and social movement, but since its establishment in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, it has become Egypt's most powerful Islamic political party. This change was influenced by the colonial context, the secularization of the state, and the movement's desire to create an Islamic state through gradual reform. Nevertheless, the course of the organization has always been influenced by the changing Political Opportunity Structure (POS) in Egypt (Al-Awadi, 2004). During Nasser's era, the Brotherhood faced brutal repression, forcing it to operate underground. Under Sadat's regime, the movement was granted limited space, allowing it to expand its influence within civil society, though only temporarily (Zollner, 2009). Under Mubarak, the Brotherhood occupied a semi-legal position. It was permitted to participate in elections, yet constantly monitored and suppressed whenever its growing power threatened the regime's stability (Wickham, 2002).

The high point of the Muslim Brotherhood was following the Arab Spring of 2011 (Brown, 2016), when it emerged as the winner of the elections and installed Mohamed Morsi as the president. Nevertheless, it was unable to control the political transition and internal crises, which resulted in the

2013 military coup (Lynch, 2012). The authoritarian Sisi regime ruthlessly disbanded the Brotherhood, declared it a terrorist group, seized its property, and pushed the movement into the shadows. This was followed by internal fragmentation, as there were intense arguments between those who believed in peaceful reform and those who believed in armed resistance (Tadros, 2012). The historical path of the Brotherhood shows that its religious, social (Tadros, 2012), and political policies have always been determined by the extent to which the regime opened or closed the spaces of participation (Clark, 2004). The resilience of the group has been put to the test on numerous occasions by the cycles of opportunity and repression that have also created patterns of adaptation, resistance, and even disintegration in response to state pressure (Schwedler, 2011).

The period after the coup in 2013 was a pivotal moment in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, which led to structural disintegration and radical change due to extreme state repression (Amnesty International, 2023). Thousands of activists were arrested, the property of IM was seized, and civil organizations related to the movement were frozen (Tadros, 2012). This pressure was so intense that it divided the Brotherhood into three different groups with different orientations: diplomatic action, peaceful resistance, and militant action. This disintegration indicates a profound existential crisis, showing that the Muslim Brotherhood has not only lost its political space but also experienced the breakdown of its social networks and the erosion of its collective identity as a movement (Kandil, 2014).

The trajectory of the Muslim Brotherhood presents a sharp contrast to the LDII's strategy in Indonesia (Hefner, 2011). The Brotherhood pursued political confrontation and centralized leadership, which made it vulnerable to repression, whereas LDII adopted a non-confrontational path and a more adaptive decentralized structure. These divergent outcomes were not only shaped by internal strategies but also by differing national contexts, as explained by McAdam et al.'s (2001) theory: Egypt's anti-Islamist military regime versus Indonesia's pluralistic, Pancasila-based system. The failure of IM and the success of LDII underscore the crucial role of the political opportunity structure in determining the fate of Islamic movements. Table 1 of the structural comparison explains this divergence.

Table. 1

Factor	Muslim Brotherhood	LDII
Political Strategy	Over-ambition for power (2012–2013)	Consistent depoliticization
State Relations	Confrontation (decrees vs. military)	Symbiosis (development partnership)
Organizational Structure	Centralized hierarchy (Supreme Guide / *Mursyid Am*)	Territorial decentralization
State Context	Anti-Islamist deep state	Inclusive Pancasila governance

Source: Author's comparative analysis based on McAdam et al. (2001) and Hefner (2011)

DIVERGENT ADAPTATION STRATEGIES TO THE POLITICAL CONTEXTS

The contrasting strategies that LDII and the Muslim Brotherhood have taken in their dealings with the state have yielded very different results in terms of organizational stability, state acceptance, and long-term operational sustainability. These findings illustrate the extent to which the political environment can influence the destiny of a religious organization through adaptation (Wunn & Grojnowski, 2018; Cheng & Brown, 2006). This profound difference is based on the national political backgrounds of the two nations. Democratic pluralism in Indonesia has given LDII the room to operate and develop without the state directly attacking it, and even to be officially recognized (Krismono et al., 2025).

Conversely, the authoritarianism that has dominated the political arena in Egypt has subjected the Muslim Brotherhood to a vicious cycle of resistance and repression that has, in most cases, resulted in bans and mass arrests of its members (Biagini & Ardovini, 2022). The apolitical, cooperative approach that focuses on religious education, social services, and the moral development of society has helped LDII establish organizational stability and growth. This non-confrontational strategy has enabled LDII to be accommodated by the state and society in the pluralistic democratic system in Indonesia. Conformity to Pancasila values has enabled LDII to achieve legitimacy without repression and to guarantee the sustainability of its religious outreach and institutional growth.

LDII demonstrates a high level of organizational stability and state acceptance through its cooperative and non-confrontational approach toward the government. As a legally registered religious organization under the Ministry of Religious Affairs, LDII can conduct its spiritual, educational, and social

activities freely and safely within the framework of national law (Machmudi, 2008). By deliberately avoiding political confrontation with the state, LDII has successfully escaped the forms of repression that frequently target politically oriented Islamist groups, thereby ensuring its institutional security and continuity (Azra, 2006). This strategic positioning has enabled LDII to pursue long-term organizational development, including the expansion of networks of mosques, Islamic boarding schools, formal educational institutions, and various social organizations without significant political interference, which in turn has strengthened its societal presence (Noor, 2020). Moreover, the organization's alignment with Pancasila values reinforces its legitimacy and allows LDII to contribute constructively within Indonesia's pluralistic democratic system. Overall, this experience illustrates that the effectiveness and sustainability of religious organizations are not necessarily determined by political influence, but rather by their capacity to adapt intelligently to state structures and prevailing social expectations.

Unlike LDII, which has experienced steady growth within Indonesia's pluralistic democratic system through an apolitical and cooperative approach, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt faced a markedly different and ultimately tragic trajectory due to its confrontational political strategy in dealing with an authoritarian regime. Its active involvement in political power struggles triggered waves of brutal and systematic state repression, particularly following the 2013 coup, when the Egyptian government designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, detained and prosecuted thousands of its members, and confiscated key organizational assets (Al-Anani, 2016). This repression led to the destruction of the Brotherhood's extensive network of charities, media outlets, and political institutions, effectively paralyzing its capacity to operate within both social and political spheres (Wickham, 2013).

At the same time, sustained authoritarian pressure generated severe internal fragmentation and strategic crises within the movement, as factions diverged over whether to pursue armed resistance, diplomatic engagement, or survival through exile (Brown & Hamzawy, 2019). Unlike LDII's non-confrontational orientation, the Brotherhood's political ambition to capture state power positioned it as a primary target of repression, forcing the organization into underground and exilic modes of existence. Overall, the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood illustrates that Islamic movements that fail to align their strategies with prevailing national political systems are vulnerable to both internal disintegration and systematic external destruction. The comparative outcomes of the differing approaches between LDII and the Muslim Brotherhood provide a clear picture of the impact of each group's strategy in

dealing with the state, as shown by Table 2.

Table. 2

Outcome	LDII	Muslim Brotherhood
Relationship with the State	Broadly accepted, legally recognized, and respected as a religious organization.	Banned, labeled a terrorist organization, and a primary target of state repression.
Organizational Stability	Very high; able to grow freely, expand its networks, and implement programs without major obstacles.	Very low; continuously suppressed, weakened, and suffering from severe internal fragmentation.
Long-Term Sustainability	Shows sustained growth with promising prospects for continued operation and contribution.	Forced to survive in exile or underground, facing major challenges to sustainability and relevance.

UNPACKING DIVERGENT PATH: POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGICAL LEGACIES

The variation in approach between LDII in Indonesia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is due to the interplay of three primary factors: domestic political institutions, state policies towards Islamic groups, and the ideological-historical heritage of each group. These three aspects influenced their ways of adjusting to the state. LDII took a collaborative and non-political course in a democratic setting, whereas the Brotherhood took a political confrontation in an authoritarian regime. These dynamics are critical to understand why two Islamic movements with similar objectives went in entirely different directions. The primary factor that affects the strategies of LDII and the Muslim Brotherhood is the differences in the political structure of Indonesia and Egypt. In the inclusive democracy of Indonesia, founded on Pancasila, LDII can legally operate and expand in a non-confrontational manner, concentrating on religious outreach (*dakwah*), education, and social programs (Muhammadiyah, 2015; Rokhim et al., 2025). Conversely, the Muslim Brotherhood has been subjected to inhuman suppression by the Egyptian authoritarian government, whose political participation was considered a threat to the stability of the military-secular ruling party. The open political system allowed LDII to become legitimate, whereas the closed system in Egypt made the Brotherhood act under pressure and the threat of being banned all the time.

The state policies towards Islamic organizations are a key determinant of the direction and adaptability of religious movements. In Indonesia, a pluralism-

based and accommodative strategy has enabled LDII to expand both legally and productively because of its emphasis on religious outreach, education, and social activities- instead of politics (Noor, 2020). In Egypt, meanwhile, structural persecution has been caused by repressive policies against the Muslim Brotherhood, which is perceived as an ideological and political threat, limiting the space of movement of the organization and compelling it to act in the shadows (Al-Anani, 2016). This demonstrates that the openness of a state to Islamic groups is a significant determinant of the sustainability and type of strategy embraced by religious organizations.

The adaptive strategies of LDII and the Muslim Brotherhood are based on historical and ideological factors. LDII expanded in the Indonesian reformist and quietist Islamic tradition, which focused on moral-spiritual growth and did not engage in direct politics (Machmudi, 2008). This orientation is consistent with the Indonesian culture of consensus and the Pancasila ideology, which enables LDII to integrate harmoniously and be accepted by the state. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood was formed within the framework of colonialism and dictatorship in Egypt, with an ideological heritage of political Islamic struggle that requires complete involvement in state power (Lia, 2006). Its adherence to the application of sharia as a state system has rendered it a consistent opposition force against the military regime in Egypt, which has resulted in a cycle of resistance and repression.

The contrasting orientations of LDII and the Muslim Brotherhood reflect how historical roots and internal ideologies shape each organization's strategic engagement with the state and the surrounding political system. LDII is grounded in a reformist and quietist tradition that emphasizes moral, positioning itself in harmony with Indonesia's political culture, which prioritizes non-confrontation and pluralistic coexistence. This apolitical and adaptive stance has significantly enhanced LDII's legal recognition, organizational stability, and long-term sustainability within the national framework (Franklin, 2020). In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood is founded upon a political Islamic ideology that explicitly pursues the establishment of an Islamic state, rooted in a historical trajectory of resistance against colonial rule and subsequent military authoritarianism. This legacy has shaped a confrontational political approach that places the organization in direct opposition to state power, resulting in recurrent cycles of repression, prohibition, and organizational marginalization (Harnisch & Mecham, 2019; Alexander, 2011). Taken together, these differences demonstrate that historical experiences and ideological foundations play a decisive role in determining how Islamic organizations respond strategically to state authority and political

constraints. The profound differences in strategies and outcomes between LDII and the Muslim Brotherhood can be summarized through the key factors that shape their respective adaptations, as indicated by Table 3.

Table. 3

Factor	LDII	Muslim Brotherhood
Political Structure	Operates within a pluralistic democratic system that provides space for non-political religious organizations.	Struggles and operates under an authoritarian military regime that suppresses independent political movements.
State Policy	Tolerated and even accommodated as a non-political religious group contributing to society.	Systematically repressed and labeled as a banned opposition movement and a terrorist organization.
Ideological Legacy	Has a quietist tradition, focusing on education, moral reform, and cultural adaptation to the Indonesian context.	Holds a strong commitment to political Islam, with a legacy of resistance against secular regimes

The comparison of LDII and the Muslim Brotherhood reveals that political structures, state policies, and internal ideology play a significant role in determining the success or failure of Islamic movements in their interaction with the state. This has enabled LDII to expand since it has been able to adjust to the democratic system in Indonesia. In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood has been repressed by its confrontational approach in the authoritarian regime of Egypt. This research confirms that the adaptability of the Islamic movements to the political environment and their ideological orientation is a significant determinant of their sustainability.

Comparative analysis of the LDII (Hefner, 2011) and the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Anani, 2016) reveals that the success or failure of Islamic movements is predetermined mainly by three key factors: the political system of the state, the attitude of the government to Islamic organizations, and the ideological heritage of the organization itself. The pluralistic democratic system of Indonesia, where LDII has been working in a non-confrontational manner that is consistent with Pancasila (Wickham, 2013), has enabled the latter to expand and become legitimate. Conversely, the IM in Egypt, which has a history of confrontational political Islam under an authoritarian regime, has remained repressed, banned, and internally fragmented (Lia, 2006).

Two important lessons can be learned from this case: first, the flexibility of strategy is much more valuable than ideological rigidity (Hefner, 2011); and

second, political involvement in an authoritarian environment can result in destruction, but a collaborative socio-religious approach can open the door to sustainability (Bush, 2015). In the case of governments, it is more effective to allow peaceful and constructive religious expression (Fealy, 2016), as in the case of LDII, rather than to repress it harshly, as in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, which only pushes Islamic movements into the underground and possibly into radicalization (Machmudi, 2008).

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS: STATE LEGITIMACY VS POLITICAL REPRESSION

The basic distinction between LDII and the Muslim Brotherhood is their attitude to the state: LDII is accommodative and non-confrontational, whereas the Muslim Brotherhood is confrontational and political. Even though both are Islamic-based movements that are active in Muslim-majority nations, their reactions to national political systems are a blend of contextual ideology and pragmatism. These divergent approaches have defined their identities, their survival, and their evolution in different socio-political environments. LDII has always been apolitical, avoiding practical political participation and concentrating on da'wah (religious outreach), religious education, and social services (Machmudi, 2008). This strategy is consistent with the ideals of Pancasila and Indonesian pluralism, which enables LDII to acquire legitimacy without causing conflict. This has helped LDII to stay stable internally, be accepted by the state and society, and develop in a safe environment in a dynamic political environment by avoiding political confrontation (Azra, 2006).

Conversely, the Muslim Brotherhood took an aggressive and confrontational political course, seeking to institute an Islamist form of governance via elections, mass mobilization, and political coercion (Wickham, 2013). Although this policy gave them temporary political power, it also initiated periods of war with the Egyptian authoritarian government. The Brotherhood became a significant target of state repression, especially following the 2013 coup, which led to its banning, mass arrests, and systematic undermining of its organizational framework (Direct confrontation, Al-Anani, 2016)—primary Comparison: Strategies and Consequences. The basic distinctions between the political strategies of LDII and the Muslim Brotherhood can be summarized in the following Table 4, which points out the main peculiarities of their strategies and relations with the state.

Table. 4

Aspect	LDII	Muslim Brotherhood
Political Attitude	Apolitical, actively avoiding conflict with the state	Highly political, directly confronting the regime
Relationship with the State	Cooperative, seeking state recognition and legitimacy	Adversarial, frequently facing repression and state persecution
Main Strategy	Religious preaching (da'wah), education, and community social service	Political Islam, governmental reform, and structural change

Table 4 shows that the presence of the state in responding to both religious movements through its legitimacy is a crucial point for the sustainability of an organization. LDII took a softer approach to gain security. They were also able to adapt to Pancasila as a meeting point for religious, social, and cultural plurality in Indonesia. In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood presents a different face when dealing with the state. As a result, they face serious consequences from the ruling regime. This comparison of strategies leads to the conclusion that choosing the wrong plan or the inability of an organization to adapt to the political climate of a country will lead to destruction rather than strengthening the organization's strategic position (McAdam et al., 2001).

CONCLUSION

A profound comparative analysis of the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Institute (LDII) in Indonesia and the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) in Egypt makes it clear that the national political environment is the most influential and decisive factor that determines the adaptive strategies, modes of operation, and eventually the destiny of religious organizations. The main results of this discussion indicate that the pluralistic democratic system in Indonesia allows LDII to flourish with an accommodative and non-confrontational strategy, which leads to legitimacy and stability. On the other hand, the authoritarian and repressive nature of the Egyptian environment compels the Muslim Brotherhood to engage in a vicious cycle of resistance and brutal state repression, which severely impairs the development of the movement and its internal unity. These opposite results are a strong indication of the profound impact of political systems on the dynamics of state-religion.

The Indonesian example is an ideal example of how democratic pluralism can be used to successfully give Islamic organizations the room to engage in

the life of the people legitimately without losing their religious identity. The success of LDII lies in its strategic and innovative alignment with Pancasila as the national ideology, and its consistent emphasis on grassroots Islamic education and delivery of concrete social services to the community. This is not only a way of protecting the organization against state intervention, but also helps the organization to develop a good community support. In comparison, in the highly restrictive political environment of Egypt, where dissent is not condoned, all efforts by the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in politics have led to repression and harsh state crackdowns. This not only causes severe internal fragmentation but also compels the movement to take different survival tactics- underground operations to exile resistance. This dramatic analogy clearly shows how two movements that share the same underlying ideals can evolve radically different traits, strategies, and results based on the national environment in which they are practiced.

Based on these results, a number of important research directions can be identified. First, comparative research might be extended to include similar organizations in Muslim-majority countries with radically different political systems. Cases in point include the study of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkey, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) of Malaysia, and the Ennahda Movement of Tunisia, which all have distinct political contexts and dynamic state-religion relationships. Second, future studies may examine the impact of generational shifts in leadership and membership on the adaptive strategies of these organizations in changing political environments. Third, the transformation of traditional forms of Islamic activism by digital platforms and social media in both democratic and authoritarian regimes also needs to be analyzed. Lastly, the other crucial dimension is to take a closer look at the impact of the changes between democratic and authoritarian periods in the transitioning states on the long-term development, resilience, and adaptability of religious movements.

In the end, this comparative analysis contributes to our knowledge of modern Islamic movements in a significant way by showing that their formation and course cannot be disconnected from the political contexts in which they are taking place. The results are precise: religious organizations have an impressive adaptive capacity in their national environments, either through cooperation and integration within accommodative democratic systems or through resistance and survival strategies in repressive authoritarian regimes. Thus, future research should further examine these dynamics to develop a more detailed and comprehensive theoretical framework on the complex intersection of religion and politics in the Muslim world.

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