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BOOK REVIEW

SINETRON LEADS TO NEGOTIATION OF IDENTITY:
Christian Identity and the Representation of Religion in Indonesian Popular Culture

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ABSTRACT

Having Pancasila as its ideology, with its first pillar of Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa (the belief in one deity), Indonesia is neither based on a certain religion, nor giving a privilege to a certain religion. In the context of the resurgence of religion, Islam obviously becomes the only normative in everyday life, including in popular culture. This paper analyzes the way Indonesian Christians see the representation of religion in sinetron, the television soap opera tat is considered the predominant form of popular culture in Indonesia, and negotiate their identity as religious minority. The work is based on a research project conducted in Gereja Kristen Jawa (GKJ/Christian Church of Java) Gondokusuman in Yogyakarta. A random survey about sinetron titles watched by the embers of the congregation show that eight titles are popular. A more intensive questionnaire is distributed to the church council as the representation of Christians who are active in church activities. It is also intended to show the most-watched sinetron in 2017. From the survey, there are two most watched sinetron: "Tukang Ojek Pengkolan" (TOP/Motorcycle-taxi Driver on the Corner) and "Dunia Terbalik" (DT/Upside-down World). Eighteen people who watch both TOP and DT then were interviewed. Using the framework of first generation of reception study, the work finds that Christians' reception on the representation of religion in sinetron can be categorized into three patterns: mirror of reality, watching for pleasure, and religion is necessary. Those three patterns show that Christians' reception is in negotiation position.

Keywords: religious, representation, popular culture, Christian identity, negotiation

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia has Pancasila (literally means "five pillars") as its ideology. The first pillar is *Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa* which means the belief in one deity. This pillar shows that Indonesian ideology is not based on one religion. It also does not mean that Indonesia gives any privilege to certain religions. Every religion is, in principle, equal. The practice, in fact, speaks differently. As it also happens in other places, that the majority is usually more dominant, Islam as the majority religion in number seems to dominate in every aspects of everyday life in the country. It can be seen in the use of Islamic prayer in public schools, the use of Islamic greeting in public event, and the fact that most of Muslim women wear jilbab (Islamic head cover) publicly. It makes difficult for non-Muslims to get equal rights in every aspects of everyday life. It does not only in the term that they are discriminated in public sphere such as participation in politics and academia, but also in the representation in popular culture, which is both public, as shared culture, and private, consumed by people, including Christians, in their homes. This is what I understand from the point of view of the minority group.

The form of popular culture chosen in this research is *sinetron*, an Indonesian genre of soap opera. It is chosen because *sinetron* and television share cultural experience of Indonesian. Initially, television, which the project was started in 1962, was used by the state to weave the unity of Indonesia (Kitley, 2014: 24-25, 28). By watching the same programme, the state hopes that the Indonesian share one national culture. It can be done when communication satellites make it possible for almost all area of Indonesia access television and the yearly programmes are centrally arranged in Jakarta (Sen and Hill, 2006: 110). But the appearance of private television and the easiness to get video cassette in the late 1980s, gave opportunity for audience to find various kind of entertainment programmes, especially foreign ones. The condition was responded by the state by making a programme that can show the identity of good Indonesian. *Sinetron* was then chosen (Kitley, 2000: 104). The storyline was focused on four normative ideologies: familyism, neighbourliness, simple life, and national ideology (*wawasan nusantara*). All good Indonesians must live those normative promoted by the state (Kitley, 2000: 147).

The collapse of the New Order in 1998 brought a kind of liberation, not only in politics that are characterized by the existence of multi political parties and the decentralization of government, but also in popular culture that is characterized by the freedom of content of television programme. The normative was slowly changes, especially in the representation of religion. While in the New Order era, the representation of religion was very strict.

After 1998, religion is freely represented. It leads to single representation of Islam. Islam is more and more represented in television in various ways (Sofjan with Hidayati, 2013: 36-50). In *sinetron*, it was started by *sinetron religi*, that obviously show Islamic elements, which firstly broadcasted during Ramadan month (Rakhmani, 2016: 54, Subijanto, 2011: 243). But in the late 2000s, *sinetron religi* broadcasted everyday throughout the year (Rakhmani, 2016: 47). Moreover, in *sinetron* that are not included in *sinetron religi*, there are also Islamic representations in it. In contrary, Christian *sinetron* is only recorded being broadcasted in holy day season but not every year and not in every television channel.

The condition explained above leads to questions about the way Christians see the single representation of religion in popular culture. Further, it also raises a question about the way Christians negotiate their identity belonging in Indonesia as a minority related with the lack of representation of their religion in popular culture. To reach the answer, the framework used is that television audience is not passively affected by television they watch as the paradigm that media is a propaganda tool and audience are only passive consumers (Brooker and Jermyn, 2003: 5-6, Adorno, 2003: 55-56, Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002: 95-97). Instead, every television audience is active. They can choose to accept the meanings brought by the media or create their own meanings (Brooker and Jermyn, 2003: 91-92). This is what is meant by reception. Sandvoss argues that reception is about the interplay between the reader and the text (Sandvoss, 2011: 231).

The reception theory used here is of the first generation (Alasuutari, 1999: 2-4). It is based on Stuart Hall's theory of "encoding" and "decoding". By using those terms, Hall argues that television program have meaning to be circulated as created by the producer. It is called as encoding process. But the audience has their free choice to understand the meaning based on their backgrounds. It is the one called as decoding. It means that audience do not always receive the same meaning as the one transmitted and each audience also can get different meaning from same programme (Hall, 1973: 4-5). For the decoding process, there are four types. The first is the dominant or hegemonic code. Audience in this type receive meaning as put by the producer; the dominant and preferred meaning. The second is the professional code, when a professional broadcaster transmits meaning according to the dominant or hegemonic one. The third is negotiated code. In this type, audience's response is the combination between accepting and opposing the transmitted meaning. They understand the meaning brought by the programme but do not wholly accept it. The fourth is oppositional code, where the audience is fully understands the

meaning transmitted through a programme but fully oppose it by decoding the meaning in contrary way (Hall, 1973: 16-18).

THE STUDIES OF REPRESENTATION OF RELIGION IN POPULAR CULTURE

To position this paper among the scholars, there are three aspects that must be considered. First is study about Christian identity in Indonesia in post-1998. One of it is "Christianity and Religious Freedom in Indonesia since 1998" (2016) by Zainal Abidin Bagir and Robert W. Hefner. It talks about that Christians in Indonesia feel better condition before the *Reformasi* in 1998. After, they feel more pressure and more limited access to politics and academia positions. They also feel that the public is coloured by Islamic bylaws. While most study about Christian identity in post-1998 mostly focus on participation in politics and academics, this paper focus on the participation of Christians in popular culture.

Second is study about the representation of religion in popular culture, especially television. There are many studies about it. In "Television" (2015), Elijah Siegler argues that the representation of religion in television can function as priest, prophet, or rabbi. It has priestly function when television maintaining religious values. Prophetic function can be seen when television criticize religion. Rabbinic is seen when television catalyses religious debate and changes in lived religion. Dicky Sofjan with Mega Hidayati in *Religion and Television in Indonesia: Ethics Surrounding Dakwahtainment* (2013) argues that television can mediate religion for audience or mediatised religion to make it fit with the consumer's needs. Ariel Heryanto in *Identity and Culture: the Politics of Indonesian Screen Culture* (2014) states that after the New Order collapsed, Islam was the only normative that comes into sight in public, including in popular culture. He sees the phenomena as the result of Indonesian history that open the space for Islam to be manifested in public and the way market seized the opportunity. Riane Subijanto argues in "The Visibility of a Pious Public" (2011) that in post New Order era, Islamic piety's presentation in media is increasing as popular piety culture that shapes and is shaped by its public. While most study about representation of religion in television focus on the representation itself, this paper focus on the way the representation is seen by the audience, especially those who have different religion with the one represented.

Third is study about the Islamic piety in public. Noorhaidi Hasan in "The Making of Public Islam: Piety, Agency, and Commodification on the Landscape of the Indonesian Public Sphere" (2009) and Greg Fealy in "Consuming Islam:

Commodified Religion and Aspirational Pietism in Contemporary Indonesia" (2008) focus on the increase of Islamic appearance in public. The appearances are in many sectors, but mostly in popular culture, in everything that can be consumed. Hasan argues that the phenomenon is the part of resurgence of religion and the way Muslims show their piety. Fealy argues that it is the way Muslims show their identity as pious. This paper investigates Islamic piety in *sinetron* but not focus on the way Muslims show it in public, but the way Christians (non-Muslims) see Islamic pietism in popular culture, which is both public and private.

This work is based on the research conducted in Gereja Kristen Jawa (GKJ/ Christian Church of Java) Gondokusuman in Yogyakarta. It is located in Yogyakarta, the place of the first television station outside Jakarta (August 1965). It is the oldest GKJ in Yogyakarta (in November 2018, it will turn 105 years old). It has a large and diverse congregation, and is located in an urban area which is intensively affected by popular culture. The members mostly are Javanese, but there are also many non-Javanese. Most of them have married members of GKJ Gondokusuman and chosen to become members as well and others are students or workers who moved to Yogyakarta and decided to be the member of GKJ Gondokusuman. The range of the age of the members is very wide; from new-born babies until those who are in age 90s. At least, the oldest council member is 81 in 2018. The congregation members mostly live in Gondokusuman *Kecamatan* (Sub-District) where the church building is located. Others live in other *kecamatan*, some even outside the City of Yogyakarta. The Sunday services are held in three languages: Bahasa Indonesia, Javanese, and English (only in third Sunday) to accommodate the diversity of the members.

The research combines quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative is used twice. First, it was random survey through WhatsApp message to know the *sinetron* title watched by congregation members of GKJ Gondokusuman. It was conducted in October 10, 2017. I sent random broadcast WhatsApp message to 250 congregation members at October 10, 2017. I asked them whether they watch *sinetron* or not and if they watch what is the title. There were 70 people who responded and from those people, 21 watch *sinetron*. From this first survey, there are eight *sinetron* titles that are watched including Dunia Terbalik, Tukang Ojek Pengkolan, OK Jek, Anak Langit, Dua Wanita Cantik, Anak Jalanan, Dia, and Cinta dan Rahasia. This first survey is continued by other survey. This second survey was conducted among the council which consists of 106 members in January 11-13, 2018. They are considered as representation of congregation members because they are directly chosen by

the congregation members to be council members. They are also considered as representing active Christians because they in charge of all church's programmes and elected because the trust of their piety. From 106 members, there are 71 men and 35 women. Of them, 38 watch *sinetron* during 2017, 23 males and 15 females. The most watched *sinetron* in 2017 according to the survey are *Tukang Ojek Pengkolan* (Motorcycle-taxi Driver in the Corner) and *Dunia Terbalik* (Upside-down World). There are eighteen members that watch both of them.

After the survey, I start the qualitative method by doing interview and categorizing the interview result in a pattern. The interviewees are those eighteen members who watch *sinetron*. The interviews were guided by a list of questions but also open for more explanation and story from the interviewees. The main questions are about religion they see in *sinetron* they watch, their opinions or feeling about the representation of that religion in *sinetron*, and the need of religion represented in *sinetron*. Some interviews are recorded by voice note in my iPhone. Two interviewees refuse to be recorded and some could not because of noisy conditions and technical failures. Besides recording, the interviews are well noted in book note. Both recordings and notes are typed in a form of summary of each question for each interviewee.

THE REPRESENTATION OF RELIGION IN *SINETRON*

Two most-watched *sinetron* by Christians in 2017 are Tukang Ojek Pengkolan (TOP/Motorcycle-taxi Driver in the Corner) and Dunia Terbalik (DT/Upside-down World). Both *sinetron* are not categorized as *sinetron religi* which the title usually used Arabic words and show Islamic teaching explicitly. But as will be shown below, those *sinetron* contain Islamic elements in them. Firstly, the representation of religion in those *sinetron* can be observed through markers of identity. It means that something observable that commonly identified as owned by certain religion. The first marker is the dressing. It can be easily observed that some women wearing *jilbab* (Islamic head cover) and men wearing *baju koko* (shirt commonly identified as Muslim fashion for men) and some kinds wearing hat that is especially identified as Islamic (*kopiah*, *peci*). The second marker is the religious activity. There are *pengajian* (reading Quran), *shalat*, preaching about Islam, wedding and funeral in Islamic way, and *adzan* (the call for worship). In DT, this second marker is shown more explicitly. The third marker is the language. The characters often use Arabic terms that commonly identified to Islam, such as *Assalamu'alaikum* (peace be unto you), *Alhamdulillah* (praise be to God), *Astaghfirullah* (may God forgive me), and *In sha Allah* (God willing). The fourth marker is the religious

role models. There are *haji* (appellation for Muslim men who already do hajj pilgrimage) that is being respected more than other people and *Ustadz* as Islamic religious teacher that has authority to teach, preach, and give advice to Muslims. The fifth marker is the place of worship. In TOP and DT, there is only mosque mentioned or showed, no reference of other religion's place of worship.

Secondly, the representation of religion is shown through religious values. Islamic values are presented through the advice given by elders, haji, and Ustadz. They give advice in the midst of quarrel or struggle of life. Other values are shown through the gesture of the characters. For example, women kiss her husband's hand. It is based on the Islamic value that husband is the imam of the family. Thirdly, the representation of religion is shown through direct dakwah (proselytizing) in the story line. This marker is only appears in DT. There are scene in the mosque where Ustadz Kemed or his assistant, Kusoy, preaching Islam. For example is in the episode of April 25, 2017. There are two scenes showing Kusoy, the assistant of *Ustadz* Kemed, teaching the history about *Nabi* Musa ("Prophet" Moses) according to Quranic version. The scenes are in the mosque and showing the lesson, with Kusoy preaching, children and adult listening, and *Ustadz* Kemed proudly smiling seeing his assistant giving well preaches. From those three ways of religion is represented, it is clear that there is only Islam represented in it. Although the title do not contain any "Islamic words" and broadcasted daily, not in Islamic holy day season, the two *sinetron* show Islam as the only religion and normativity.

THREE PATTERNS OF WATCHING *SINETRON* BY CHRISTIANS

I argue that Christians become active audience in the case of watching *sinetron* in TV program. The way they see the representation of religion in *sinetron* is not automatically influenced by the portrayal of religion in *sinetron*. They have their own backgrounds, experience, and understanding that form their reception on the representation of religion in *sinetron*. Their answers can be categorized into three patterns. The first pattern is that they identify *sinetron* they watch with their real life. I call this pattern as the "mirror of reality". This first pattern is expanded to the way they see religion represented in *sinetron*, the way religion represented, and the representation of Islam and Muslim compared with the reality in interviewees' daily life. The second pattern is that they choose to start and keep watching these *sinetron* for their own enjoyment. They choose the less Islamic *sinetron* ones. They do not pay attention to the religious side of the *sinetron* and choose to enjoy only the entertainment side. I call this second pattern as "watching for pleasure". The third pattern is

that they think religion must be presented in *sinetron*. This opinion does not depend on the genre of *sinetron* they watch but based on their understanding of *sinetron* and common life. I call this third pattern as "religion is necessary".

PATTERN 1: "MIRROR OF REALITY"

In the case of this work, Christians like watching *sinetron* that shows reality. They choose Tukang Ojek Pengkolan (TOP) and Dunia Terbalik (DT) because they see these *sinetron* show reality. They use the words *masuk akal* (make sense), *merakyat* (grassroots), *seperti kenyataan* (like reality), *keseharian* (daily life), *seperti bukan sinetron-seperti kehidupan sehari-hari* (like not a *sinetron-* like daily life), *tidak mengada-ada* (not making up), *cermin masyarakat Indonesia* (mirror of Indonesian society), *gambaran hidup* (portrayal of life), and *tidak dibuat-buat* (not artificial). The identification with reality is further reflected in terms that the characters of these *sinetron* wear ordinary clothes, not glamorous, not weird. It is different from other *sinetron* or other kinds of TV dramas that mostly show the high class way of life.

Speaking about reality, in relation with main plot of DT, which background is husbands who are left by their respective wife to be migrant labourer, some interviewees cannot connect it with their daily life. It is related with their condition in Yogyakarta where the existence of migrant labourer is rare. Others mention that the phenomenon of women migrant labourer shows that women can be strong and responsible for the family. Negative impact of a story about women migrant labourer also mentioned because this *sinetron* is indicated as push women in rural area to be migrant labourer and leads the husband to be not responsible. The comments about women migrant labourer shows that the ideal of husband as breadwinner in a family still dominating Christians so that although they somehow feel distance with the reality they see in DT.

The discussion about *sinetron* and reality can be further expanded to religious representation. Most of the interviewees think that the religion of all the characters in TOP and DT is Islam. They say that it is because the characters in *sinetron* resemble Muslims in their daily life. They mention about dress, religious activities, language, place of worship, and religious character which are identified with Islam. They also can mention values that they see as Islamic. Actually, this single portrayal of religion does not fit with reality because Indonesia consists of various religions. The interviewees' neighbourhood also home for people with various religions. It leads to a statement that in reality there is no harmony between different religious adherents, while in *sinetron* there is no diversity of religion. Nevertheless, in the same time,

some interviewees see this as portraying the reality experienced by them. In their daily life, Christians, as minority, are always left aside. It is the same, in *sinetron*, Christians also get no place.

Responding to single representation of Islam in *sinetron*, the interviewees relate it to the fact that Islam is majority in Indonesia. It is understandable to them that only Islam is put in *sinetron*. It is to attract Muslims, the majority of Indonesian population, to watch those *sinetron*. It is related with ratings and advertising. It means that Christians' number do not count as important to gain popularity and money for the *sinetron* producer and television station. In representation of Islam and Muslim, most of the interviewees see that it is different with what they see in daily life. Some Muslim in *sinetron* is better than in reality because they are diligent and full of peace, while in their daily life, Muslims they know are lazy to do worship and fanatics to other religion. On the other hand, other interviewees see that Muslims in the daily life are more diligent to do worship than in *sinetron*. The other points directly to the fact that in daily life there are more Muslim women wear jilbab than in *sinetron*.

These opinions show that Christians understand what kind of Islam brought by *sinetron*. But they have their own knowledge about Islam in their daily life. They do not automatically and fully receive the portrayal of Islam in *sinetron*. They negotiate their knowledge with their observation of *sinetron* and daily life. From this first pattern, it can be seen that Christians can partly identify themselves with the reality shown by the *sinetron*. The identification is mainly about way of life, especially in ordinary or simple life living by the characters. But they cannot identify the *sinetron* with the reality of diverse Indonesia and with their fellow Muslims. Ironically, they can see their powerlessness as religious minority so that they are not considered important to be represented in *sinetron* because their number will not significant in raising rating and advertising.

PATTERN 2: "WATCHING FOR PLEASURE"

In the search for entertainment, as other people in Indonesia, Christians watch *sinetron*. Among many options of *sinetron* title, two become most watched. As mentioned in pattern 1, the "reality" becomes one of the reasons of the choosing of these *sinetron*. Other reason that is mentioned is the humorous elements on it. They need to be refreshed and feel relief when they can laugh when watching these *sinetron*. They do not really pay attention to the story and conflict there. Most of them even get difficulty to remember the name of the characters. Those reasons also explain why the Christians keep watching these *sinetron* although religion represented there is only Islam. They already

choose the less Islamic ones among many other *sinetron* titles. They keep distance with the religious elements, do not pay attention to religious side, and feel confidence with their own faith that will not be affected by Islamic elements in the *sinetron*. They also see that goodness portrayed in *sinetron* actually is universal, not exclusively owned by Islam, although the characters are Muslims.

On the other side, there are also statements that show the powerlessness of Christians in popular culture. They say *terima apa adanya* (accept what it is), *menghargai* (appreciate), *tidak menjadikan sinetron sebagai sumber didikan* (do not make *sinetron* as source of education), *tidak masalah karena Islamnya tidak terlalu tampak* (no matter because the Islam is not very visible), *tidak ada pilihan lain* (no other choice), *tidak ada tontonan Kristen* (no Christian programming), *adanya itu* (only that exists), *ambil yang baik-baiknya saja* (take only the goodness). Those phrases show that they long for Christianity element in *sinetron* or at least no Islamic element, but they do not have other choice than to enjoy what is offered. It shows the way Christians negotiate their identity. They need entertainment but the choice is limited to Islamic coloured programmes. They choose the less Islamic *sinetron*, do not pay attention to religious elements in it, and think that goodness portrayed is universal. They understand of their powerlessness but keep to make active choice to get them entertained by the confidence that their faith will not be affected.

PATTERN 3: "RELIGION IS NECESSARY"

Regarding to the religious element in *sinetron*, most of the interviewees say that it is necessary to include religion in *sinetron*. Some say it without condition. They say that religion can be more easily understandable in popular language of *sinetron* than by preaching in worship places. Other says that religion is needed to guide the audience to remember God and do goodness. Nevertheless, most of them require certain condition in representing religion in *sinetron*. They think that it is better to represent various religions in *sinetron* so the audiences can be reminded about the real condition of Indonesia. Other condition that mentioned is that religion is better presented through the manner of the characters, not by religious symbols, and also that the representation leads to good relationship among neighbours. If the condition cannot be met, it is better to exclude religion from *sinetron*.

The fact that most Christians see that religion is necessary to be represented in *sinetron* show the changes in normativity in television. While before 1998, national ideology is the only ideology that must be represented in television, after 1998, religion becomes the only normativity represented. Christians

may be affected with the representation of religion that have already coloured television during twenty years after *Reformasi* so they see that religious must be represented in *sinetron*. But at the same time, they also keep the value of national ideology because they want the representation of religion show the diversity religion in Indonesia and become guidance to live harmoniously with others. This opinion is also applied to Christianity. If the *sinetron* represent Christianity, they also want the same condition applied. In this pattern, Christians negotiate their identity as a Christian and an Indonesian. They do not want to wholly accept that Islam is the only normativity that should be followed. They understand that Islam can bring goodness but must be accompanied by other religions and in a bigger frame as in Indonesian context.

CONCLUSION

The *reformasi* era has brought a new form of freedom to Indonesian democratic system, not only in political dynamic but also in popular culture. It is understood that before the *reformasi* era, the national ideology was the basic normativity. After the *reformasi*, Islam has been seen as the obvious normativity offered. *Sinetron*, as the predominant form of popular culture, has shown a single representation of religion; Islam. In the case of the audiences of *sinetron* in TV, the Christians who watch the *sinetron* choose to negotiate their identity when watching the *sinetron* representing only Islam according to their points of view.

Christians identify the *sinetron* not only with the reality life, especially in the way ordinary people live, but also in the fact that Christians are left aside by Muslims. As in *sinetron* they do not get a place, they also understand that Islam presented in the *sinetron* is not always the same with Islam they know in their neighbourhood. They consume *sinetron* only for their own pleasure, choosing the less Islamic ones, and do not pay attention to religious sides on it as they think the goodness portrayed is universal values and they are confidence that their faith will not be affected. They think that religion is necessary to be included in *sinetron* but in a more ideal way by showing various religious norms to support a building harmony among Indonesians. These three patterns show that Christians receive the message brought by the *sinetron* in negotiation code. They understand that the *sinetron* bring dominant message about Islam and their dominance, but they choose to receive the meaning in their own way, based on their background, experience, and benefit.

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INTER-RELIGIOUS INTERACTION IN CENTRAL KALIMANTAN:
A Study of Islam, Christianity, and Hindu Kaharingan in Palangka Raya City And Eastern Kotawaringin

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ABSTRACT

Central Kalimantan is one of the provinces in Indonesia where the population is heterogeneous in terms of religion, culture and ethnicity. In several regencies and cities, there are places of worship located side by side (eg mosques, churches, Balai Basarah, and Vihara). Religious relations in several locations indicate awareness of social relations based on kinship. This work is aimed at exploring the patterns of interaction between the life of religious communities in religious, social activities and cultural life. The study employs a naturalistic qualitative approach where the actual condition in the field is being observed or to be natural with the conditions as they are. The data is based on observation, documents and interviews with selected informants from various religious groups including those practicing Islam, Christianity, and Hindu Kaharingan. Two important findings of the work include, firstly, that the tolerance attitude among them is created because of the ideological strength of the local culture of 'Huma Betang' and the values of kinship. Secondly, the process of interaction occurrence is encouraged by the existed meaning of the 'front stage' (emphazising more on the interests of the group). It is an understanding of the differences among them without having to prioritize them in social life, culture and others as well as in the 'back stage' (personal self-concept) of being alert, prejudiced and more careful in daily communication.

Keywords: Inter-religious, interaction, interfaith, religion, Central Kalimantan

INTRODUCTION

Demographic conditions in Central Kalimantan with the upstream and

downstream areas of the river have made the composition of Central Kalimantan population diverse, both from ethnic heteroginity and religious sides. Central Kalimantan is classified as a heterogeneous region because there living various ethnicities such as Dayak, Javanese, Banjar, Madurese and Chinese (Cahyono, 2016, p. 40; Widen, 2017; Prasojo, 2017). The variety of existing communities can be seen from the number of religious groups in the cities of Palangka Raya; Muslims are as many as 221,972, Protestants are 87,245, Catholic Christians are 8,793, Hindus are 7,942, Buddhists are 3,154, and Confucius are 1,700 (Central Bureau of Statistics of Central Kalimantan Province). Meanwhile, the religious population in the Antang Kalang sub-district is that Muslim population of 2,678, Protestant Christian of 4,093, Catholic Christians of 298, Hindus of 3,299, Buddhist of 3, and Confucianis of 20 (Sampit, 2017).

The research was carried out in the AMACO housing complex, with other two locations, precisely on Galaksi Street in the city of Palangka Raya. With the uniqueness of the location, it was found symbolic forms of tolerance as seen in places of worship such as mosques and churches side by side. This location provides harmonious tolerance between both parties. As an example, if there is a religious event by one of them, the other will help and provide with a place or space of parking for them. Then they would give permission to other religious followers to use mosque loudspeakers to announce the news from the community both bad and good ones of their religion. In addition, in social life in the community, people are very concerned on mutual cooperation of both at the event of death, marriage or celebration (Hadi, 2016). Similarly, the other location of the research field is in the village of Tumbang Kalang, Kotawaringin Timur Regency, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. The indications of harmonious life are also seen in symbolic ways. For example, houses of worship among mosques, churches and Balai Basarah are located side by side (Harkrisnowo, 2010). The form of harmony is not only in adjoining places of worship but also in the relationships of social interactions existing in the community (such as attending and assisting in occasions of wedding, death, party of celebration). Other forms of harmony are also found in cultural aspects such as attending local traditional ceremonies as a form of appreciation and respect for fellow humans. Economically the members of the communities in the two research fields feel being supported each other in doing bussiness and other economical activities with a pattern of brotherhood rules and practices (Tamburian, 2018).

The interaction of inter-religious life in these two places is very harmonious. Life among religious people in the community is claerly indicated in daily

communication including in the forms of helping each other and appreciating the difference beliefs. It is evidence of a tolerance practice in the case of the Muslim allowing their neighbours of different religious backround to use the sound system in the mosque for the announcement of news of death from a Christian family. Not only soundsystem, but the members of the communities are also allowed to sure other Mosque facilities such as toilet and parking lots. The people have a strong commitment of sharing the usage of faclities in the mosque, church and basarah as they also have an agreement to provide helps as needed for the maintanace of the facilities. The point is that they have agreed to respect their places of worships as necessary. When Jumat prayer takes place, the Christians will allow Muslims to use the front yard of the curch for parking considering the number of worshipers using cars and motor cycles is higher. The Muslims would also do the same for Cristians when they need helps on Sunday prayers.

The interesting and important phenomena mentioned earlier is related to the diversity of cultures, ethnicities and religious practices, especially in Central Kalimantan, that matter to the development of peace and harmony within a society. The portrait of harmony and social interaction from the case of Palangkaraya city and eastern Kota Waringin is pure and inspiring (Marshall, 2018). The communication activities between the people of diferent religious groups in their daily life show harmony and run in accordance with the wishes and expectations of each adherent '*lakum dii nukum waliadin*' (Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018). From this statement, it is necessary to examine how the patterns of interaction between religious people among Islam, Christianity and Hindu Kaharingan (as local religions). Then what motives are behind the scene is also important to elaborate so other people learn from then practice of an interreligious relationship, especially in Central Kalimantan.

METHOD

The study is based on the results of a research project that employs a naturalistic qualitative approach. The reserach was conducted in two regencies in the province of Central Kalimantan. They include Palangka Raya Town and East Kotawaringin Regency. The total number of informants was 35 people, consisting of 22 Muslims, 6 Protestants, 1 Catholic, 6 Hindu Kaharingan, and having various professions from civil servants, mosque maintainer (Ta'mir), religious leaders, and the local public leaders. The informants' characteristics were selected according to the problem questioned related with their relationship with inter-religious harmony. The informants were deliberately chosen among religious leaders, the local public leaders and some informants

were from the government and non government agancies (FKUB, chief of village, etc.).

The interview technique was carried out directly using a free interview model related with inter-religious interaction from various groups of Muslims, Protestants, Catholics, Buddhists and Hindu Kaharingan. To complete the documentation data in this study as supporting data, the researcher records data from the local religious affair offices, as well as from the Inter-Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB), the village office and the Central Statistic Center of Central Kalimantan province. Research observation was conducted by researcher from October - December 2016, and June - September 2017. Observation results were analyzed through daily records being evaluated every weekend. This evaluation is focused on patterns of interaction between religious people in their social lives.

RESULTS

Based on the results of observation related to inter-religious life in the fields, especially in Palangka Raya Town, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia, it can be seen that there is a significant sign of harmony indicated by the location if the buildings of places of worship which is adjacent to each other in several locations. For example, the location between mosques and churches is just on the next door of each other. This data shows the evidence of the very conducive relationship among interfaith social interactions. The religious life of the surrounding people can be seen in the pattern of social interaction as like the running of religious events such as the tradition of commemoration of Isra 'and Mi'raj, Maulid of the Prophet SAW, Nuzulul Qur'an during the month of Ramadan (Islamic traditions) and Sunday prayers in Christian tradition. In this case, the members of the community give supports to those having the programs of religious activities. The supports can be in the forms of physical helps such as parking space or suoud system as well as non-physical assistance such as respect and permission.

The other religious activities such as the Muslim holiday, the Eid-ul-Fitr holiday, and the culture of visiting each other on religious holidays are not only practiced by Muslims but also by people of other religious backgrounds. When the Christians celebrate Christmas and New Year, the culture of visiting each other is done by Christians and Muslims alike. In addition to religious holidays, good interactions are also done when there is a society member passing. Both Muslims and non-Muslims visit each other as to express the solidarity toward their fellow human beings/neighbors. The unique is that when the event is in the Christian place, the Muslim people will be provided

with food which is made specific for Muslim, halal food, so that Muslims are protected from forbidden food.[2]

The nuances of inter-religious harmony have been seen very warm as happening in the the two fields of research, especially in the village of Antang Kalang, Kotawaringin Timur district, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. The local residents are united by blood relatives. The area has several places of worship adjacent to one another such as mosques, churches and basarah. The intension to have them located in the neoighboring place in one location is that they hope that tolerance will be created not only in the relationship between people, but also by the eixstance of the adjacent houses of worship. The relationship description of interaction among religious people in the village of Tumbang Kalang is very dynamic. It was in 2014 when the District level of Musabaqah Tilawatil Qur'an (MTQ) was held in that village. Tumbang Kalang village is chosen as the venue for the event. The organizing team was selected from Muslims, Christians, and Hindus of Kaharingan. They work together hand in hand to clean up the worship places and other facilities to support the program.

The local community strongly adheres to the customary values that they believe in. Customary values become a strong ideology as a foundation for creating harmony. It can be proven that blood ties become the source/basis of the development of social order although they have different beliefs. Other patterns of interaction occur as the establishment of tolerance during the month of Ramadan. Young people and old people were very respectful of Muslims doing fasting. Therefore, the non-Muslims would respect the Muslims doing fasting by going to private area for drink, lunch and smoking.[3]

DISCUSSION

The interaction and relationship among interreligious groups of people is the result of the collection of information, ideas, concepts, desires, hopes, goals and messages of people when they are bound in a community setting as they need social order that requires personal understanding and awareness (Eder, 2010). An identity is certainly born from social interaction and communication. Identity is produced by negotiation through media, namely language (Parker et al, 2014). Therefore, a person's identity is determined by the appearance of one's own self, and the recognition. This explains that good communication among religious followers is evidenced by tolerance or good respect for

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[2] This is based on interviews with several key informants from the two fields of research.

[3] The data is based on interviews in 2016 and 2017.

religious people (Liliweri, 2009, pp. 42). Religious diversity is not a barrier to create harmony, because Dayak people in Central Kalimantan prioritize the power of brotherhood and kinship. This promotes an acknowledgment that arises within the people Central Kalimantan. The Dayak people believe that they have strong connection in terms of kindship and blood relationship as known with the term "*oloh itah*" within the people in Central Kalimantan.

The perception of people who have share similar identity and uniqueness is as a result of good social interaction among the people. For example, when someone says that 'I a Muslim, you are a Christian and you are Hindu Kaharingan' he unsderstand that the people's identity is totally different but they still understand and respect each other (Burhani, 2011). According to the Hindu Kaharingan philosophy, some terms are known in their teaching such as *'Penyang'* that means to unite and have bond together, love and love. The *'Huma Betang'* is meant to the purpose of the philosophy within their life. Although they different beliefs exist, they have to maintain a harmonious and peaceful life because the concept of "Betang Huma" is a long house that is inhabited by those having various backgrounds in which they can share, understand and tolerate and minimize the existing differences (Kdr, 2017). Describing social interactions that occur both in Palangka Raya Town and Tumbang Kalang Village, there are some findings that can be seen from the process (front stage)/ appearing on the surface of tolerance and being aware of the ideological differences. This can be said as an associative social process or a positive social interaction process in the form of tolerance, cooperation, and tolerance (Raihani, 2014).

In addition, the second stage is (back stage) or behind the surface or the human self-concept (internal). It can be said that the concept means how an individual can learn, adapt, understand a difference, both ethnic and religion. This is produced from the concept or understanding of a person without the influence of social interaction. It can be positive or negative thing. If it is negative, therefore, the interaction is less harmonious or there is a mistake in understanding the difference. It is evidenced in some people who still maintain a distance with different beliefs or different ethnicities. Like the Muslims with the symbol of Muslim clothing (headscarves) and their robes, they are not being Muslims only with their dress but are supposed topractice the teaching of Islam in their daily activities including their interaction with others no matter their tradition is.

There is a concern that disharmony is caused by the coming of outsiders or migrants by bringing exclusive concept /teachings. This asuption has been one supported by a case in Palangka Raya Town and Tumbang Kalang

village. Responding to what they have heard about the rumor of the couses of disharmony theats, traditional leaders, communities and religious leaders sit together in order to discuss the prevention of unwanted conflicts. One example of the dissociative social processes is the emergence of antiphaty and prejudice based on non-flexible generalization. Antiphaty is usually being expressed or addressed to groups or individuals of a particular group of 'negative feelings' (Liliweri, 2009, pp. 199-200). This can be seen in the case of feeling afraid of entering the exclusive Islamic views, making the concept of Islam truly narrow and isolating themselves from other religious communities. The basis of social interaction between religious people is on how each process interprets the meaning of the communication received or captured (Amal, 2010, p. 168). For these issues is they gather to discuss the appropriate responses.

The communities believe that the proper interaction is supoosed to take place within the daily life. From several interviews with informants, it is found that their motives for living safely, peacefully and happily are based on local cultural values, such as blood relations, kinship or family. The concept of social interaction occurs because they are bound by the basis of kinship/ kinship. It is emmebaded in the concept of *'oloh itah'*. The purpose of the proverb is that to guide people not to see the background of their faith in building daily interaction; whether Muslim or non-Muslim are the same in human life interaction. The Dayak in Central Kalimantan believe that if they enter the environment or region of Kalimantan and have the same mission of peace, togetherness, then they are considered by the Dayak people as brothers (Masduki, 2017). They also consider that the immigrants aretheir brother as well. From two different places, it can be concluded that the portrait of the creation of inter-religious harmony is evidence in both social and religious activities, both personally and collectively. The form of social interaction is in the form of mutual cooperation, friendship and participation in religious events which are certainly outside from the procession of ritually worship activities (Erawati, 2012).

CONCLUSION

The portrait of inte-relegious interactions among people in Palangka Raya Town and Tumbang Kalang Village occurs naturally based on the basis of cultural values and local norms inherited from earlier generation. The people have been able to continue the strong tradition although more chalanging world has influenced the sifting environment of modern life to post modern behavior in the gobal arena that also makes influences to many different aspects of life of the people in Central Kalimantan. The communities have

been supported by several important evidfences as the work have founf them in the research. First, tolerance emerges due to the ideological strength of the local culture of 'Huma Betang Huma', blood relations and kinship. The local values have strongly influenced the way people think and behave in daily life, especially in terms of community interaction. Second, the process of interaction occurrence is caused by the existed meaning of 'front stage' (emphazising more on the interests of the group). It is an understanding the differences without having to prioritize in social life, culture and others as well as 'back stage' (personal self-concept) in which people need to be aware of their responsibelities of being careful of harmony and peaceful life in the community.

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SOCIAL MEDIA, RELIGION, GENDER AND POLITICS IN MALAYSIA:
A Case of the Social Media Usage by Sarawak Muslim Female Candidates in Batang Sadong and Batang Lupar in the 2018 Malaysian General Election

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ABSTRACT

The 14th Malaysian General Election (GE2018) had changed the political land-scape in Malaysia. For the very first time, the ruling party of Barisan Nasional failed to dominate the government in all states except that of Pahang, Perlis and Sarawak. This study is intended to discuss the scenario of GE2018 by focusing on the election results among female candidates in Sarawak. Ten female candidates participated in GE2018 as compared to a total of 78 candidates to grab 31 Parliamentary seats in Sarawak. Meaning, merely 12.82 percentages of female candidates competed in GE2018. Nevertheless, out of ten female election candidates competing, only five (4 PBB + 1 DAP) won which was 16.12 percentages of winning whilst a big portion of the percentages of 83.87 went to the winning male election candidates. Interestingly, the usage of social media is frequently used by the candidates in GE2018. Hence, this work focuses on the usage of social media among two female Muslim election candidates from a political party of Parti Bumiputera Bersatu Sarawak (PBB). The findings reveal that the frequent usage of Facebook has positive and negative impacts on both female candidates. Eventhough both female candidates win the election but one has an increased in votes and majority votes whilst the other has a drastic decrease of votes and majority votes obtained.

Keywords: *Sarawak, female, election, candidate, social media, posting.*

INTRODUCTION

Over a decade ago, the sudden increase of frequent usage of social media by individuals or people proved that using the social media for business

provides a user friendly website for users. The platform sees to the needs of the users to socialize and communicate through their opinions, openly discussed in the social media. It also provides an avenue for the business with an opportunity to advertise and marketing their products (Malaysian Multimedia Communication Commission/SKMM, 2017). SKMM (2017) also noted that the social media account number has amounted to a high percentage of internet users increased since 2015. The SKMM's informaton is based on the *Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, WeChat Moments, Google+, Twitter, LinkedIn, Snapchat, LINE Timeline, Tumblr* among other things. From the ten social media as reported by SKMM (2017), Facebook has the highest account since 2015, in which the users had increased from 96.5 percentages to 97.3 percentages in 2017. Therefore, an interesting fact by Statista (2018) also indicates that the usage of social media would increase from 2015 to 2022. In fact it is expected according to Statista (2018) that the increase is estimated from 20.42 millions of social media users, from 18.62 millions users from 2017.

The current statistics by SKMM (2017) and Statista (2017) offer an interesting evaluation of the usage of social media by focusing on the Facebook. Subsequently, the trend of frequent usage of the social media is evident among the election candidates in GE2018. In this case, the female candidates are not an exemption. Though the social media is said to influence the voters but it does not entirely depend on the social media alone. Other factors such as the candidates' personalities, the choosing of political party, religious affiliation and the issues highlighted during the campaign could contribute to the winning of an election candidate. Furthermore, the social media could lead to a small winning of a candidate or the probability of losing an election. This could be due to determinant factors of an individual as voters and not based on the frequent political media campaign.

Together, these studies provide important insights into my study in answering two research questions. Firstly, what are the types of information in the social media to influence the voters in deciding which political party and which election candidate that they would choose and secondly, what are the issues in the social media. In relating to the questions, this study is focused on the frequent usage of social media based on the postings of the two female Muslim election candidates; which comprise the pictures and videos posted or uploaded in the Facebook. In addition, the data is also based on the number of votes, the percentages of votes and the majority votes garnered by the female election candidates for two constituencies, which are P200 Batang Sadong and P201 Batang Lupar to answer the first research question. For the

second research question, the issues highlighted in the social media indicate the acceptance of the voters towards these two female candidates.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed for this study is qualitative research. The qualitative method is used to probe into details and to provide the actual information for this study. In addition, the content analysis is used to collect data. According to Mariette Bengtsson (2016), content analysis can be used on all types of written texts no matter where the material comes from. Moreover, there are no specific rules that must be followed (Berg, 2001, Burnard, 1991, Catanzaro, 1988, Downe-Wambolt, 1992), for example, deep interviews (Wann-Hansson, Hallberg, Klevsgård & Andersson, 2005), focus group interviews (Golsäter, Sidenvall, Lingfors & Enskär, 2011), one single written question (Bengtsson, Ohlsson & Ulander, 2007), open-ended questions as in a questionnaire (Donath, Winkler, Graessel, & Luttenberger, 2011), or observations of situations (Eastwood, O Connell & Considine, 2011) as well as from pictures and films (Krippendorff, 2004, Neuendorf, 2002). However, the choice of data collection method affects the depth of the analysis. For example, open-ended, written questions cannot provide the same depth that an interview can provide, as the researcher has the opportunity to deepen the discussion with the informants.[2]

The data analysis refers to the purpose and the meaning of the collected data to a realistic conclusion. Content analysis is employed in this study as a unique analytical unit applicable in both quantitative and qualitative.[3] In quantitative content analysis, facts from the text are presented in the form of frequency expressed as a percentage or actual numbers of key categories that is the researcher seeks to answer questions about *how many* (Bengtsson, 2016 quoting works of Berelson 1952, Krippendorff, 2004, Neuendorf, 2002). This method differs from that of the qualitative content analysis; in this method, data are presented in words and themes to draw interpretation of the results. That is, the qualitative content analysis gave the researchers answers to questions such as "how "and "how many". Nevertheless, the choice of analysis method depends on the depth of the data presented by the researcher which reflects on the informant about a subject. This in turn, would have an effect on the data collection and on the total number of informants needed.

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[2] Bengtsson (2016) referred to all the references in this paragraph to write his journal article, entitled How *to plan and perform a qualitative study using content analysis.*

[3] Bengtsson (2016) refers to previous studies by Krippendorff, 2004 and Neuendorf, 2002 (quantitative) and the works of Berg, 2001, Burnard, 1991, Catanzaro, 1988, and Downe-Wambolt, 1992 (qualitative), and the deductive and inductive method is used.

Therefore, the researcher either chose the manifest analysis or the latent analysis. In the manifest analysis, the researcher specifies the "what" matters as informed by the informant or what the informants actually say. Further, the researcher stays very close to the text, uses the words themselves and describes the visible and obvious text in the text. In contrast, latent analysis is extended to an interpretive level in which the researcher seeks to find the underlying meaning of the text: what the text is talking about (Berg 2001, Catanzaro 1988, Downe-Wambolt 1992, as quoted by Bengtsson, 2016).

Secondary data is also employed to study on the voting pattern and the voting information is based on two general elections of GE2013 and GE2018. Social media such as Facebook is used to gather information on the current issues at P200 Batang Sadong and P201 Batang Lupar, the chosen constituency areas for this purpose. Consequently, the qualitative content analysis would reveal the contents of the information or postings in the Facebook in a reasonable way. Duration of the study is for 16 days. It started on the 24th of April 2018, the day of appointment of candidates until the polling day of 9th May 2018. This study eluded the interview method but merely referring to the postings made in both the female candidates' Facebook. The choice of these two constituency areas of P200 Batang Sadong and P201 Batang Lupar is because both are caretakers of these areas since 2004 (for P201) and since 2008 (for P200). Thus, it is impeccably significant to investigate the loyalty of the voters as the female candidates are representatives for more than three or four terms which are approximately 10-14 years.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a growing body of research literature on social media use and political participation since 2004—the birth year of Facebook. Most of them attempted to discover whether the general use of social media could enhance young people's online and offline political participation and civic engagement (e.g., Baumgartner & Morris, 2010; Bode, Vraga, Borah, & Shah, 2014; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012; Hargittai & Shaw, 2013; Valenzuela, Kim, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2012; Valenzuela, Park, & Kee, 2009). Most of these studies were conducted in Western democracies such as the United States (e.g., Bode et al., 2014; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012), the United Kingdom (Xenos, Vromen, & Loader, 2014), Australia (Xenos et al., 2014), Sweden (Sveningsson, 2014; Svensson, 2014), Italy (Vaccari et al., 2015), Spain and the Netherlands (Calenda & Meijer, 2009) as quoted by Yang and Dehart (2016)).[4]

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[4] Yang and Dehart (2016) referred to all the above references in these two paragraphs to write their research article entitled Social Media Use and Online Political Participation Among College Students During the US Election 2012.

The research article by Hongwei Chris Yang and Jean L. Dehart (2016) also proposed that the United States (US) citizens' online political participation is on the rise, fueled by the phenomenal growth of social media. Further, Yang and Dehart (2016) revealed that the Pew Internet & American Life Project found that there was an increase of US adult internet users from 2008 election (55 per cent), 2010 midterm elections (54 per cent of US adult) and a more recent survey found that the social networking site 66 per cent of social media users (of which 22 per cent of online adults) stayed connected with the internet. The internet allowed the users to get involved in the political process or to receive political news or information, or got involved online, visited these sites for political information or getting involved in the campaign. More interestingly is the fact that political scientists and communication scholars urged politicians to tap the huge potential of engaging voters and campaigning via social media (Yang and Dehart (2016) cited Utz, 2009) because those who use social media for political purposes are more likely to vote or to donate to a campaign (Yang and Dehart 2016).

This is further stipulated by Sebastian Stier, Arnim Bleier, Haiko Lietz & Markus Strohmaier, (2017). The researchers specified that usage of Facebook and Twitter enable election candidates to directly reach out to voters, mobilize supporters, and influence the public agenda. In addition, these fundamental changes in political communication therefore present election candidates with a widened range of strategic choices. This was evident with the researchers work based on their empirical analysis focuses on political communication on Facebook and Twitter by candidates during the German federal election (Bundestagswahl) campaign 2013. The baseline is a representative survey of the German population conducted during the election campaign and the researchers noted that social media have become universal communication channels for election candidates during election campaigns. Taken together, their findings suggest that campaign strategies and political communication in general are mediated by varying sociotechnical affordances of social media platforms.

Having in mind the importance of social media to the users either in the United States, Germany, and other parts of the world or even in Malaysia, how is social media related to the choice of voting among voters? I am interested in the question of how the rational choice theories could influence the political views and perhaps in the long term the political culture at large among the voters. Therefore, Jiirg Steiner (2017) pointed out that this is a special question within a much broader problem, namely how political science influences the political life of a country. According to Steiner (2017), politicians, equally

selfishly, are motivated to be elected and reelected and rational choice theories may be based on other motives including motives of morality and altruism. Hence, by referring to the works of rational choice theorists William H. Riker, Steiner noted that Riker has formulated the basic axiom in a very concise way: "Politically rational man is the man who would rather win than lose, regardless of the particular stakes." Thus, winning is always better than losing; staying in office better than being thrown out of office; a higher office better than a lower one.

The discussion on the voters' choice of voting is referred to as Rational Choice theory. According to S.M. Amadae (2017), rational choice theory, also called rational choice theory or rational choice school of thought is based on the assumption that individuals choose a course of action that is most in line with their personal preferences. Rational choice theory is used to model human decision making, especially in the context of microeconomics, where it helps economists better understand the behaviour of a society in terms of individual actions as explained through rationality, in which choices are consistent because they are made according to personal preference. Eventually, rational choice theory is applied to other areas as well, including evolutionary theory, political science, and warfare.

It started with a basic assumption about being rational in an action and to simplify the behavior of actors based on a mathematical methodology (Anthony McGann, 2016). Nonetheless, McGann (2016) noted that for the purpose of analysis, the writers did not use the mathematical methodology as stated by them. Instead, McGann stipulated that the writers focused on the postings and the comments in the social media particularly the Facebook. Further, McGann (2016), described that the assumptions illustrated by the Rational Choice Model experts are – people chose consistently and they do things with a reason, thinking about its consequences - it is not something that could be rejected, but it is acceptable to the researchers; that is at least their expectations towards certain matters. Consequently, the question is which particular voting model is consistent to these assumptions? Hence, the most apparent matter is the ideological voting, meaning, the people voting for political party that they agreed to. This is based on the people's liking over matters such as government policies, and therefore they chose that government. Alternatively, the probability the voters use ideology as an experiment if their knowledge on a policy is limited. That is, a voter would not know the tax policy in depth but he or she knows which political party made an effort to restructure the tax policy.

On the other hand, Sara (Berita Harian online, 2017) is opinionated that

Facebook is 'an information Centre' for the Malaysians specifically during the GE2018 campaigns. The upsurge data happened hastily with plentiful of information from various sources. In analyzing Facebook, Sara (2017) found that the Facebook in Malaysia during GE2018 is evident what she terms it as 'Facebook Election'. Sara (2017) concludes that Facebook would continue to become the main stream media attention, either in the broadcast media or printed media to share current information directly through this online platform. Sara (Sinar Harian online, 2017) stressed that the manifestation of social media such as blog, Facebook or WhatsApp became a force or strength for a political party and in the political scene, this is unavoidable. Through the social media, it has become a medium of communication for the election candidates; for at least to update status regarding issues raised by the people. Thus, Sara viewed this from a political arena that is way different back in five to ten years ago.

A similar view was expressed by James Chau, a reporter from *China Central Television* (CCTV). He is opinionated that today's political campaign normally takes into the social media and the media landscape is interesting to analyze as there are many attractions from various angles (Zainuddin, 2018). However, James Chau (2018, as quoted by Dania) did not deny the fact that simultaneously, the usage of traditional media also plays an important role. James Chau gave an example of choosing and voting of United States of America's President in 2016 and the EU Referendum, the social media became a war zone for campaigns and for the younger generations to use Twitter and Facebook to access information.

In Malaysia, the GE2018 resulted in the hashtag like #GE14 (which stands for GE2018), *#PulangMengundi* (which means come home for voting) #MalaysiaMemilih (means Malaysia chooses/voting) in the social media to encourage the young ones to vote and to discuss political matters. Further, James Chau stressed that the new technology in the social media platform such as live streaming has open an opportunity for politicians and personalities to convey their messages or information which is accessible to the public. Similarly, a study of "Internet usage and political perception of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia" by Junaidi et al. (2013) stated that the internet influence and social media played an important role in influencing the political behavior among the students of UKM. In fact, a study in the United States of America (2000) and the United Kingdom (2001) revealed that media played an important role as an important source for political information and news related to election (Junaidi Awang Besar & Mohd Fuad Mat Jali. 2015). Political communication through the internet has transformed the

political discourse, political participation and methods of election campaign of a country which later created a conducive democratic environment and freedom of speech (Junaidi Awang Besar & Mohd Fuad Mat Jali, 2015 quoting the study of Jankowski and Van Selm, 2008).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This study refers to two social media on Facebook of P200 Batang Sadong (P200) and P201 Batang Lupar (P201), making comparisons based on the frequency of postings including campaigning methods used through their video and pictures shared in their Facebook. This in turn would allow the researcher to analyze and answer the first question of what types of information posted in the social media could influence voter' decision in choosing the political party and which election candidate would they choose. This would lead to the findings on the number of votes, percentages of votes and majority votes garnered by the candidates from P200 and P201. Secondly is the issue arising in the social media of P200 and P201. In order to understand what was mentioned in the earlier paragraph, there are four main factors discussed in the following paragraphs.

Firstly is the number of postings or frequency of postings in the Facebook. Within the dates of 25 April 2018 until 9 May 2018 (the polling day), P201 had frequent postings of pictures and/or election campaigning postings. A total of 137 pictures and two videos were uploaded in her Facebook. This differs from P200 who uploaded 27 pictures or/and election campaigning postings, and seven videos. This further confirms the idea of Hongwei and Dehart, 2016 (cited the work of Utz, 2009) that an interesting fact that urged politicians to tap the huge potential of engaging voters and campaigning via social media because those who use social media for political purposes are more likely to vote or to donate to a campaign (Hongwei and Dehart, 2016; Kim & Geidner, 2008).

Secondly, based on the numerous postings it is seen that P201 election candidate fully utilized the platform for campaigning by uploading it in her Facebook almost every day. On the other hand, this is not so for election candidate of P200. It could be deduced that P201 acquired eleven days to upload her postings, between the dates of 25 April 2018 up to 9 May 2018, whilst P200 needed five days to do so. An act of numerous postings by P201 election candidate via Facebook is an evident of how a politician directly reaches out to voters, mobilize supporters, and influence the public agenda as suggested by Sebastian Stier, Arnim Bleier, Haiko Lietz & Markus Strohmaier (2017).

Thirdly, the last or final dates for both P200 and P201 uploaded their postings also differ. P200 did her political campaigning until the polling date of 9 May 2018 but P201 did not upload postings on the 9th of May 2018. Therefore, P201 had a gap between the differences of nine days, 8 May 2018 (final posting) until the new posting on 17 May 2018 (wishing her Muslim followers celebrating Ramadhan). Nothing was uploaded after 17 May 2018 (for P201) but P201 visited her constituency on 30 May 2018. Based on her Facebook, she uploaded activities such as break of fast and teraweh prayers, giving of contributions for religious activities, GawaiRaya 2018 celebration and GE2018's Thanksgiving function. A similar approach was evident in P200's Facebook. Her postings were not limited to wishing her Muslim prayers for Ramadhan but also attending break of fast with the Muslims and non-Muslims of her constituency.

The fourth point is significant. P200 continued to serve her constituency. Her facebook indicates that she serves her constituency during the month of Ramadhan and especially helping out of the water problem due to limited amount of water in her area. The water problem involved 27 villagers between the dates of 20 May 2018 to 13 June 2018. Although the problem arose, the break of fast activities was continued elsewhere. Although Ramadhan was a fasting month, this did not stop P200's election candidate from visiting and receiving visitors to celebrate Gawai Raya with the villagers in her constituency.

These four findings raise intriguing questions regarding the number of votes garnered by both election candidates. Surprisingly, it was found that the numerous times of postings political campaigns in the Facebook gave both positive and negative effects to P200 and P201. Simultaneously, it gave a negative effect to P201. Positive effect refers to both female election candidates won in GE2018. As a contrast, the negative effect refers to P201, although she won the election, but, a sudden decrease in the number of votes garnered was less as compared to GE2013. This finding is unexpected and suggests that multiply postings do not guarantee an increase in votes. What is more, P201 was an incumbent in her constituency area and had served for 14 years since 2004.

To add to the mentioned arguments on the positive and negative effects towards the votings of the election candidates in Sarawak, a study conducted by Patrícia Rossini, Jeff Hemsley, Sikana Tanupabrungsun, Feifei Zhang, Jennifer Stromer-Galley, 2018 is worthy to note. Specifically, the researchers' study has demonstrated that candidate standing in public opinion polls is positively related to social media use in several ways. Candidates who are performing better, as indicated by higher polling numbers, tend to rely more heavily on

social media to communicate with voters.

This finding by the researchers is contrary to a prior study looking at gubernatorial elections by Rossini et al.,2018 (cited by Patrícia Rossini, Jeff Hemsley, Sikana Tanupabrungsun, Feifei Zhang, Jennifer Stromer-Galley, 2018) that suggested that those who were behind in the polls were more likely to frequently post on social media platforms. In actual fact, according to my study, the female Muslim election candidate of P201 won the election but with a reduction of 27.8 per cent of votes garnered (by comparing the 75.4 per cent votes garnered in 2013 and 47.6 per cent votes garnered in 2018 and by comparing the votes gained in 2013 was 15,625 was reduced to 14,204 in 2018 – please refer to Table 1).

Consistent with the literature, this study found that as stipulaed by McGann (2016), the female election candidates focus on the postings and the comments in the social media particularly the Facebook. This study also supports evidence from Sara (2017) who dubbed the Facebook during the GE2018 as 'Facebook Election', which was clearly the case of both the female Muslim election candidates in this study.   This study also supported Sara's (Sinar Harian online, 2017) manifestation of social media such Facebook is unavoidable in the political scene. This also accords that through the social media, it has become a medium of communication for the election candidates.

The eminent of social media is evident in the case of the opposition party of Pakatan Harapan (PH). What is more interesting is that, PH has championed the usage of social media way before the GE2014. According to Najwa Abdullah and Amalina Anuar (2018), PH's social media lead was relatively diminished in this electoral cycle; it had already established a strong online presence in previous elections. Thus, this likely influenced younger and first-time voters in GE14, as they would be familiar with PH based on its previous popular campaigns like #IniKalilah (This is the Time) and #Ubah (Change) that have taken root in Malaysian society over the years. As in the case of the female Muslim election candidates of Batang Sadong and Batang Lupar, both had been postings frequently on Facebook of their activities. However, the most frequent postings were during the campaigning period of GE2018.

Votes and majority votes obtained by both female election candidates could be seen in Table 1. Table 1 also shows the differences between the votes and majority votes for both candidates based on two parliamentary elections of 2013 and 2018.   It is apparent that P200 illustrates an increase of majority votes and a decrease of majority votes for P201. Majority votes received by P200 increased from 11,206 in GE2013 to 12,328 in GE2018. Nevertheless,

percentage votes for P200 decreased from 85.5 percentages to 61.2 percentages. The percentage difference of 24.3 is apparent of a drastic decrease in votes. Votes and majority votes garnered by P201 has decreased. One unanticipated finding was that P201 is an old-timer, had served her constituency for 14 years. Her 14,204 votes obtained in GE2018 compared to 15,625 votes in GE2013 was astonishment. In terms of percentages, from 75.4 percentages to 47.6 percentages suggests a 27.8 percentage of votes plunged. Table 1 continues to reveal the full figures for the contested elelction candidate of P200 and P201, showed their performance in terms of votes and majority votes attained based on comparison between GE2013 and GE2018.

Table 1 : Muslim female election candidates,
votes and majority votes 2013 dan 2018

Muslim female election candidates / political party / Parlimentary constituency	Votes garnered (percentage of votes in bracket) 2018	Majority votes 2018	Votes garnered (percentage of votes in bracket) 2013	Majority votes 2013
P200 Batang Sadong	14,208 (61.2%)	12,328	13,277 (85.5%)	11,260
P201 Batang Lupar	14,204 (47.6%)	10,277	15,625 (75.4%)	10,964

Source: Data is acquired from The Star (10 May 2018) and the researcher had modified the data based on the constraint of this study.

With respect to the first research question, it was found that P201's numerous postings in the Facebook did not give her a positive impact. Even before Facebook was popular in 2013, P201's votes were higher. The usage of Facebook would increase votes of any other election candidates, and in this particular case, most of Pakatan Harapan's candidates successfully won GE2018. Pakatan Harapan took over Malaysia except for the three states of Sarawak, Perlis and Pahang. And example is Langkawi's election candidate; Tun Mahathir's video entitled Tun M: Not Much Time Left (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lYFr9raKeiI) was uploaded in YouTube and had 26,092 viewers. Whilst Tamara (2018) noted that the video was uploaded in TWEETER and Tun Mahathir's Facebook on 27 April 2018. The video had 762,000 viewers and received mixed feelings among viewers that signify support and forgiveness to Tun Mahathir; although there are some who questioned his sincerety.

Campaign content appeared more sincere on PH's end. For instance, the

campaign video showing Dr Mahathir Mohamad talking to a little girl about saving the country resonated with many (Najwa Abdullah and Amalina Anuar, 2018). However, the opposites befell to Barisan Nasional's election candidates that received negative comments from the facebookers. As such, despite a smaller election machinery on PH, mass mobilisation via the Internet enabled PH to draw large crowds to their ad hoc campaign rallies across the country (or alternatively, to their Facebook live streaming videos), potentially swaying fence-sitters and consolidating votes amongst its supporters.

This study is set out with the second aim of assessing the issues arising in the social media of P201. On the other hand, P200 who has no comments in her Facebook, indicated that P200 is well accepted by her voters. Evidently, it is unlikely for P201.   It is interesting to note here that Facebook was utilized by her followers who uploaded pictures and comments for P201. The most obvious finding to emerge from the analysis is there is no limit for voters or individuals to be opinionated over their dissatisfaction of the female election candidate (P201).

The resentment against P201 was based on protest by the villagers of her constituency. Data on the ground suggested that the grassroots were promised assistance and services by one of the family members of P201 female election candidate. But the promises were not materialized.   An example is the dissatisfaction of I.A. (pseudo name) posted in his Facebook who shared another counterpart's comments (S.A.M – pseudo name) dated 15 April 2018. S.A.M initially had uploaded in a group's Facebook of Saribas Global, a picture of two handwritten banners which said, "*We love the Chief Minister/ Government. But we rejected the BN's P201 election candidate D.R.*" and "*We will vote Barisan Nasional if the P201 election candidate is changed to another person*".

S.A.M.'s dissatisfaction continued with his second comment to Saribas Global timed at 8.49 am (15 April 2018). He stated that,

> "The villagers of Batang Lupar wanted a new face so he or she coul bring development to our area. This constituency area need a leader who goes to the ground, not merely coming once the general election is near. We want change, our Chief Minister, Abang Johari Abang Openg, we demanded your promise, you promise if the representative is not good, we can change to a new representative…if the people of Batang Lupar had forgotten, please share this information, and let others know the real situation of Batang Lupar".

The statement made by S.A.M. clearly stated that there was a demand for a new representative for P201 who could develop their area and to listen to the grievances of the people. Having a representative who could be hardly seen at the area made them demanded a new face to represent them. The phrase "touch and go" attitude of the representative is uncalled for. This phrase is common among the people of Sarawak by having the constituency representatives who seldom visited their constituency areas or even to organize activities in those areas.

Thus, Facebook could not be denined of its significance. It should be utilized as a means of communication between the election candidates and their voters. As mentioned by Damian Tambini (2018), in terms of deliberation and information gathering related to elections, Facebook is becoming the crucial platform in some countries, which is reflected in the shift of UK political advertising onto the platform over the past five years. Moreover, the complex process of deliberation and debate during an election cycle, the flow of ideas, memes, reversals of public opinion, and fluctuations of fortune of individual politicians is now more knowable than ever before.

On top of the two handwritten banners as discussed in the previous pages, an observation was also conducted by the researcher to few small districts at P201 on 31 March 2018; the journey to Kampung Sebangan witnessed a huge billboard at the road side that has the picture of the female election candidate (P201) and small children with her. On the billboard, there was a scribble of calling the female election candidate, a liar, on the (face) picture. A blue colored spray was used to scrawl on it. It is somewhat surprising to note in this condition that the probability of any individual(s) or group(s) dared to show their resentment by scribbling on the billboard. To add to the argument on the negative effects of social media via the Facebook, Patrícia Rossini, Jeff Hemsley, Sikana Tanupabrungsun, Feifei Zhang, Jennifer Stromer-Galley (2018) argued that the results indicate that a candidate's performance in the polls drives certain communicative strategies, such as the use of messages of attacks and advocacy, as well as the focus on personal image.

Henceforth, these findings suggest important implications. Firstly, this study has identified that recurrent postings in the Facebook gave positive and negative effects. The study has also shown that it affected the number of votes obtained by both P200 and P201 female Muslim election candidates. Likewise, the research has shown that the various postings by P201 are more compared to postings by P200, gave negative effect to P201 female election candidate. That is, her votes have decreased as compared to the votes she garnered in the previous GE2013. The second major finding was that the number of posting

of P200 is less from the frequent postings of P201 that has a positive effect to P200 in a way that her votes increased even though in terms of percentages had dropped.

Furthermore, this study has also found that the contents of videos uploaded by P200 and P201 are dissimilar. P200 adopted a casual live streaming video, meeting the villagers at her constituency area by visiting from house to house whilst P201 hired a professional video maker of her and children. The video give the impression of superficial as compared to that of a casual live streaming by P200. The most obvious finding to emerge is the common problem of under developed villages in P201, continuously raised by the villagers in their Facebook. This is related with calling the female election candidate of P201 as a liar because of her promise to bring development to her constituency.

CONCLUSION

Although most prior research analyzes the social media research in elections, this study focuses on the election results among two female Muslim women in the Malaysian General Election (GE2018). The GE2018 presents an ideal opportunity test on how numerous postings or uploading of information can determine the votes garnered by both female election candidates. This study's findings suggest that communication strategies on Facebook are significantly related to how well candidates are performing in the polls. Overall, the findings show that the usage of social media such as Facebook has a positive and negative impact to the owners of facebook. It shows that social media has been positiviely associated with higher increase of voters obtained by one of the female election candidates. On the other hand, it also shows a negative impact towards other female election candidates even though she has numerous postings in her facebook using some different contents including those related to ideas, ethnicity, religion and culture.

It could also be understood that political efficacy among voters in P200 and P201 is driven mostly by their interest in the election and their attention to election news or matters discussed in the social media. Their interest in the election and political discussions in the social media were primarily associated with their preference over the female election candidate. This study also suggests that social media platform matters for campaign strategies. Hence, the 'Facebook Election' as labelled by Sara (2017) seems safe to conclude that the social media is growing rapidly for people who want to have an alternative medium that not only provide viewers with diversed political information about GE2018 in Malaysia, but also gave voters to choose whom they wanted to vote for or vote against.

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TRANSBOUNDARY HAZE: ISLAM PROHIBITS DESTRUCTION OF EARTH[1]

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ABSTRACT

Recurring episodes of transboundary haze have been similarly to an annual event in Malaysia since the 1980's. Transboundary haze is typically haze caused by forest fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan, Indonesia which moves thousands of miles and encompasses neighboring regional countries. This is caused by human hands that continue to pursue unplanned development without taking into account the aspect of environmental sustainability. This study looks into and the understanding of recurring occurrences of transboundary haze in Sarawak. From the perspective of Islam, by making the Holy Quran as the absolute source of reference, God forbids the destruction of nature and calls upon mankind to do good not only to other humans and animals but also to the environment. Human beings are endowed with a great mind that can guide them to make and do the right thing, thus, various efforts need to be taken into consideration and be done collectively amongst the ASEAN countries in a joint effort towards reducing or preventing continuous episodes of transboundary haze within the region.

Keywords: Transboundary Haze, Air Pollutant Index, Forest Fires, Air Pollution

INTRODUCTION

Haze is a phenomenon of air pollution caused by particulates or fine particles

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which cannot be seen by the naked eyes that are suspended in the atmosphere in high concentrations. Among the natural factors that lead to formation of haze are natural phenomenon such as volcanic eruptions, soil dust and sea breezes that contain salt. On the other hand, some of the man-made factors arising from the release of pollutants are from motor vehicles, open burning, emissions from industries through chimneys, land development and construction works. However, the high concentration of haze that occurred in Malaysia particularly in 1983, 1997, 2005, 2013 and 2015 are called transboundary haze due to the fact that the main source came from the open burning carried out at large-scale oil palm plantations mainly in Sumatra and Kalimantan (Afroz et al., 2003). These findings were based on studies carried out and the findings showed that the rate of the formation of haze had a positive correlation with sulfur, whereby the occurrence of forest fires or biomass materials will release sulfur and potassium into the air.

In 2002, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) had agreed to sign an agreement on cross-border haze pollution and to find ways to prevent re-occurrence of forest fires that will lead to formation of haze. Indonesia, however, did not ratify the agreement (ASEAN, 2002). The occurrences of haze will cause various problems in terms of 1) forest fires that leads to emissions of greenhouse gasses, the destructions of the biodiversity and habitat for the flora and fauna, 2) increases health risks especially to the elderly, children and the sickly people, 3) negative effects on the economic and tourism industries, and 4) threatens diplomatic relation between neighbouring countries (Glover et al., 2003; Narayanan; 2002). It could worsen if the occurrence of haze leads to high biomass combustion causing changes in earth temperature and eventually global climate (Huang et al., 2013). Thus, this study contributes to the understanding of the occurrence of transboundary haze in the State of Sarawak with reference to the Islamic prohibition as mentioned in the Holy Quran.

Malaysia adopts a computational system called the Air Pollutant Index (API) system. This index system was developed by the Department of Environment (DOE) of Malaysia and it was translated into API readings as in Table 1 to facilitate relaying of information and understanding to the community at large. The API reading is developed in easily understood ranges of values as a mean of reporting the quality of air instead of using the actual concentration of air pollutants. The higher the API value, the higher the level of air pollution where it is used to inform the public about the health status of the air quality as stipulated in the National Haze Action Plan. The reading involves measuring 5 types of air pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO_2), ozone

(O_3), nitrogen dioxide (NO_2) and fine particulate matter with diameter size less than 10μm (PM_{10}). The Malaysian API system closely follows the Pollutant Standard Index (PSI) developed by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA).

Table 1. Air Pollutants Index (API)

API	Status
0 - 50	Good
51 – 100	Moderate
101 - 200	Unhealthy
201 – 300	Very Unhealthy
Ø 301	Hazardous

Source: Department of Environment

Sarawak had the worst impacts of haze across the country by recording a percentage of 23.8% of the unhealthy days (Afroz et al., 2013). The state of Sarawak, which borders on Kalimantan, allows it to receive a high amount of haze brought by wind factor. Therefore, the National Resources and Environment Board of Sarawak (NREB) is committed to develop three air quality monitoring stations focusing on border areas with Indonesia, namely Tebedu, Lubok Antu and Lawas as shown in Figure 1. On top of that, the monitoring of air quality mainly in the residential and industrial area is under direct supervision of Department of Enviroment (DOE). Based on the available data and the analysis process, this work provides the explanation of the detail occurrence of the haze, its impacts to human healthiness and the responses of human being to the transboundary haze based on religious teaching, especially Islam for the seeks of better initiatives.

Figure 1. Three air quality monitoring stations under NREB supervision

THE CHRONOLOGY ON HAZE OCCURRENCES IN SARAWAK

Sarawak recorded the worst episode of haze with the highest API reading of 860 in 1997 which caused the government to declare a state of emergency for 10 days from September 19 to 28, 1997. This transboundary haze was due to forest fires in Kalimantan as a result of combustion of biomass activities in agriculture. It was exacerbated by the El Nino factor that affected the rainfall which caused a long dry season. The effects of the horrendous haze of 1997 caused 10,000 people to get treatment due to illness caused by haze such as breathlessness, eye sore and sore throat. Smoke, dust and gases emitted from this biomass combustion was carried by the Southwest monsoon from Sumatra and Kalimantan to Malaysia. The haze was also trapped by mountain systems and ranges. According to DOE, the top air pollutant parameter for the worst haze in Southeast Asia in 1997 was PM_{10}. A haze study conducted by Anwar et al., (2010) in Riau in 2006 found that the highest concentrations of PM_{10} and O_3 were during the haze season as compared to the non-haze days.

In August of 2006, several areas in Kuching, Sibu, Samarahan, Sarikei, Sri Aman, Petra Jaya and Bintulu recorded unhealthy API readings. The air quality worsened in late September and by early October of 2006, the town of Sri Aman recorded an APIs of 224 on 6 October 2006. Several series of haze emanating from transboundary haze occurred from May to September 2011 that was a result of forest fires in Central Sumatra and Kalimantan during the

dry season. Haze once again recurred in 2012 from June to August and this time around it was exacerbated by mangrove fires in Miri as well as forest fires in the northern and central region of Sumatra (DOE, 2018).

Several divisions in Sarawak recorded an extremely unhealthy API reading from July to September 2014. In Sibu for example, a reading of 270 was recorded on July 28, 2014. In several states of Peninsular Malaysia in the same year, severe unhealthy concentration of haze was also recorded. While in 2015, during the Southwest monsoon season, Malaysia once again received a slump in air quality due to the opening of large agricultural fields that led to forest fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan. On September 15, 2015, 34 areas recorded unhealthy air quality status for the first time in Malaysia's history since 1997. Several schools around Kuching, Samarahan, Putrajaya, Negeri Sembilan and Malacca were ordered to be close. (DOE, 2018). Figure 2 shows the concentration of PM_{10} as recorded at Tebedu station a small town in Sarawak bordering Kalimantan, Indonesia.

Figure 2. PM_{10} concentration in Tebedu in September 2015

NUMBER OF HOTSPOTS

A hotspot represents an area of 1 x 1 km^2 which means forest fires as large as the size of the pixel shown. A total of 3918 hotspots were detected in Kalimantan, Indonesia, Sarawak in September 2015 as shown in Figure 3. During the same period, 2691 hotspots were detected in Sumatra and 10 in Sarawak. Through the image of the National Oceanic Atmospheric Association (NOAA) 18, the highest number of hotspots was detected on September 22, 2015, where 479 fire events were detected in Kalimantan. Malaysia took some very important

precautionary measures by reminding people not to conduct open burning which could have aggravated the hazy conditions. The advice was done when an increase in hotspots was spotted across the country.

Figure 3. Number of hotspots in Kalimantan in September 2015

The Regional Haze Map as issued by the ASEAN Specialized Meteorological Centre (ASMC) on 8th September 2015 as shown in Figure 4, shows the thick and medium structured haze smog movement from the fire areas in Kalimantan, Indonesia to the West of Sarawak, whereas thick and moderately formed haze structure from fire areas in Central and Southern Sumatra, Indonesia is found to have covered most of the West Coast of Peninsular Malaysia.

IMPACT OF AIR POLLUTION ON HUMAN HEALTH

Exposure to air pollution, either in the short or long term, does affects human health. During the occurrence of haze, sunlight will be dispersed by suspended particles, causing harmful bacterial and viral reproduction (Beardsley et al., 1997). In addition, suspended particles contain chemical and organic compositions such as Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon (PAH) known to be a form of cancer agent. Haze not only affects the quality of human health but affects economic and school activities. This is because in many incidences, schools will be directed to close by the Malaysia Ministry of Education, if the API level reaches a dangerous level. In this unhealthy condition, affected school going children have been reported to be breathing faster and thus more of the unhealthy particles will be inhaled as compared to adults. Another

related issue would also be inadequate (perhaps incomplete) immunization levels given to the children and adults concerned (Mohamad et al., 2016).

A study conducted by Nasir et al., (2000) showed that the haze of 1997 had caused 285, 227 cases of asthma attacks, 118, 804 cases of bronchitis in children, 3889 chronic cases of bronchitis among adults, 2003 related cases of individuals being detained in hospital due to respiratory problems, and 26, 684 emergency treatment cases. Indirectly, medical costs increased significantly during that historical hazy season. The number of outpatients seeking treatments at hospitals in Kuching, Sarawak also increased from two to three times higher than normal during that severe haze phenomenon that struck the country in 1997. In addition to respiratory problems, infectious cases such as conjunctivitis also increased dramatically during the haze season. In Selangor for example, the increase was recorded, from only 207 cases in June of that year to 3496 cases in October. The same pattern was also recorded in Sarawak where it was closely linked to the increase of API (Afroz et al., 2003).

THE HOLY QURAN PROHIBITS DESTRUCTION OF EARTH

Haze is categorized as man-made damage because its main cause is from uncontrolled human activities. Mohamad (2005) described the act of polluting air like open burning is categorized as a nuisance to mankind as its unhealthy effects enter the airspace in neighbouring countries. The Islamic school of thoughts of scholars like Maliki and Hanbali assert that any form of nuisance activities and also purposeful destructions caused by mankind must be stopped immediately. There are many Quranic verses that clearly explain about the need to protect the environment such as the order of not doing damage to the earth, the effects and consequences of human acts, the rewards for the arrogance and the reprisal of the corrupt. Among the surahs and verses of the Quran mentioned in relation to the environment are provided below.

1) Order not to do damage to the earth

   "…and when it is said unto them; Do not make mischief in the land, they say: "We are the only ones who make good".
   Surah Al-Baqarah verse 11

2) Cause and effect of human destruction

   "There was visible damage on land and in the sea due to human hands; Allah wishes them to taste some of their evil deeds, that they may return

(to the right path)".
Surah Ar-Rum verse 41

3) Requital to those who destroy Allah's Creation

"..and those who breaks God's (covenant) after it has been decided upon, thus God commanded to be reattached, yet they are mischievous and continue to make destruction on earth – (Allah) be cursed upon them to those who do evil and they will be rewarded with the worst of days in the Hereafter".
Surah Ar-Ra'd verse 25

4) Comparisons between believers and those who are cruel to the environment

"… then should there be among the people that had been destroyed before you, are those who are excesses of reason that forbid their people from evil deeds on earth but, what a pity..! There is none to forbid except a few, those whom We have saved amongst them, and those who do not forbid, are the ones who choose luxury bestowed to them (over faith) and they are the ones who are sinners ".
Surah Hud verse 116

Based on the above arguments and proofs from the Holy Quran, it is clear that Islam staunchly forbids humanity to make damage to the earth because the consequences are not confined within our country but can also do harm to other areas such, thus the occurrences known as cross-border haze. However, sadly, very few individuals are willing to partake the effort and responsibility in protecting the environment and also preventing others from damaging the environments around us. Development, of course, cannot be separated from our present life. However, human wisdom in balancing development and the preservation of the environment around us is important in ensuring the continuous survival of future generations.

The need for this balance in the environment correlates with the concept of Al-Mizan as emphasised by the Islamic teaching. According to Halim and Akhir (2016), based on this concept, God has given roles and responsibilities to all of His creation. If the roles or responsibilities entrusted are not done, then this natural system Allah has created will change. The system that Allah has created will not be affected if greed and human exploitation of nature for the purpose of development is avoided and controlled. This is because the system will form an equal balance through order and harmony in nature that

will complement each other (Akhir, 2004).

CONCLUSION

Various efforts have been introduced since 1995 to formulate plans to prevent peat and forest fires in the region through improved policy, continuous enforcement and state of the art monitoring mechanisms. However, this effort requires strong co-ordination and cooperation from all countries involved within the Southeast Asian region to ensure all the planned efforts that have been agreed upon being successfully implemented. The work also suggests that the efforts of encouraging the participation of more individuals on reducing the transboundary haze need the support by religiously based initiatives. This is in line with the command of Allah to humanity preventing man from doing any damage to the earth that human beings should therefore act as a caliph and take responsibility for what they do to the environment around. God has entrusted this world of ours for us to save and keep and that is what the people have to do for the benefit of humanity today and tomorrow.

This work recognizes that in embracing the Industrial Revolution 4.0, Malaysia is in full force in taking challenges of the new era with the implementation of digital technology in many aspects. The DOE has introduced a MyIPU smartphone application for Air Pollutants Index (API) as part of the new government's ongoing commitment to improve service quality for the people. The apps, which can be downloaded via all smartphones applications platform aims to inform the public on the current status of API readings throughout the country. In addition, all weather information, hotspots, rainfalls and haze-related statistics are also available directly from relevant websites. This initiative is intended to help people to have early warning awareness so that they are able to take immediate responses as necessary.

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THE CONCEPT OF *TAWHEED* OF BUGINESE PEOPLE IN THE ANCIENT MANUSCRIPT *LONTARA ATTORIOLOANG RI WAJO* OF WEST KALIMANTAN

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses a tawheed concept of buginese people in the ancient manuscript, Lontara Attorioloang ri Wajo and focuses on the concept of al-uluhiyah and ar-rububiyah of Buginese people according to the manuscript. This work is based on research on manuscript through philology approach since Lontara Attorioloang ri Wajo is a handwriting manuscript written without punctuation (comma or full stop) and space. The concept of tawheed al-uluhiyah of buginese people in Lontara Attorioloang ri Wajo manuscript is shown in the form of testimony of the presence of Dewata Seuwwae or God the one; He begets not, nor was He begotten. The belief of the oneness of god is embodied in self-surrender and full obedience by performing worship qhairu mahda but not ibadah mahdah. This confession can be seen in 18 dialogues between Arung Matoa and an Arung from another place. The concept of tawheed ar-rububiyah in the manuscript is shown in the form of a belief that Dewata Seuwwae or the one God is a lord of the worlds; He determines all creatures' destiny and prosperity. Further, the Buginese people's belief in the oneness of God is shown by the agreement they have made, and Arung Matoa Toudamang's message about how to behave toward god, other person, and nature. There are 8 dialogues in the form of agreement and pappaseng.

Keywords: Tauhid, Uluhiyah, Rububiyyah, Bugis, Lontara Attorioloang ri wajo

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia has many ancient manuscripts addressing religious values and local wisdom. This work talks about a buginese ancient manuscripts which constitutes of source of historical documents about the life of buginese people. The manuscript contains cultural values, politics, *pappaseng* (messages), religious teachings, and tradition of buginese people. One of the buginese

ancient manuscripts is entitled *Lontara Attorioloang ri Wajo* which is what is being discussed in this article. Buginese people do not only show their strong concern to their oral but also written tradition. Christian Pelras mentions that since the 14th century buginese people have begun to write volumes of handwriting manuscript (lontara) that can be found at the hands ofvillagers across South Sulawesi. This fact is a proof of wide spread, at least in the 18th century, of high literacy even in villages (Pelras, 2005: 41-49). Although lontara has a role to sustain a tradition to record history (a*ttorioloang*), law, custom, ritual, and ancient knowledge about agriculture, astronomy, navigation, and design of ship and house, it also provides notes of innovations. The manuscript is not only used to mention the name of the rulers when the innovation was created but also used to spread the innovation borrowed from other places which later become a part of religious and technical tradition. For example, the *Safinat Al-Najah* talks about religious teaching written by Muhammad Yusuf Al-Maqassari, a legendary Islamic scholar in South Sulawesi (Azra, 2004: 260) dan (Solihin, 2005: 287).

Buginese people are very interested in writing that is reflected by the habit of the people's bringing their manuscripts when leaving their hometown or doing migration (Patmawati, 2005: 114-115; Hasanuddin, 2000: 80). The researchers found several lontara*s* outside buginese area such as in West and East Kalimantan. This work discusses the one found in West Kalimantan entitled *Lontara Attorioloang ri Wajo* which was written in Arabic characters containing *du'a,* picture of star, compass, and writing of *iqomah* but the word of *hayya alal falah* was not mentioned in the manuscript. It consists of 1-3 volumes, and was named as *Falaq* book written in 1210 H by Sayyid Muhyiddin Al-Arabi. It was translated into Buginese language. The lontara was written by Sufu (Yusuf).

The existence of *Lontara Attoriolong ri Wajo* cannot be separated from the literate Buginese people so that the manuscript is a replica or description of the condition of the people at that time. For that, the research on ancient manuscript needs to be continued including the research on *Lontara Attoriolong ri Wajo* in order to understand important values in it. For this work, the focus the concept of tawheed al-uluhiya and *tawheed ar-rububiyah* according to buginese people which found being written in the manuscript. As the data is being analyzed, the authors find several important aspects of the life of the Bugenesse people living in West Kalimantan being discussed in the manuscript. The focus on the concept of the two kinds of *tawheed* is to deepen the discussion of the work.

RESEARCH METHOD

The main aspect in analyzing a manuscript is the selection of the object. When it was found, the ancient manuscript of Lontara Attoriolong ri Wajo was without a title. Then after reading and comprehending its content and discussing the history of Wajo along with its all events, the researchers and their team members agree to name the ancient manuscript "Lontara Attoriolong ri Wajo." Tha naming is a part of the process in the methodology in the field of philology studies. The next step is making an inventory of the manuscript by tracking it in West Kalimantan Barat and contacting those who have big concern to manuscript. Finally, the researchers found several buginese manuscripts at Abdurrahman Palloga's house but the researcher did not find the similar one. Then, the researchers continue to track the manuscripts in the books discussing the Wajo Kingdom. One of them is found that is written by Ima Kesuma. The book discusses the history of Wajo Kingdom by referring to Lontara Wajo. The researchers found similarities and differences between the book and the Lontara Attoriolong ri Wajo but they could not determine which manuscript being is being copied or the original.

To continue, the researchers make the description of the manuscript by identifying its physical condition, content of the text. The decision of providing a statement on the earlier manuscript and the copy one is being made after a very serious and detail analysis. This is conducted for the purpose of to gain the more comprehensive description of the manuscript and the text (Fathurahman, 2016: 7). After making inventory activities and describing the manuscript, the researchers transliterate the Buginese character into Latin in order to enable all people especially the Buginese youngsters in West Kalimantan to read the manuscript. The following step is translating the manuscript into Bahasa Indonesia. The translation shows the themes being discussed in the manuscript. The last is doing content analysis which focuses on the concept of tawheed of the Buginese people according to Lontara Attoriolong ri Wajo.

A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE *LONTARA ATTORIOLOANG RI WAJO*

This manuscript is originated in Wajo Kingdom in South Sulawesi. Its presence in Sambas was caused by the migration of Buginese people from South Sulawesi to West Kalimantan. They migrated in groups or along with their family and relatives hundred years ago before the era of colonial in Nusantara region. This migration is called *malekke' dapureng* as indicated in the manuscript. When migrating they brought their lontara including *Lontara Attorioloang ri Wajo.* Lontara is used as their identity as people from Wajo as well as used as

the identity that they are the decendent of the king. It is a unique identity for them for multiple purposes.

The evidence of the presence of the Buginese in Sambas is shown by the existence of a figure as well known as Opu Daeng Kamase who becomes *To Warani* and get married to a member of royale family. In addition, the role of *To Panrita* people is shown by several manuscipts such as the Arabic Buginese manuscitp, the manuscitp containing do'a and the Falaq book, and the Buginese manuscipt written in Arabic character, Islamic astonomy. There are even some manuscipts found in Brunei such as those written by Daeng Abdul Fatah and Imam Ya'qub al-Bugisi available at the collection of the Office of Jabatan Mufti of the Kingdom of Brunei Darussalam.

Lontara Attorioloang ri Wajo is a manusciept found by a team from the reseach and social service centre of STAIN Pontianak which later becomes IAIN Pontianak. The manuscipt is from the collection of Mul'am Husairi, a Buginese decendant living in Sambas. The team could only take its photo since it could no longer be photocopied. The photo was given to Yahya Natsir, a Buginese decendent and also a senior lecturer of STAIN Pontianak. He then gave the photo to his daughter, Nelly Mujahida, who is also a lecture of STAIN Pontianak. She then handed over it to Patmawati who was conducting the reseach on Buginese migration to West Kalimantan. This manuscipt was used as an efidence of the presence of Buginese people in West Kalimantan. In 2016 Patmawati and Besse Wahidah analyzed the manuscipt and named it *Lontara Attorioloang ri Wajo*. Futher, they got information from their colleague Pengiran Mahani in Brunei Darussalam that there is also such a manuscipt found in Brunei Darussalam.

TAWHEED AL-ULUHIYAH IN THE *LONTARA ATTORIOLONG RI WAJO*

Tawheed al-uluhiyah in *Lontara Attoriolong ri Wajo* discusses the issues of human's life as a community that requires rules and social harmony including agreement or contract, statement, good deed and request. All of their activities are centered in *tawheed al-uluhiyah* as the goal of all deeds will be presented to *Dewataseuwae,* the one God. This is in line with *shahadah* in Islam in which the first part of the statement is integration of negation and exception that lead to the testimony of the oneness of God. The negation that there is no God is aimed at liberating human beings form other beliefs and surrender along with their effects. Then, the exception that there is no God but Allah is aimed at telling humans that they must only obey Allah. It suggests that before Allah or *Dewataseuwae,* all creatures are week and powerless, and are not able to help

other without His permit. Only humans' words and deeds that in line with His willing can save human when living in the world (Maarif, 1995: 8).

Tawheed has a consequence when performing worship as Allah said "You (Alone) we worship, and You (Alone) we ask for help (for each and everything) (Q.S. Al-Fatiha: 5). It means that none should be worshipped, obeyed, and asked for help except Him alone. Whoever worship and obey other than Allah, and ask for help to other than Him is called as *shirik* (practicing idolatry). Therefore, *tawheed* is a belief of oneness of god in which eventually expressed in a faith that none should be obeyed (worshipped) and asked for help except Allah (Kusumamihardja, 1985: 150). *Lontara Attoriolong ri Wajo* shows that there should be a balance between the freedom of human as autonomous individual and the power of god as creator. This is different from the concept purposed by Frederic Nietzsche in M. Solihin who states that human is super (superman), aggressive, autonomous, and free will (Solihin, 2005: 2).

Tawheee al-uluhiyah means that none should be worshiped except Allah (Yasdi, 2003: 74). The meaning shows that all worhsips and obidiences are only presented to the Almignty Allah. According to Ja'far Subhani, the right to be worshipped and obeyed belongs only to Allah, if the right is provided for other that Allah there will be the deviation of Aqidah that leads to *shirik* (Subhani, 1987: 17). This concept has considered Allah as a central of all kinds of *Ibadah* and human's deed. This is shown by following dialogues found in *Lontara Attorioloang ri Wajo*.

1. The agreement between Cinnotabi and Buli

"*Nalāo Arung Cinnottabi na Arung ri Būli, nasennang wanuwanna ri Wajo, napatettonni sapposisenna, maddanreng iya tellu, Lamatareng, Latenri Pékka Latenri Tau, nariyaseng Arung Cinnotabi, Batara Wajo, nariasenna Latenri Tappe Arung Penrang, nasseajinna tanae ri Mampu, mangurū ja' mangurū décéng, nasabbi Dewataseuwwae*"

Meaning:

Leaving Arung Cinnotabi and Arung Buli, and people of Wajo became happy. Their three cousins were promoted to be *paddanreng*, Lamattareng, Latenri Pekka, Latenri Tau and were titled Arung Cinnotabi *Batara Wajo*, while Latenri tappe was titled *ArungPénrang*. Make a close relationship with Mampu area, together in badness and goodness, witnessed by god the one.

2. The summission of Macanang to Wajo

"*Naia napuada toMacanangnge atake napuangngi wajo ianapuelo wajo ia*

kikadoi. Rekkuatuotta geromunangke. Naiya napuada arung matoae ianari-tu nasabbi dewataseuwae pusangngi ane'mu eppomu. Tennatiwi tomate tanawawaja tana".

Meaning:

Whatever said by Macanan people "kami Ata and wajo people Puang-nya" whatever wished by wajo that what we do. *Rekkuannao tagero'mu nangke.* Whatever said by arung Matoae "god the one is the witness of what you say, tell this your descents who are not stopped by the death.

3. The submission of Sompe and Ugi

Nauttāma ri Wajo to sompe'e mpawa tellu lotong. Napaddaoi tanana. Naiyya naellauang na'ei ri Wajo. Natomaddualeng baliwi ada nakadoi ritu adammu arussompe to Wajoe ana'e sompe naina Wajo temmasserang ri ja ri deceng. Adanna kuwa ina'e. Mupasengeng anemu eppomu anae sompe naina' Wajo. Nasabbi dewata seuwae. Nariala tedonna to sompe'e. Naritununa riareng seng Wajo. Nasetaung maddaung tosompe'e ri Wajo. Naengka arulliu sitinro arumpugi muttama ri Wajo tiwi enneng lotong napaddaoi tanana ri Wajo. Naiya naellau arulliu riasengnge Lamappatora. Ana'e ri Wajo liu ugi naina' Wajo. Natomaddualeng baliwi adanna arulliu nakadoiwi ritu adammu ana'e liu ugi ri Wajo ana'e risappareng atuwonna ri nanna. Tenna pekkakia elona inanna. Yanae tapasengeng ana eppo ada assikadongetta tennawawa to mate nasabbi dewata seuwae. Tenna walaie anae inanna. Dekko polei jae. Nakado arulliu nariala tedonna arulliu naritununa nariareng seng Wajo

Meaning:

Sompe entered wajo by bringing there fruits (lotong?) to unite his region, he asked Wajo. Tomaddualeng replied that Wajo people agreed with Arung Sompe's wish. Sompe as the oldest child and Wajo as a parent were not inseparable, and this was witnessed by God, the one. Sompe's buffalo was slaughtered, burned, and eaten by all people in wajo. A year after Sompe joined with Wajo, Arung Liu and Arung Pugi arrived in Wajo bringing six lotong and united their region in Wajo, and was asked by Arung Liu, Lamappatora to be a Childand Wajo as his father. Tomaddualeng replied Arung Liu, and was agreed by Liu Ugi, Wajo's son. A child was looked after by his parent so that he might not be against him. This agreement was witnessed by God, the one. A child would not leave his parents when bad things happen. Arung Liu agreed then Liu's buffalo was slaughtered, burned, and eaten by all Wajo people.

4. The Brotherhood of Luwu and Wajo

Natellumpulengpurana mattoWajo to liue. Nalabu essoe naleppang ri topaceddo datue ri Luwu. Nassuro tiwirangngi Arung Matoae waramparang tellu tau, tellu terong potto. Natampaiwi no sita ri topaceddo. Naengkana to Wajoe no selili sita datue ri Luwu. Nasitudangenna datue ri Luwu Arung Matoae. Puangrimaggalatung. Nakkeda datue ri Luwu. Riasengnge raja dewa. Amaseangnga seajing mualai ceddena tanae ri Luwu tellu tarong potto tapasseajingngi tanae ri Luwu tanae ri Wajo. Napadao…. Seina seamma. Nakaka Luwu nanri Wajo. Seuwwa ja naurui seuwwa deceng naurui. Nasabbi dewata seuwae. Appada orowane'na tanae riLuwu tanae ri Wajo.

Meaning:

Three months after Liu turned into Wajo at sunset. Datu Luwu stopped by Topaceddo bringing rewards to Arung Matoa: 3 persons and 3 bracelets. He then invited Wajo to come to Toppecado. Wajo arrived and saw Datu Luwu and sat next to Arung Matoa. Puangrimaggalatung. Datu Luwu named Raja Dewang said 'please be pity and take just a little land of Luwu and three bracelets, and consider Luwu and Wajo as your bothers. Luwu as the elder brother and Wajo as the younger one, are together in good or bad condition and is witnessed by God the one.

5. Message about the Oneness of God

Namalasa arungmatoae naengkasi karaengnge matoae muttama ri wajo. Mitai lasanna arung matoae. Nakkeda karaengnge maserro ritu lasammu ancaji amaseangngas mupoada adangnga seaga majeppu dewata. Nakkeda Arung Matoae seuwwamua ritu dewata suronamuaritu dewatae maega. Nakkeda karaengnge iyyaga dewwata seuwae tekkeina'na tekke ammana. Nakkeda arung matoae iyyamuanariaseng dewata seuwae tekke ina'ga tekke amma' ga.

Meaning:

Arung Matoa was sick and Karaeng Matoae went home to see him then said "Your sickness looks so bad. Thus, please be pity and tell me about the oneness of God". Arung Matoae replied "really, God is the one but He has many messengers". Karaeng asked "Does God does not give birth and does not have child?" Arung Matoae said "God begets not, nor was He begotten".

Some Arung Matoae's statements indicate the existence of Dewataseuwae (single lord) who acknowledges and witnesses all people's activities. It suggests that the ruler of Wajo Kingdom had admitted that there was a biggest power outside. Their mind had found that there was the Almighty One who always

knows all humans' deeds. This is in accordance with the thought of Mu'tazialah which states that human's mind must be able to realize the presence of God the one. Sulaiman Bin Abdallah reveals that according to *tawheed al-uluhiyah* all kind of worships are performed only to Allah. So that the realization of the tawheed are based on: 1) performing all kind of worship only to Almighty Allah and believing that there is nothing comparable to Him; and 2) all kinds of devotion should be according to Allah's order, and leaving His prohibitions (Abdallah, 1987: 33). It means that *tawheed al-uluhiyah* implicitly tells humans to purify their intention to perform *ibadah* and religious activity since the only genuine intention will be accepted while other than that will be rejected. Therefore, intention is the core of *ibadah*.

Mustafa Abdullah identifies that a man with *tawheed al-uluhiyah* is surely has strong *tawheed ar-rububiyah* and *tawheed al-ama wa alsifat*. Yet a man with *tawheed ar-rububiyah* or *tawheed al-asma wa al-sifat* is not automatically has strong *tawheed al-uluhiyah* (Basri, 2009: 15). It indicates that *tawheed al-uluhiyah* covers *tawheed ar-rububiyah* and *tawheed al-asma wa al sifat*. In other words, *tawheed al-uluhiyah* is the highest level of *tawheed* and has fundamental position in Islam according to several Quranic verses. "Allah, the ever-living, the self-subsisting by whom all subsist…" (QS. al-Baqarah: 255)."And your god is one God. There is no "deity [worthy of worship] except Him, the entirely Merciful, the Especially Merciful". (QS. Al Baqarah:163). "And We sent not before you any messenger except that We revealed to him that, "There is no deity except Me, so worship Me" (QS. Al-Anbiya:25).

Those *naqli* agumentations show that Almighty Allah is the only God for all creatures across universe and deny the existence of other gods such as idols or sacred things. *Lontara Attorioloang ri Wajo* explicitly describes the rule of *Dewataseuwae* as God the one.

TAWHEED AR-RUBUBIYAH IN THE *LONTARA ATTORIOLONG RI WAJO*

Lontara Attoriolong ri Wajo contains *tawheed ar-rububiyah* as it is found in it that *Dewataseuwae* is the ruler, determiner of destiny, lover, and giver. In Islam, *tawheed ar-rububiyah* means believing in the oneness of Allah as the only God, the creator, sustainer, determiner, and controller of all creatures (al-Buraikan, 1998: 141). According to *tawheed ar-rububiyah* , god is believed to be oneness in His deeds such as creating, sustaining, determining, controlling, giving and ending life of all creatures. *Tawheed ar-rububiyah* according to Islam and *Lontara Attoriolong ri Wajo* is not in contradiction. This can be seen in the following statements.

1. The submission of Palippu

Nalimampenni sorōna riwanuwanna to Wajoe, naengkana muttāma ri Wajo topalippue todataae totincoe. Tīwī tellutau, nakkeda arung palippu ritellae Mattekkengpessiearungdata arungtinco. Iyamai kiengkang … amaseangkeng mualai cede mennang tasséajing serāja. Tapada madécéng tapada majā. Naseuwwa riāseng Wajo rija. Seuwa riaseng Wajo rilau. Nakkeda Arung Matoae Puangrimaggalatung. Kerru pōlé sumange'mu enrenggia warangparammu silaong ada madecemmu kusompa waliwi kutarimai.Iyya. Naiya masséajitta tessi uraga-urāgai tessi élōrangngi majā. Tassīta riadécengetta. Nakkeda Arung Palippu arung data arung tinco. Iyani tau paurāga paelorang maja iyyana… (pebali) dewata seuwae. Naropu' nakkedana Arung Matoae iyyanaritu adammu nasabbi Dewata seuwae. Naiyato kupoada toLoa, toAnabanuae, to atatae betaae ri Palippu apa' pura nabicārani ritu dewataseuwae. Nakkeda arung Palippu, iyanaritu tasséajīngeng téssiacinnang anuéngngi assūro-wommālai anummu.

Meaning:

Five nights after the return of Wajo people to their hometown, Palippu, Datā, Totinco people come to Wajo along with three people. Arung Palippu known as *Mattekkeng Pessie*, arung Data, and Arung Tinco said "please be pity to our arrival here, do not take from us except just little. We are family from the same kingdom and have mutual interest and lost. One area of Wajo is in the west and other area of Wajo is in the east. Then, Arung Matoa Puangrimaggalatung said "Poor you, your property, and I accept your good words with my hands opens. As family we will not bother and hurt one another, instead we will have good togetherness memory". Arung Palippu, Arung Data, and Arung Tinco replied "those who will hurt other is against God the one". While nodding, Arung Matoae said "God the one will be the witness of what you say. Then, I want to tell you that Loa' Anabanua, Para Ata people moved to Pallipu constitutes a destiny. Arung Palippu said "family does not snatch each other, and tell someone to take your possession (atamu).

2. The Submission of Soppeng

Nasiulengpurana nabbereang ri Wajo datue ri Luwu to malluse' saloe. Nauttama ri Wajo maddaong to soppengnge. Tiwi waramparang nakkeda arung soppeng iya mai kulaoang seajing amaseangnga mualai cedde ku tellu tau tellu sampu tellu terong potto ku ana' muina apa mabbani Wajo-Wajona datue. Nakkeda Arung Matoae kupakerru sumange'I waramparammu silaong ada madecemmu. Kusompa wali kutarimai. Anaeko ku ina tapada

madeceng tapada maja. Nasabbi dewata seuwae. Dekkia ana' muragai ina'na, dettosia ina melorangngi maja ane'na, nakkeda arung soppeng. Iyani tau paelorang maja riseri bacca-bacca ri dewatae. Nakkeda Arung Matoae iyanaritu adammu seajing nasabbi dewata seuwaEe

Meaning:

A month after granting Malluse' Saloe, soppeng *maddaong* people arrived in Wajo, bringing their properties. Then Arung Soppeng said "my coming to this place is to offer you parts of three people, three parts and places". Then Arung matoae said "poor your property, and I accept your good words with my hands open so that we have common goodness and badness, and is witnessed by God the one. No child damages his parent, and no parent hurts his child". Arung Soppeng replied, "Whoever intends to do bad things is very hated by *dewata seuwwae*". Arung Matoa said "your words are witnessed by God the one.

Lontara Attoriolong ri Wajo shows that human a social and individual setting must experience a crash so that he can learn how to compromise and forgive each other but still remind one another. According to Buginese philosophy, this is called *malilu sipakainge*: for the sake of common goodness. Theologically, *sipakainge* (reminding each other) is a part of human's holy duty. Meanwhile, sociologically it is required by human to improve and embody individual and social devotion who loves each other and implements *marhamah* community order based on *tawheed*, brotherhood spirit, awareness of common prosperity, and enforcement of law among the community (Enjang As & Aliyudin, 2009: 1-2). This is called as *mali siparappe, rebba sipatokong* (encourage and support each other).

Muhammad Rasyid Ridha explains that *tahweed ar-rububiyah* is the oneness of god is in His creating, determining, and controlling universe and imposing sharia rule. This concept does not only aim to convince *muattilin* group (to releasing all the explanation about God, and considering Him as beyond his religious awareness) and *syirk* toward *rububiyah,* but also intend to believe in Allah by forbidding doing *syirk* to Allah (Rahman, 2017: 128; Ridha, 1971: 170). Therefore, *tawheed ar-rububiyah* denies the belief to the existence of creator, ruler, and controller other than Allah. *Tawheed ar-rububiyah* means believing in Allah the only creator, owner, and controller of the universe with His destiny; He gives and takes a life, and control the universe with His *sunah* (al-Buraikan, 1998:141). The explanation is not separated from the term of *tawheed* derived from Arabic language as Allah is the sustainer of His creatures, messengers, and saints along with their specification. His blessing is

for all mankind who always assists them to fix their condition with the pillars of life. The concept of *tawheed ar-rububiyah* is based on Quranic verses:

> "All praise is due to Allah, Lord of the worlds" (QS. al-Fatihah: 1), "Indeed, your Lord is Allah, who created the heavens and earth in six days and then established Himself above the Throne. He covers the night with the day, [another night] chasing it rapidly; and [He created] the sun, the moon, and the stars, subjected by His command. Unquestionably, His is the creation and the command; blessed is Allah, Lord of the worlds. (QS. al-A'raaf: 54), "It is He who created for you all of that which is on the earth. Then He directed Himself to the heaven, [His being above all creation], and made them seven heavens, and He is Knowing of all things". (QS. al-baqarah: 29), "And when I am ill, it is He who cures me" (QS. asy-Syu'ara: 80).

The augmentations show that the position of *tawheed ar-rububiyah* is an important part of Islamic teaching that should be comprehended holistically and implemented in all aspects of life. And according to *Lontara Attoriolong ri Wajo*, Arung Wajo had strong belief in *tawheed ar-rububiyah* in which God is lord, determiner and controller.

CONCLUSION

The finding of the Buginese manuscripts in West Kalimantan has indicated the tradition of the Buginese to migrate to another place. The number of Buginese communities found in other places, not in the place of the Buginese origin, is as a proof that the tradition of migration has been practiced by the Buginesse for long time. The diaspora of the Bugines in West Kalimantan has shown that the identity of the Buginese within the Buginese people is very strong. In addtition, the identity of the Buginese consists of culture and religious aspects that are highly influenced by Islamic teaching. Based on the data analysis provided in the discussion, the Islamic teaching is found in the concept of *tawheed al-uluhiyah* in *Lontara Attoriolong ri Wajo*. The concept is in the form of testimony of the existence of *Dewata seuwwae* or God the one. He begets not, nor was He begotten. This belief in oneness of the God is embodied through the submission and devotion in the form of worship of *qairu mahda* but not *ibadah mahdah*. The concept of *tawheed ar-rububiyah* in *Lontara Attoriolong ri Wajo* is in the form of belief that God is the one is lord of the worlds, determiner of destiny of His creature, and giver. This belief led the arung along with his people to the concept of *tawakkal*.

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JIHAD PENISTA AGAMA JIHAD NKRI: ANTONIO GRAMSCI'S HEGEMONY THEORY ANALYSIS OF RADICAL DA'WAH PHENOMENA IN ONLINE MEDIA

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ABSTRACT

This article explores the new trends of Islamic radicalism through missionary jihad against a blasphemer (Ahok) as part of the jihad for the NKRI (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia). The trend of radical dakwah in online media is interesting to research, regardless of the interest of the local election, or Caliphate and NKRI sharia on the other hand. The purpose of this research is to find out the trend of radical dakwah in online media by calling jihad against a blasphemer as part of the NKRI jihad and its implication. The questions in this study will be examined using the theory of domination of interests (hegemony), given the position of the radicals is to seize the hegemony of society through online viral media. In conclusion, the use of the term Jihad against a blasphemer, and political branding that radical groups still maintain the integrity of the NKRI is a hegemonic form to defeat the cultural power of the moderate, tolerant, and plural Muslims. These radicals, together with the intellectual actors behind them, realize that in order to gain legitimacy of religious power, they must collaborate with the MUI (fatwa institution), then use social media to invite all to participate to do counter discourse. After that, they collaborated with politicians to advocate the idea they propose. Finally, they use symbolic Islamic slogans to bring Muslims to the struggle that they do.

Keywords : Blasphemer, Hegemonic Jihad, Radicalism

INTRODUCTION

It was Tuesday, 27 September 2016 when a story began. A speech delivered by the Jakarta Governor, Basuki Cahaya Purnama or often called Ahok during his visit to the Pramuka Island of Seribu Islands is considered to be blasphemy. In his visit to the cultivation program funded by the Provincial Government of Jakarta, Ahok mentioned Surat al-Maidah verse 51 as one of the verses used to "deceive" the public. Nine days after this speech was delivered, precisely on 6 October 2016, a video recording of Ahok's speech was uploaded via Buni Yani's Facebook account entitled "Blasphemy against Religion?" With Ahok's speech transcription. Ahok's speech on Seribu Islands left many problems in the future. Reports and complaints to the police came in a row, both from FPI and MUI, participating as the reporter.[2] Various media outlets responded to Ahok›s viral speech as hot news from the capital city of Jakarta. It even became national scale news delivered to the Indonesian people from Sabang to Merauke, although Ahok has offered his apology to the public. [3]

Viral online media about blasphemy led to mass mobilization of Muslims, the Islamic community movement 411, the Muslim movement 212, to the Muslim movement 505 who are radical and intolerant. Mobilization and call for radical dakwah through the moment and event of the Islamic movement is inseparable from the role of online media, both news and social media such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, blogs or Whatsapp applications by blowing up the case massively as a radical propaganda to attract the sympathy of Muslims. In this case, Tri Pujiati considered that social media propaganda was used as a useful means of radical dakwah. Openly, the propaganda was carried out to recruit as many people as possible *face to face*. As a result, a large number of victims were those in their teens who in fact were active users of social media. The age range of 15-25 years is vulnerable and easily influenced and swayed to show self existence.[4]

Nafi Muthohirin argued that in the second decade of the 21st century there appeared the tendency of radical groups to increase their interaction

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[2] Ismantoro Dwi Yuwono, *Gara-Gara Ahok dari Kegaduhan ke Kegaduhan* (Yogyakarta: Media Pressindo, 2017), 311-314; for further reference, see also Abdul Malik, "Agitasi dan Propaganda di Media Sosial (Studi Kasus Cyberwar Antar-Netizen terkait Dugaan Penistaan Agama oleh Basuki Tjahaja Purnama)," *Jurnal Lontar*, Vol 4 No 3 (September – Desember 2016), 7-8.

[3] Ahmad Junaidi, "Media dan Keberagaman: Analisis Pemberitaan Media Daring Seputar Pemilihan Kepala Daerah DKI Jakarta," *Jurnal Muara Ilmu Sosial, Humaniora, dan Seni*, (Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2017), 330-334.

[4] Tri Pujiati, "Dakwah Radikal dan Propaganda Media Sosial," in http://jalandamai.org/dakwah-radikal-dan-propaganda-media-sosial.html

and propaganda. They make certain pages to spread ideas and hate, radicalism, threats, and provide tutorial on how to make bombs. A number of *websites* have their identities hidden with unknown encryption technology tools. Even with such tight control, radical groups can still find their way and continue to use anonymous accounts. The use of pictorial memes containing radical messages is also created in order to attract the sympathy of young people. Then, consistently and creatively, the meme images are posted and shared on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and WhatsApp reaching thousands of netizens in a short time.[5]

Radical dakwah in online media regarding Ahok's speech on the Pramuka Island of the Thousand Islands gave a real picture of the radical resistance movement to the existing situation. Even the slogans and jargons that have always been the source of online media struggle by radicals call for dakwah to carry out jihad against the blasphemer as part of the NKRI jihad. The slogan that is always echoed is: "Ready for jihad? Ready to defend the country, ready to defend Islam, ready to defend NKRI (the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia?)."[6] This slogan became a hash-tag on various social media by always referring to Ahok as "the blasphemer" of ethnic Chinese who has disturbed the harmony and sovereignty of Muslims in the Republic of Indonesia. Even the radicals have publicly stated that Ahok is the threat that divides the tribes and nations and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is under threat and expansion of the Chinese State.[7]

With regard to the various polemics and discourses, this will give birth to a hypothesis that the hashtags of jihad against the blasphemer, jihad NKRI became a propaganda trend for radicals in some online media that are always viral in the last period in this country. All radical propaganda, issues and movements have made the speech of "the blasphemer" the beginning of resistance (jihad) which bring diverse responses and analyses. Is it for the sake of DKI Jakarta elections on the one hand, or for the interest of the Caliphate and NKRI in sharia on the other. In this light, it is interesting to carry out this research.

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[5] Nafi Muthohirin, "Mewaspadai Radikalisme Islam di Media Sosial," in http://geo-times.co.id/mewaspadai-radikalisme-islam-di-media-sosial/

[6] The call for jihad bela NKRI is first launched by Habib Rizieq acting as the Imam Besar Front Pembela Islam in the middle of the crowd for his special speech in for the Forum Umat Islam (FUI) members and supporters doing protest vigil in front of the house of parliament (Gedung DPR RI). The related news about the FPI and radical movement organizations with the slogan of *Jihad NKRI* can be read here http://nasional.kini.co.id/2017/02/21/20880/habib-rizieq-ajak-massa-jihad-bela-negara-bela-islam-dan-nkri

[7] The statement by radicalism movements can be found here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lAlkdqIpLi0

To frame this research as a scientific product, there are two aspects that the writer focus on. Why did the radical dakwah trend occur in online media by calling on jihad against the blasphemer as part of the NKRI jihad? What are the implications of the radical dakwah trend in online media by calling on jihad against the blasphemer as part of NKRI jihad? Two focus issues will be explored using the qualitative research method and Antonio Gramsci's theory will be used as a perspective framework of the phenomenon. In addition, the author will also limit the phenomenon of jihad against the blasphemer in the Jakarta local elections because the issue of blasphemy and the anarchic behavior of radical groups against others is often seen not only in the momentum of the Local Elections.

ISLAMIC RADICALISM IN MEDIA CONSIDERATION

It was the dictum *After 9/11 2001 tragedy,* which became the beginning of Islam, radicalism, and terrorism to be re-discussed; whether it is academic discourse, mass media and electronics, or ethnographic translation discussed by people in their respective environments. J. Esposito said that this 9/11 2001 tragedy was a global shock and had a poorly perceptual impact on Islam itself. Moreover, this call for resistance to Islam was carried out by a president of a superpower like America. J. Esposito revealed:

> "For many, understanding Islam and Muslims can be confusing. Muslim leaders speak of Islam as a religion of peace and justice; Osama bin Laden and other Muslim terrorists slaughter non-Muslims and Muslims globally. President George W. Bush referred to Islam as a religion of peace; the Franklin Graham evangelist called Islam an evil religion; Samuel Huntington, prominent Harvard professor and author of The Clash of Civilizations, wrote, 'Islam has bloody borders. . . and innards. '' But, as President Barrack Obama has pointed out, '' Islam has demonstrated through words and the possibilities of religious tolerance and racial equality. . . . Partnership between America and Islam must be based on what Islam is, not what it isn't."[8]

The ambiguity of this diverse definition of Islam finally presented the religion in various new 'logos'. Radical Islam, fundamental Islam, liberal Islam, moderate Islam, and inclusive Islam. All of these logos have an impact on the choice of attitudes of Muslims in the world including in Indonesia. Today, when discussing Indonesia's Islam, it cannot be completed in the space of moderation of the two major powers of Islamic organizations (*Nahdlatul*

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[8] J. Esposito, *The Future Of Islam,* (New York : Oxford University Press, 2010), 01

Ulama and Muhammadiyah). In Indonesia, many Islamic variants have been reduced rather than ways of thinking, acting, and they are associated with one another.

The discourse variants related to the Islamic attitudes above are inseparable from the global concessions, especially the tragedy in the reform era (burning of Christian houses of worship in some areas) and the Bali bombing tragedy in 2002. At that time, the contestation of Islamism (read: Islamic ideals and attitudes, not Islamic ideology) are again discussed in the public space. There are many intellectual actors who will return the Islamic discourse in that era. Among those who represent moderate groups are Abdurrahman Wahid, Nur Chalis Madjid, as well as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah Muslim scholars. The liberal group is represented by Ulil Abshar Abdallah, Lutfi A., Muqsith Ghazali, and those who are gathered in the Jakarta Utan Kayu Community. On the other side, there are Isamail Yusanto, Hatono Ahmad Jaiz, and Addian Husaeni, intellectual groups who are more conservative in their thought. On the movement side, names such as Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Baasyir, and Imam Samudera, were represented by the Jemaah Islamiyah movement group which in the Soeharto era was alienated due to rebellion to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia.[9] Because of the length of the debate on Islamism and the attitudes of nationalism in Indonesia, all of them have been recorded by academics to read the current phenomena. So this study focuses on two important aspects: *first,* reframing the contestation of Islamic radicalism and religio-nationalism in the online media in recent years, particularly in the past ten years. Of course by making representation of the two groups that have debated on how to present Islam in Indonesia. *Second,* the shift of radical groups in campaigning their radical ideas through radical group organization websites, social media, and several articles submitted to Islamic nuance newspaper like *Republika*.

At the beginning of the reform, access to information and radical ideas was not as easy as it is today. Transmission of information related to radicalism, its tendency, can only be accessed through print reporting, very rarely based on *online networking*. Therefore, this paper will seek to discuss the discourse on Islamic radicalism in media coverage, and patterns of change. The first period, in the 2001-2005 era, where the contestation of Islamic ideas took place in a narrow space especially in the newspaper information booth. The second period, 2005-2010, internet-based information access has begun to spread in Indonesia. The internet could even be accessed by the village community, although it is still based on internet provider stalls. In the same

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[9] Din Wahid, "Kembalinya Konservatisme Islam Indonesia," *Studia Islamika*, (Vol. 21 No. 2 2014), 387.

year, social media has also begun to be in demand by the community as an alternative media to get the latest information. Finally, in the period of 2010 to present, where access to information is already in the grip of a smart phone, the community involvement in social media has become more active than before. This is coupled with the existence of news television station which has become the dominant source of information in the community. Borrowing the terminology in the media center of political actors, today is the era of generation Z, the generation that understands and wants to always be involved in every activity of (digital) virtual life.

In this early period, radical groups and at the same time moderate groups in Indonesia contested through print media; whether it is owned by religious organizations, or national media that provides a column of opinions where the outside community can contribute their thoughts. Syamsul Rizal's research identified several magazines / print media that had affiliations with radical groups. For example; *Sabili, Ummi, Annida, Tarbawi, Saksi,* [10] Arie Styaningrum Pamungkas also conducted a similar research on several radical media in Indonesia that were disseminated by radical groups. Unlike Rizal, Pamungkas is more specific about talking about the impact of "Ummi's da'wah media" in the process of constructing an understanding of Islamism and radicalism in Indonesia.[11] In the national newspaper contestation which has more concern about the pattern and Islamic life in Indonesia such as Republika. Discourse related to radicalism can be more open compared to magazines that are made and published by themselves. The following are some of the contestations that occurred after radicalism emerged into open space in Indonesia in that period in the Republika newspaper.

There are two important ideas related to Islamic radicalism in Indonesia; *first* groups that calls on the government (as a regulator) to fight such movement because it would pose a serious threat to the condition of plurality in Indonesia, as well as the idea of the need for the re-actualization of values that did not have the motive of forced ideology to be understood. Second, a counter-discourse that calls on the government not to juxtapose terrorists and radical attitudes with Islam. In this context, almost all Islamic dakwah media have the same tendency. The first groups are, for example the works of Rumadi,[12]

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[10] Syamsul Rizal, "Media and Islamism in Post New Order Indonesia; The Case of sabili, *Studia Islamika* Vol 12 No 3 , 2005, 431

[11] Arie Setyaningrum Pamungkas, "The Dakwah Media in Post Soeharto Indonesia; From Politics Identity to popular culture; The Case of Ummi, Phd Thesis Universitas Berlin 2015.

[12] Rumadi, "Demokrasi dan Radikalisme Agama" in *Surat Kabar Republika Jakarta*, Edisi Kamis, 2 Juni 2002.

Riza Sahbudi[13], Umarudin Masdar,[14] and Dawam Rahardjo.[15] While from the second group, there are papers from Addian Husaeni and Isma'il Yusanto who defended Islamism from the frame of absolute universalism. That is, Islam cannot be identified with radical and explosive movements as broadcast in the context of terrorism in Indonesia.[16]

Contestation as I stated above, can only be accessed by a number of community groups. The spread of magazines and newspapers made by radical groups is certainly very minimal, community-based, and those who are interested in Islamic issues in Indonesia. Framing Islamism and how discourse contestation in newspapers, electronic media, and several other magazines are not as numerous as in Hidayatullah, Sabili, Republika, etc. Almost all national newspapers focus more on reporting on economic, political, and social conditions, as well as sports, which in segmentation of market share is more favored than raising ideas and Islamic contestations that have been debated time after time in Indonesia. Another possibility is that in the national newspapers and television, the editors are more aware of the importance of the idea of multiculturalism, pluralism and tolerance, rather than framing the importance of Islamic-based life in Indonesia.

In the second period, the period that has begun to change from the print tradition to virtual and online based. This seems to make the government and other elements of society who are anxious about the existence of radical groups begin to think to find ways to anticipate it. The researchers have also shifted from a large paradigm to a more post-modernist tradition, where one postulate is framed in certain conditions and realities. It is almost impossible to generalize what websites created by these radical groups are identified to automatically have affiliations with certain groups. In fact, as explained by the Ministry of Communication and Information of the Republic of Indonesia, starting from the beginning of 2010 there have been 814,594 sites contending the call for radicalism blocked by the government.[17] After the 2008 ITE Law was passed, the government did not hesitate to publish to the public to be

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[13] Riza Sihbudi Islam, "Radikalisme dan Demokrasi," in *Surat Kabar Republika Jakarta*, Edisi Kamis, 23 September 2004.

[14] Umaruddin Masdar, "Globalisasi dan Radikalisasi Massa" in *Harian Pagi Republika Jakarta*, Edisi Jumat, 04 Juli 2003.

[15] M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Fatwa MUI Cermin Radikalisasi Syariat Islam," in *Harian Pagi Republika*, Edisi Jumat, 20 Desember 2005.

[16] Adian Husaini, "Simpang Siur Radikalisme," in Harian Pagi Republika Edisi Jumat, 01 Desember 2005.

[17] See also that the Kominfo has blocked the sum of 814.594 sites. https://kominfo.go.id/index.php/content/detail/5083/Kominfo+Sudah+Blokir+814.594+Situs+Radikal+/0/sorotan_med (retrieved on 21 Nopember 2017)

more self-aware in rsponding radical sites in Indonesia.[18] The government's assertive attitude towards radical groups shows that the existence of radical sites began to disrupt the stability of Muslims in Indonesia, as well as escalating dynamics of the national politics.

The government explained that the blocking was carried out because of the content with nuances of resistance to the government, an invitation to jihad against the government, and a distortion of the Pancasila ideology that had been agreed upon by a pluralistic Indonesian society. In this context, the government did not fight against Islam, but rather the Islamic groups who began inviting ways of treason against the state. However, what is unique is perhaps in the era of democracy, taking sides which has been demonstrated by the government as previously discussed, is not necessarily acceptable to the people of Indonesia. The battle ideas reappeared to adorn the debate on partiality. The general trend is that *first*, radical group sites have framed government policy as an arrogant and anti-democratic form of democracy. *Second*, the government treatment is considered part of a political strategy to eliminate Islam. *Third*, the government treatment is anti-Islamic and supports the secular paradigm. And the most interesting thing is that whatever the problem and policy made by the government, they always offer an Islamic system and an Islamic state as a solution to their readers. In fact, they did not argue whether the Islamic system offered provided space for freedom of expression as democracy implanted in the values of its government.

The last is the millennial era where the government has to work extra to be able to stem radicalism and how they spread radical ideas. The era where all media can be created, privatized, then distributed without people being able to monitor simultaneously. In this era, the existence of websites, blogs, and other online media products, has been linked to private space like BBM, Twitter, WhatsApp, telegram, and Facebook. In this private room, as a rule of thumb, the provider is very guarded. No one can manage this space, unless they make it. Recently, the government asked the owner of the Telegram social media to give the government access in order to be able to observe radical groups on their sharing channels.[19] Like it or not, telegram provides some features that are timed and can disappear without the government's knowledge (secret chat). According to the government, the telegram channel also provides content that has nuances of radicalism, terrorism and calls to assemble bombs.[20] In

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[18] See also that the Kominfo BNPT asks for the ban of 22 sites https://kominfo.go.id/index.php/content/detail/4627/BNPT+Minta+Kominfo+Blokir+22+Situs+Radikal/0/berita_satker (retrieved on 21 Nopember 2017)

[19] https://news.okezone.com/read/2017/07/16/337/1737475/telegram-diblokir-joko-wi-kita-sudah-lama-amati-dan-ini-demi-keamanan-negara

[20]http://tekno.kompas.com/read/2017/07/14/20495927/ini-alasan-pemerin-

privatized spaces like this, reframing what is actually spread by radical groups is no longer easy. What is certain is that they voiced themselves for jihad against the government, jihad against the West and American antagonism, and other ideological content, as already described in the general character of radical movements in Indonesia.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Apart from the dimensions of political strategy, debates on social media, to mainstream media, between Islamic groups to fight the political power of Ahok, there is a topic that will actually be discussed more in this study, namely the call for jihad to fight religious enemies and jihad for the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Jihad against religious enemies because of the momentum of Rizieq Shihab's speech at the second 212 demonstration (February 21, 2017) in front of the Parliament's office. The speech was actually a common occurrence in radical Islamic circles, especially for the Islamic Defenders Front.[21] However, the unique thing is what it really means by defending the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia in the frame of this radical group. Are they going to present Islam as a political system, or just call the substantive norms of Islam become the basis of the process and basis for determining the existing policies in Indonesia.[22]

Other facts related to radical groups and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, such as FPI, FUI, and other groups that still consider that the the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia need not be changed are available on the official website of the Islamic Defenders Front. (http://www.mozaikharokahfpi.com/search/label/Politik) and official habibrizieq.com (although in the process of this research, the site has been blocked / hacked, because it was inaccessible). These pages clearly state that they want to defend the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) from liberalism,[23] communism,[24] and foreign imperialism.[25] On the other hand, the activities of this group are not in accordance with the ethical patterns that exist within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. They tend to

tah-blokir-telegram

[21] http://www.voa-islam.com/read/indonesiana/2013/02/26/23405/wawasan-ke-bangsaan-habib-rizieq-soal-nkri-dan-gerakan-separatisme/#sthash.8wNOayNJ.7cyUCJr4.dpbs

[22] http://www.voa-islam.com/read/indonesiana/2014/06/06/30786/habib-rizieq-perda-syariat-sejalan-dengan-konstitusi-nkri-ideologi-pdip-anti-islam/

[23] http://www.mozaikharokahfpi.com/2015/09/fpi-dengan-dukungan-penuh-kopassus-dan.html

[24] http://www.mozaikharokahfpi.com/2015/08/pernyataan-sikap-dpp-fpi-terhadap.html

[25] http://www.mozaikharokahfpi.com/2015/07/ada-israel-di-tolikara.html

use anarchic methods to uphold their beliefs. They are also very concerned about the issue of defamation and the existence of religion, especially Islam. Moreover, they also pay attention to what is done by campus activist groups who tend to have Western thoughts, and so on.

In this light, it is not wrong then if the government and several regional heads urge FPI to continue to work on the whole the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. For example, at the 19th FPI anniversary event Aneis Baswedan congratulated and hoped that FPI could maintain the integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and the diversity that has existed in Indonesia.[26] The coverage by hidatullah.com also gave the title "Affirm the commitment to protect the the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, FPI held the 19th Anniversary and the Commemoration of the Republic of Indonesia's Anniversary.[27] Or the coverage by merdeka.com is similar; the headline used is that FPI will guard the NKRI from divisive groups.[28] Even so on the official FPI website, they made a title that was more interesting, they mentioned that FPI celebrated the anniversary and at the same time committed to maintaining the integrity of the the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.[29] And there are still many other reports that mention similar patterns related to the relationship between FPI and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

Different on official pages, or in other radical Islamist groups, national media often frames FPI and some groups uphold Islamic sharia without changing the NKRI (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) into an Islamic state, as an anti-NKRI group. This is because what is disclosed and implemented in the form of action does not apply equally. For example in several cases FPI carried out activities that "violated" compliance as citizens against existing constitutions; insulting Pancasila,[30] cross out the red and white flag,[31] refused the construction of houses of worship of other religions,[32] or the rejection of groups that do not agree with them through anarchic means. Therefore, portraits and slogans campaigned and endorsed by political actors on the

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[26] https://www.antaranews.com/berita/647554/anies-minta-fpi-jaga-nkri-dan-ke-bhinekaan

[27] https://www.hidayatullah.com/berita/nasional/read/2017/08/19/121780/teguh-kan-komitmen-jaga-nkri-fpi-gelar-milad-ke-19-dan-peringatan-hut-ri.html

[28] https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/fpi-kami-akan-jadi-garda-terdepan-jaga-nkri-dari-kelompok-pemecah-belah-bangsa.html

[29] http://www.mozaikharokahfpi.com/2015/09/fpi-dengan-dukungan-penuh-kopas-sus-dan.html

[30] http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt581324d499b3f/dinilai-menghi-na-pancasila--ketua-fpi-dilaporkan-ke-bareskrim

[31] http://news.liputan6.com/read/2833684/polisi-pembawa-bendera-dicoret-ter-sangka-dan-simpatisan-fpi

[32] http://www.beritasatu.com/megapolitan/421380-ini-alasan-massa-tolak-pemban-gunan-gereja-santa-clara.html

existence of FPI wanting to keep the the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia needs reinterpretation. This seems like the lips service of FPI leaders in order not to be the main opponent of the government.

The same pattern is also true for other radical groups, if one looks at what appears in cyberspace coverage. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) which is the accomplice of the transnational movement, Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, and several other groups that play the political stage as models of their movements, often mention that NKRI is final. NKRI has become the result of joint ijtihad which cannot be contested. The following is some news related to PKS supporting the NKRI; republika.co.id "PKS initiates the Integrity of NKRI"[33], on the party's official website, "PKS Legislator, NKRI is Undisputed" [34] and "PKS shows a sense of nationalism and NKRI is undisputed"[35]. This is the case with Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) , which today is on the verge of dissolution by the government. On various occasions, the chairman of HTI has always emphasized that HTI activities are not in conflict with the Pancasila and NKRI,[36] HTI contributes to strengthening the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia by educating the public,[37] and HTI only provides ideas for discussion to find the best format for the Republic of Indonesia.[38]

From this fact it is clear that calls of anti-Pancasila, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity) are only made in closed spaces. They do not declare themselves as a group that wants to establish a different system with four national pillars in Indonesia. Occasionally they did not agree on Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the diversity that existed in Indonesia, but they still wanted to take refuge behind the term of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Or conversely, they doubted the existence of a unitary state system (republic), but still acknowledged the diversity that existed in Indonesia as an authentic form and destiny of the Almighty. Moreover, it must be admitted, the diction and logos that they use in political contestation are indeed more often hypocritical, just to get support from the plural Indonesian society. They did not hesitate to claim to be the most nationalist and supporters of the Republic of Indonesia if

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[33] http://www.republika.co.id/berita/gaya-hidup/trend/17/05/03/en/islam-in-archi-pelago/13/11/21/nasional/daerah/13/10/30/mvh5rm-pks-sulut-keutuhan-nkri-harga-mati

[34] http://pks.id/content/legislator-pks-nkri-harga-mati

[35] http://www.pkskabsmg.id/2017/10/09/kader-pks-tunjukan-sikap-nasional-isme-yang-tinggi-nkri-harga-mati/

[36] https://nasional.tempo.co/read/873786/disebut-usung-konsep-khilafah-di-indo-nesia-ini-pengakuan-hti

[37] https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/1203734/13/ismail-yusanto-kegia-tan-hti-tak-bertentangan-dengan-pancasila-1494310247

[38] http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2017/05/09/hti-bantah-tudingan-tidak-pu-nya-kontribusi-bagi-negara

they were already in a state of political contestation. Or, this is just an anecdote on social media, these radical groups are impromptu nationalist groups. Suddenly nationalists after being suspended, suddenly nationalists after being disbanded, were suddenly nationalist after their followers were abandoned.

As explained above how radical groups wrap up their political movements in the online media space. The simple thing to translate is that they show Islamic symbols as part of their struggle. In addition, hey do not display treason efforts as often directed at them. They, in my one-sided perspective, play the role of Islamism on the the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia frame. So, in this way, their existence cannot be rejected by all groups in Indonesia, especially Muslims. Perhaps it will be a little different if the Islamic features they use exactly the same as the covert ideology they indoctrinate to all members of the organization. For example they use different names than the origin of their group. The callers' association of Jihad against religious opponents is the National Movement for Guarding the Fatwa of the Indonesian Ulema Council (GNPF MUI). They are separated from one institution and side by side with the religious authority in Indonesia.

In addition to hiding some of the radical[39] characteristics of the group, they also played with the sentiment of Muslims through a very provocative diction. For example, jihad, infidels, religious opponents, and Chinese. The word jihad, in the Islamic tradition is an attitude of sincerity to defend religion. The word jihad also has implications for sacrifices that have no limits for those who have the power to do it. The word jihad also means warfare to those who persecute society. And, what is shown in the Jakarta regional election, Ahok is often illustrated as a very anti-Islamic figure,[40]   Ahok interpreted the scriptures of others, and Ahok evicted poor Muslims in Jakarta and collaborated with Chinese people who have more capital to build grand buildings in Jakarta. And there are still many other issues framed by this radical group. Therefore, the simple answer to the question why it was viral on social media, because they played with the sentiment and sense of ownership of Muslims in religion which is believed to be true.

In addition, they also categorized Ahok as an infidel. The infidels in the Islamic dictionary are indeed prohibited from being a leader. The word kafir is "the enemy" of the Prophet Muhammad when leading Islam. The word Kafir is a word intended for anyone who is hostile to Islam. And, it must also be realized that, the prohibition of an infidel as a leader is certain (*qath'i*). As

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[39] Atmaja (2016) provides a discussion of the ambiguous terminology of what is so called terrorism. This might be true for the case of the terminology of radicalism as well.

[40]   https://www.eramuslim.com/berita/nasional/heboh-ahok-melarang-sembe-lih-kurban.htm

for the debate of Muslim scholars, in a space far from the crowd related to the Kafir interpretation, it seems that it cannot be accepted by the majority of Indonesian people who have experience in religious education in a very rural environment. Therefore, when the word Kafir is identified with Ahok, there is no other reason to see the true side of Ahok; Ahok is a non-Muslim. Moreover, when Ahok had to face the verdict as a person who defamed Islam by the Religious Decision of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), the MUI Deputy Secretary General Tengku Zulkarnain defined Ahok as a person to fight against and his blood is permitted to kill, in the dialog at the Indonesian Lawyer Club.

On the other hand, Ahok is a non-Indigenous person. Ahok comes from ethnic minorities, but has a history of dominating the economic sphere in Indonesia. So clearly, people's sentiment against the figure of Ahok can be framed from these various aspects. Ahok can be drowned out through the issue of religion-based, because he is practicing blasphemy, and this is still a living conflict that has no base in Indonesia. Ahok is also a figure of ethnic Chinese descent who has a dark history in Indonesia, and Ahok also has conflicttual political communication and no-compromise attitude when dealing with other political actors.[41]

Finally, this is perhaps very subjective, but it can be verified. The Ahok factor and the strengthening the attitude of conservatism and Islamism in the world, as well as the moral support provided by the MUI, and there is one more namely the Team Buzzer and the Media Center of the Political Parties of all parties who contested in the Jakarta Regional Election, have contributed to such contestation. For political observers, social media, and young people, today's cyber war is definitely supported by trained Human Resources. The Media Center Teams of each candidate can play various social media accounts in one hand. They can make tranding topics using robotic accounts and networks that they have. In my observation, all social media teams in the Jakarta regional election played like they were fighting in the real sense. It was obvious how the three candidates' hash-tags appeared when the debate took place in the Election process. In my opinion, all these elements provide a very strong slender for why the issue of jihad against religious issues can hit the social media.

There are two effects of Islamic radicalism preaching that took place in the Jakarta Election: First, the impact on the internal Muslims themselves. Second, the external impact on the integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia

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[41] For further information about Ahok profile's, see Rudi Valinka, *A Man Called Ahok: Sepenggal Kisah Perjuangan & Ketulusan* (Kurawa: 2016).

based on Pancasila, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, and the 1945 Constitution. In the first part, radical groups' propaganda through social media has implications for demystification of Islamic teachings and figures who support Ahok in the post-conflict local election era. that is. For example, how pluralist figures such as Syafii Maarif, Said Aqil Siradj, Musthofa Bisri, Nadirsyah Husen, and Ahmad Sahal were identified with groups who did not understand Islam correctly. In fact, everyone knows, these Islamic thinkers have very much work and contributions in terms of moderate Islamic attitudes in Indonesia. Radical groups have succeeded in drawing lines of demarcation, which ones are truly Islamic, and which groups whose Islam is defeated by tolerant and westernized attitudes.

In addition to moderate Islamic figures, this line of demarcation has finally stunned young people in this moderate group. Because they are still young, the attitude they take is different from that of their neighbors who are wiser in acting. Moderate and radical group battles are very visible; such as the rejection of Banser and Ansor against Habib Riziq in Bangil Pasuruan, Rejection of Felix Shauw and Basallamah in Surabaya, and many other actions which were a reaction to the demystification of radical groups to kyai who became role models in the *Nahdliyin* in particular. In addition, the Nahdlatul Ulama youths are in fact also very creative in conducting cyber-war. They duplicate sites that have Islamic radicalism to make it more tolerant. They create blogs, twiter accounts, and Facebook fanspage to counter-fight radical groups who have already done so.

As for the external impact, of course, disharmony in the harmony of religious people. The discriminatory treatment of Ahok finally has an impact on the rejection of Radical-Islamic figures in areas where the majority are Christian or other religions. There are many facts of rejection of these radical groups in several regions, in Bali for example, or the strict rejection of the Dayak community against Tengku Zulkarnaen in Sintang. and several other regions. In fact, in the analysis of Idrus Al Hamid, the Jakarta effect also approached Jayapura, Manado, and Ambon Maluku. In areas with a majority that are not Muslim, they begin to think about how they also want to make rules so that prospective regional leaders must have the same religion as the majority of the religious communities around them. Of course, this has become very counterproductive to the patterns of religious harmony that have long been built in Indonesia. It is counter productive to tolerant and moderate symbols developed by the government.

There are four important concepts in discussing the thoughts of Antonio Gramsci; culture, hegemony, intellectualism and *crisis*. In the cultural position,

Gramsci talks about how the ruling group plays its role, or it can lose its power. In this cultural position, also, the war of position and war of maneuvers are defined by Gramsci. In this context, according to Gramsci, a large group that has a strong role in forming and developing a cultural value system of a country can be defeated by attitudes and maneuvers carried out by militant groups. He gave an example of how the hegemonic dogma carried out by the designers of the power of Global capitalism could be defeated by communist groups in Russia. For Gramsci, a regulation and a search for strategic positions is very important to form the supra-structure of culture in a particular country. Stave Jones concludes Gramsci's view as follows:

> "..the notion that the economic base determines the operations of an ideological and cultural superstructure. He proposes instead that we see the relationship between base and superstructure as a reflexive and dynamic one. Within this formation, he isolates civil society as having a key intermediary role and proposes that both conservative and transformative projects attempt to occupy consciousness and everyday life through the functioning of a civil society created in their service. To change society involves a protracted period of negotiation carried out in all the institutions of society and culture.…since it involves elaborating subaltern and subordinate elements into a broader cultural and political project without dismissing their cultural distinctiveness."[42]

This quote means that a cultural value and ideology of a nation will continue to run dynamically, not statically. He is different from thinkers such as Althusser and Karl Marx who consider that the cultural space is influenced by piloting ideology and capitalism that play behind a nation's ideology. For Gramsci, an ideology will continue to be dialectically based on the supra-cultural forces in society. This belief is the one that was found behind the phenomena with radical preaching which overcame a long discourse on moderatism, liberalism, pluralism and tolerance in Indonesia. The Indonesian society has returned to an era where ideology of religion and Indonesian-ness is contested through hidden strategies. They, the radical groups, are very well aware of not being able to bring up the issue of anti-nationalism in front of Indonesian society, but can bring Radical Islamism into a political contestation in Indonesia, especially in a democratic society. This is in line with the theoretical assumptions developed by Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo which stated that democracy has a dual role; giving freedom to act, while providing space for developing conservatism and fundamentalism, so that they can rein

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[42] Stave Jones, *Antonio Gramsci*, (Madison Eve, New York: Routledge, 2006), 99.

in the condition of society in Indonesia.[43]

> The nest is hegemony. Theoretically Gramsci defines hegemony, as quoted by Steve Jones as follows:
> "Instead of seeing the economy as determining culture and politics, Gramsci argues that culture, politics and the economy are organized in a relationship of mutual exchange with one another, a constantly circulating and shifting network of influence. To this process he gives the name hegemony and ..... how hegemony differs fundamentally from domination. Seeing hegemony as a dynamic process militates against the view that students of culture can understand the meaning of a text in isolation. In this sense, asking you to analyse a single participatory programme was mildly disingenuous, since no one representation can capture the nexus of power at any one moment – it is indeed, for Gramsci, precisely not something that one can pin down since it is always 'in the process of becoming".[44]

It means that Gramsci interprets the word Hegemony instead of focussing on domination and the pressures made by certain groups or social classes. However, the word hegemony means a dynamic on-going processes which can be done in several ways and enforcement. Hegemony, according to Gramsci has many factors and variables that can be analyzed, not always dominated by aspects of politics, economy, and culture. The basis of Gramsci's epistemology in this hegemony can be assumed to originate from the concept of consciousness. A new knowledge or ideology or belief that is put in disguise, habituation and implementation (doctrination) into the atmosphere of the collective-mass consciousness, giving rise to a relatively new awareness. The source of knowledge possessed by individuals in a group, is not always easy to guess its origin, but it could be that awareness and knowledge that have been settling in society is a hegemonic program instilled by certain group subjects.

Hegemony refers to the notion of a socio-political situation which in Gramsci terminology is called a moment, where philosophy and social practices are united in a balanced state. Domination is the concept of reality which spreads through society in an institution and individual manifestations. The influence of this spirit is in the form of morality, customs, religion, political principles and all social relations, especially from the intellectual. Hegemony is always related to the state as a dictator class.[45] Gramci changed the meaning of hegemony from strategy which, according to Lenin, becomes a concept like

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[43] Greg Fealy dan Anthony Bubalo, *Jejak Kafilah, terj,* Akh. Muzakki (Bandung: Mizan, 2007), 78.
[44] *bid.* 78.
[45] *Ibid.*, 90.

the Marxist concept of power and relations of production, class and state, and also becomes a means to understand society in order to change it. He develops ideas about leadership and their implementation of hegemony. A social group can even have to exercise leadership before seizing power of government (this is clearly one of the main requirements for obtaining that power); such readiness, in turn, becomes very important when the group exercises power, they must constantly "lead".

This concept of hegemony can be traced through Gramsci's explanation of class supremacy. According to him, the supremacy of a group manifests in two ways: domination and intellectual leadership. Hegemony refers to the strong influence of leadership in moral and intellectual form, which forms a class-led attitude. This becomes a consensual image. The consensus that occurs between these two classes is created through coercion and covert influence through knowledge spread through the apparatuses of power. In other words hegemony is a chain of victories obtained through a consensus mechanism rather than through oppression of other social classes. Basically, hegemony is an attempt to lead people to assess and view social problems in a defined framework.[46]

Practically, according to Gramsci, one can gain hegemony through three processes of internalization as follows; first, identity, which is a locus that is pinned to someone, whether it is a form of profession or someone's psychological nature. Second, representation, i.e. a person must be able to represent another person's anxiety and similarity that will be influenced by his subconscious. Third, institutionalization, namely the institutionalization process of ideas and identities that have been read before. Therefore, if one looks at what happened in Jakarta, the fight and stakes of whose identity is the most Islamic and not full of Islam is carried out by radical groups in launching their preaching. They also represent the group from all elements, for example; there are Islamists from Nahdlatul Ulama ', as is often stated, following KH. Ma'ruf Amin who is in fact the Chairperson of NU's Syuriah. Din Syamsudin and Amin Rais from Muhammadiyah, as well as other Islamic groups who could be moderate, were not radical. Even nationalist groups cannot escape the representation of their groups; there are figures such Prabowo Subianto, Kivlan Zein, and several retired high ranking military officers who seem to be under the strengthening of Islamism in Indonesia. They also called on the MUI as an institutionalization of their ideas and ideas.

Next is intellectualism. For Gramsci intellectualism is an important tool in carrying out hegemony or winning ideological or cultural settings. In his book

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[46] Peter Mayo, *Gramsci and Educational Thought* (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2010), 23.

Prison, Gramsci defines what he means by intellectualism in social functions;

"distinct social category independent of class is a myth. All men are potentially intellectuals in the sense of having an intellect and using it, but not all are intellectuals by social function. Intellectuals in the functional sense fall into two groups. In the first place there are the "traditional" professional intellectuals, literary, scientific and so on, whose position in the interstices of society has a certain inter-class aura about it but derives ultimately from past and present class relations and conceals an attachment to various historical class formations. Secondly, there are the "organic" intellectuals, the thinking and organizing element of a particular fundamental social class. These organic intellectuals are distinguished less by their profession, which may be any job characteristic of their class, than by their function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they organically belong."[47]

In the Jakarta regional elections, Eep Syaiful Hidayat, Yunarto Widjaya, and several branding teams of candidates who have the ability to read voter tendencies and Islamic attitudes in Indonesia which can be used by intellectual groups that seek to play the issue of diversity becomes viral in the media. Such accurate analysis, of course, cannot be done by just anyone. Even by Muslim intellectuals themselves. We can still remember that after the Jakarta Election, Syafii Maarif targeted successful teams of certain candidates who collaborated actively with radical groups in Jakarta. On the same occasion, one of the successful teams responded to the statement of concern by demonstrating strategic steps to reconnect religious conflicts in Jakarta. He gave an example of how at first Jokowi and Prabowo contested, but soon their relationship improved, forming Indonesian reconciliation faster than predicted.

The last of the processes of defining Gramsci's theory is crisis. For Gramsci the existence of a crisis is also an important factor in practicing hegemony. He said that:

"In every country the process is different, although the content is the same. And the content is the crisis of the ruling class's hegemony, which occurs either because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses (war, for example), or because huge masses . . . have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands which taken together, albeit not organicall formulated, add up to a revolution. A 'crisis of authority' is spoken of: this is precisely the crisis of hegemony, or

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[47] Antonio Gramsci, *Selection From The Prison Notebook,* Quintin Hoiare dan Nowell Smith (ed), Internasionale, Pullisher New York, 2000. 105.

general crisis of the State."[48]

In this case, from my point of view, the demonstration of binding and the playing of social media is an attempt to carry out illegal acts on the authority of the state so as to create a crisis of trust in the government. The government itself has made many efforts to form a different movement pattern.[49] However, the government maneuvers and political movements would not be able to stop what happened in Jakarta. Jakarta has become a vortex of the power of Radical Islamism, the stage of intolerant groups, and gained the power legitimacy of the Indonesian Ulema Council as a representation of Muslims in general.[50]

Basically, in my opinion regarding the dynamics of the Jakarta Election, the use of the term Jihad against religious enemies, and political branding that radical groups maintain the integrity of the the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is a hegemonic form used to defeat the power of the moderate, tolerant and plural Muslim culture. They, along with the intellectual actors behind them, realize that to gain the legitimacy of religious power, they must collaborate with MUI (the fatwa institution in particular), then play social media card to invite all to participate, counter discourse either through their own online media or become resource persons in the national media.[51] After that, they share with politicians who have an interest in advocating for ideas that are initiated. Finally, they use symbolic slogans with Islamic nuances to bring Muslims closer to the struggle they will carry out. This is similar to the pattern described by Masdar Hilmy regarding how radical groups carried out political-strategic resistance to the de-radicalization program launched by the government. Needless to say, that they did not carry out terrorist acts in the Jakarta Election contest.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, radical propaganda became viral and draws attention of Muslims in Indonesia is caused by several factors; *first*, the political battle that presents identity politics in the country. *Second*, there is a shift in the

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[48] Ibid, 192

[49] Compare to M. Husein Maruapey, "Penegakan Hukum dan Perlindungan Negara (Analisys Kritis terhadap Kasus Penistaan Agama oleh Patahana Gubernur DKI Jakarta," *JIP-SI: Jurnal Ilmu Politik dan Komunikasi*, Vol 7, No 1 (2017), 28-29.

[50] Compare to Rahmatul Izad, "Fenomena Penistaan Agama dalam Perspektif Islam dan Filsafat Pancasila (Studi Kasus terhadap Demo Jilid II pada 04 November 2016," *Jurnal Panangkaran*, (Vol. 1, No. 2, 2017), 178-180. doi:https://doi.org/10.14421/panangkaran.2017.0101-10.

[51] S. Hamdi, "Conflicting Religious Identities: Blaspheming Islam and the Future of Democracy in Indonesia," *Al-Albab, 6*(2), (2017), 247 - 262. doi:https://doi.org/10.24260/alalbab.v6i2.778

attitude of Islamism in Indonesia; from moderatism to conservativism. *Third*, the diction selected by using an Islamic symbolization approach which are literally Islamic teachings. *Fourth*, the support of the campaigning team and intellectual groups in the process of dissemination. There are two impacts resulting from this radical dakwah process; first, there was a de-mystification of religious leaders (especially those with moderate thought) and the division of Muslims in the grassroot. Second, the strengthening of the intolerant attitudes shown by Muslims and vice versa of non-Muslims in some regions.

Theoretically, the way we look at today's media cannot be immediately seen from mainstream journalism products, but it is also important to see mutualistic relations between social media, political actors, and intellectual actors who act play behind the news. At least, through such interpretation, it will produce a holistic understanding; including the politics of media owners. Practically, this research can be used as a basis for re-interpret how radical groups use the issue of saving the the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as a hiding space from the ideology they want to display. The government needs to rethink how religion and identity politics should be presented in Indonesia, so that similar patterns are not copied by other regions in the country. The government, despite the fact that it has been done, need not be afraid to block the sites that provide calls for radicalism in Indonesia.

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MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION PRACTICES AND SOCIO-RELIGIOUS VALUES: The Study of Trans-Dalam Community in Central Kalimantan of Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

This article describes the practice of multiculturalism education among local migrant communities with Trans-Dalam community in Pulang Pisau regency, Kalimantan Tengah province, Indonesia, as its focus of analysis. It asks the question about how Trans-Dalam community members with diverse social and religious backgrounds develop multicultural practices in their daily lives. The required data were collected through in-depth interviews and observation. This article argues that Trans-Dalam villagers preserve and conduct multicultural ideas and practices as seen in their day-to-day harmonious communal life due to their shared local values and wisdom. Inspired by their own expressions of shared social-religious values, each community of different ethnic background develops these multicultural practices, which are closely connected to their need for security as settlers with diverse social-cultural backgrounds that make them aware of the importance of living in harmony, mutual respect, and solidarity regardless of their differences in ethnicity, place of origin or religion.

Key words: multiculturalism, education, practice, local, migrant, Trans-Dalam

INTRODUCTION

The notion of multiculturalism has been discussed by scholars from different disciplines in various forms of academic works. These include, among others, the works by van Tonder and Snootiness (2014), Sanchez and Salaberri (2017), Logviona (2016), Boeva (2016), Kyun *et.al* (2015), Ova (2014), Edewor and Aluko (2007), Rex and Singh (2003), Radtke (2003), Lian (2016), Haryanto (2013), and Ernas and Qodir (2013), Aytuga (2018), Astyrid (2017), Vervaet (2018), Webster (2017), Marshall (2017), Yampolsky (2016), Chaoa (2015), and Girdauskienea (2015). Undoubtedly, these studies provide important insight into understanding multiculturalism. However, this literature lacks empirical support that is based on the experience of community in the field where multicultural ideas and practices are closely connected to particular

local social values, which are shared and adopted by the community members. To fill this gap, this article deals with the practices of multiculturalism in communities by focusing its analysis on local migrant communities in the rural area known as Trans-Dalam, which is located in Pulang Pisau regency, Kalimantan Tengah province, Indonesia. This site was chosen because it has characteristics that reflect how multiculturalism is practiced and lived by community members. For this purpose, by employing Maslow's concept of human needs as a theoretical framework, this article questions the development of multicultural ideas and practices in the rural communities of Trans-Dalam in Kalimantan Tengah.

This study of multiculturalism is important because it contributes to the promotion and preservation of open-minded attitude in order to live a peaceful live in pluralistic societies of the Indonesian archipelago. The rich and uniqueness of culture within and among Indonesian communities necessitate understanding of multiculturalism, which should be maintained and promoted by individuals, groups and institutions. For the purpose of this study, this article employed Abraham Maslow's theory of individuals' motivation as a theoretical framework. He developed a hierarchy of human needs, with which people attempt to fulfil their needs, from the lowest need (number 5) to the highest one (number 1). According to him, people attempt every effort to meet the important needs in a hierarchical way including the need for self-realization, the need for self-esteem, the need for a sense of belonging and a sense of love, the need for sense of security and the physiological needs (Maslow, 1993:43-57; Jarvis, 2010: 94). In the context of this study, the need for security is particularly seen as a central motivation that has played a significant role in creating and maintaining a multicultural society. My observation revealed that Trans-Dalam local migrant communities live a multicultural life due to their need for security. The findings of my field work serve to confirm Maslow's theory of human needs.

In general, multiculturalism is a notion or attitude that considers "cultural diversity" as the core of humanity, an inseparable bond with which people are willing to accept each other regardless of their differences. There are some terms that are often used interchangeably to describe a society with diversity in terms of religion, race, language, and culture. These are "plurality", "diversity", and "multiculturalism". These three terms do not actually represent the same thing, although they all refer to the state of plurality within society. The term "plurality" presupposes the existence of more than one entity. Meanwhile, the term "diversity" shows that the entity is not altogether the same, but rather heterogeneous and even unequal (Mulkan, 2006:4).

Compared to two other terms, multiculturalism is relatively new term (Zulkarnaen, 2013). Different from "plurality" and "diversity", multiculturalism is a willingness to accept different groups as a whole, regardless of their varied entities of culture, ethnicity, gender, language, and religion. While plurality represents a non-singularity, multiculturalism gives affirmation that despite their differences, either visible or invisible, each group is entitled to have space in the public sphere of society. Multiculturalism has become a new policy in response to the diversity of communities. These communities not only need to be recognized as being different in nature from each other, but also be treated equally by the state (Zulkarnaen, 2013).

Multiculturalism as a movement demands the politic of recognition regarding all differences in society. These differences must be accepted, respected, protected and guaranteed (Zulkarnaen, 2013: 5). Social order and prosperity are possible to achieve when aspirations for togetherness, mutual respect, spirit of progress, and inspiring ethos of advancement become the soul of multicultural society. The implementation of multiculturalism functions as a prevention as well as a solution to conflict and disharmony in a pluralistic society. For example, the implementation of multiculturalism through education can be an important means to solve socio-cultural conflicts. Multicultural education plays important roles in two ways: preparing individuals to be able to cope with new cultural waves of globalization and unifying national interests with various local cultures (Zulkarnaen, 2013:29). Both are taking place in the form of individuals' ability to face the challenges of living in harmony with one another.

Educational institutions like school can actually develop multicultural education according to the principle of school autonomy. This can be implemented using interconnected approaches to religious education by promoting, for instance, Islamic values of living in harmony with one another in society. People tend to know the stereotypes of an ethnic group more than what it is in factual ways. In the context of multicultural education, it is important to understand realities behind the apparent culture of an ethnic group. The implementation of multicultural education can be regarded successful when students or citizens develop tolerance and prevent hostility or conflict regardless of cultural, ethnic, language, custom differences. In addition, multicultural education nurtures students not to be uprooted from their own local cultures in the face of globalization. This can be pursued through several ways such as educating students about morality, good manner and etiquette as early as possible (Mahfud, 2010).

MULTICULTURAL PRACTICES WITHIN TRANS-DALAM COMMUNITY

Trans-Dalam community is diverse in that its members came from various regions in Indonesia. Some came from outer Kalimantan islands such as Java, Bali and Nusa Tenggara. Others came from inland Kalimantan regions like Kapuas and Banjarmasin. Through the transmigration program of the Ministry of Transmigration, those from Java came to Trans-Dalam by ship in 1982 and those from Bali and Nusa Tenggara got there in 1983. Meanwhile, most of community members with local Kalimantan background came to Trans-Dalam voluntarily, not through the government program of transmigration.

Trans-Dalam community is also diverse in terms of religious background. The community members have various religious faiths; most of those with Javanese and Banjarese backgrounds are Muslims, those from Kapuas with Dayak background and from Nusa Tenggara are Christians, and those from Bali are Hindus. These migrants came to Trans-Dalam to find a better future. They were treated equally by local government regardless of their backgrounds. When they came, each family was given 2 acres of land, allowances which were worth two year living expenses and a modest house. Compared to other migrant communities in Pulang Pisau regency, Trans-Dalam is considered the most diverse migrant community. Led by a village chief (*kepala desa*), Trans-Dalam consists of 20 groups of household called *rukun tetangga,* just like other communities in Indonesia.

Socio-Religious Interaction

Trans-Dalam villagers developed interaction that took place any time in their convenience. This interaction occurred between individuals within the same faith group and culture or among those with different faiths and cultures. The interaction, which occurred warmly or incidentally among community members with different faiths, united those engaged in the shared religious values of social interaction and hindered misunderstanding, especially in issued related to personal hygiene and food. The peaceful interaction within Trans-Dalam communities made the villagers possible to establish solidarity and unity among them. This in turn created awareness of the importance of living in harmony among the villagers so that their social and economic lives run smoothly without any friction. A Trans-Dalam community member gives an interesting statement below.

> I think I have never seen any problems that disturb people here. I feel nothing disturbs me so that is why I feel at home here. Feeling happy,

that's all. I see harmony in terms of religious or social relations. Even in Idul Fitri festival, we cannot differentiate between Muslims and Christians as they are busy helping each other. It is good here. In market, for example, we are all the same. We find no discrimination. I don't understand. Even the elders mingle with one another; either they are Javanese, Banjarese, or Dayaks. All attend every congregation which is regularly arranged. In this surrounding, in this market area of Block 16, whenever you meet a Banjarese, you will find him being together with a Javanese [community member].

This was supported by a Christian community member:
We help each other, trying to ease the burden of our neighbourhood. When Muslims are busy in welcoming Id festival, I as a Christian light-heartedly assist them to prepare meals. In the same way, later during Christmas, or other Christian festivals, Muslims help Christians. So it's been routine. I, together with my son and husband, and [my Muslim neighbours] visit each other in our surrounding. Women usually prepared sweets or food. There are no constraints to our relationship with our neighbours.

The community members loved to help each other due to mutual recognition, mutual trust, and then mutual respect among themselves. Visiting each other among Trans-Dalam community members at the commemoration of religious holidays was considered an important moment. However, this was restricted to social interactions, avoiding participation in shared rituals or worship. For Muslims villagers, this was in accordance with a Quranic verse that says "For you your religion and for me my religion" (Qur'an 109: 6).

The Trans-Dalam villagers were also keen to share with those in need. Those who were successful in their farming normally donate some of their crops to help neighbours or colleagues in need so that no one was reported to experience short of food. Crop production in rural areas increased significantly for community members worked in safe and secure conditions. No anxiety was felt by Muslims, Christians and local belief Dayak adherents. This condition had been realized in Trans-Dalam since the transmigration program was launched by government in the early 1980s, which brought local migrants from Java, South Kalimantan and other cities in Kalimantan. Therefore, Trans-Dalam community lived a harmonious life regardless of their social, cultural and religious differences. A community member reported the following notes.

There are three ethnic groups here: Banjarese, Javanese, and Dayak Kapuas. They never have a dispute resulting from differences in religion. Disputes may occur among teenagers because of their delinquency,

not because of religious or ethnic differences. Once it was heard that [religious conflict] broke out in Pangkoh. But, it was fake news. I saw it myself [that it was fake]. Rumour [about conflict] sometimes scares us. In fact, no conflict happens here. It is peaceful here.

Trans-Dalam community members felt comfortable, secured and safe in their neighbourhood. The local migrants from Java, for example, were seen to be different in terms of background, ethnicity and belief. But, in everyday life, they were treated in a good and respectful way in spite of their origin of place. The Trans-Dalam communities developed and lived a harmonious life among themselves regardless of their various social-cultural backgrounds. A villager said:

[All community members] are united, supportive of each other and helpful of each other. It is how they live here. Look, for example, my neighbour Bu Intan. Her husband is a Banjarese. He is good to my family and me. No word of insult or offensive comment has ever been heard from him. There is indeed a mutual respect. Another example is a school teacher Bu Ainun who is from Banjar. She has been kind to us so far. For tens of years we know her. The school headmaster is from Java, Pak Tohari. Yes, he is like brother to us. We have been good colleagues since our school times. [1]

In Trans-Dalam community, native people of Kalimantan Tengah (Dayak Kapuas), local migrants from Kalimantan Selatan and Java developed a meaningful interaction. This interaction appeared to have something to do with their shared psychological experiences. The three ethnic groups tended to focus on their own family business, avoiding the intervention of their neighbours' affairs or colleagues' personal issues. In other words, these ethnic groups developed a self-control, which made them able to avoid interfering with one another. Trans-Dalam consisted of some communities with different ethnic groups. This meant there were a variety of customs, traditions, and ordinances and so on. However, those who came from outside Central Kalimantan seemed to be able or were smart enough to place themselves within new community in a peaceful way and make themselves useful to all people. For Muslim villagers, this attitude was inspired by an Islamic teaching that "The best person among you is he or she who makes himself or herself most useful to people around him or her". [2]

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[1] Interview with Sri Wahyuni (50 years old) and her husband, Wahyu (53 years old), 20 December, 2013. Their two children, now working in provincial ministry of general constructions, gained a degree from faculty of technology in a university in Palangka Raya.

[2] This refers to a saying by the Prophet Muhammad: *Khayr al-nas anfa'uhum li al-nas*

Trans-Dalam was conducive to develop peaceful interaction among community members with different religious background. The fact that most community members live close to each other made them easy to communicate and interact. Most villagers knew each other and were acquainted to each other. This in turn created the sense of security and trust among people in Trans-Dalam. A community member said:

> It is safe here. There has never been conflict between ethnic groups. All people get along well. Here everyone is happy. During religious festivals, everyone pays a visit to each other. My Muslim neighbours have no problem in visiting me to celebrate the holidays together, though I am a Christian. Although our Christian people are small in number, about four to six families in this area, and 98 % of the community members are Muslims, [we live peacefully and respect each other]. [3]

The visit to enhance social-religious interaction was not only developed between community members with different social-religious backgrounds, but also within those with same faith. This was popularly known as *silaturrahim*. In Trans-Dalam, there were groups with the same ethnic groups, place of origin or religious organizations, which were known as *paguyuban*. These included   Dulangmas and Pakuwojo *paguyuban* of Javanese background in Central Kalimantan, and Bakumpai community of Dayak origin. In particular, Banjarese people who lived near Pasar Rebo market also expressed their gratitude for living next to people from other regions and different ethnic backgrounds. A Banjarese described how they treated other people with different backgrounds.

> We are from Banjar. There are just 17 families that live in Hulu Sungai Selatan Regency… In the area Pandih Batu, a subdistrict of Hulu Sungai Selatan, the percentage of Muslims and non-Muslim is equal, fifty-fifty. In this trans-settlement, 99% of its people are Muslims. We are united here. There is no conflict. They respect each other. Banjarese and Javanese villagers have the same creed. Yes, we are in fact brothers.[4]

Banjarese villagers loved to live next to the market as they were quite talented in trading and business negotiation. They preferred staying at business centres to living at farmlands. They also loved to live near mosques or Islamic educational institutions such as *madrasah* or *pesantren* to gain Islamic knowledge. This attitude surely stemmed from their obedience to an Islamic doctrine that all

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(the best people are those who are the most useful to others).

[3] Interview with Sri Wahyuni, 11 August 2013.

[4] Interview with Normansyah (53 years old), 11 August 2013.

Muslims, male and female, must search for knowledge and achieve happiness here and hereafter. The Banjarese people's interests in commercial transactions combined with their stay in Pasar Rebo market in Trans-Dalam area, was not only motivated by economic progress, but also by religious. In their business, they were highly motivated to collect money in order to perform *Hajj* or Pilgrimage to Mecca on their own, not by government or institutional support.

Other community members of different ethnic groups also felt strongly connected with Trans-Dalam settlement. This was true for the case of Sri Wahyuni and her husband. They decided to live next to Banjarese people who had already lived in Trans-Dalam earlier. They felt comfortable for being close with the Banjarese, forming a strong bond between them in Pasar Rebo market. A community member said:

> The number of Banjarese is quite a lot in this market, around Pasar Rebo, while in other place they are rare. These people like to work as traders. They had lands before, but did not want to build houses on the land so that they sold them.[5]

The places of origin were considered to have given influence to the way of life or work after marriage. When grown up, Banjarese villagers in Trans-Dalam normally did the work which was previously experienced since childhood. For instance, Normansyah from Anjir Pasar participated a local transmigration program with his friends who were working as traders. Norman and his friends sold their houses located near farms to build new houses next to Pasar Rebo market. They already had experience as traders of everyday needs in the market, so they pioneered the business though the market was opened one a week. Another kind of job in which the Banjarese local migrants in Trans-Dalam were skilled at was fishing. The Dayak and Javanese people in the village highly admired their skills. They said: "Banjarese people, some of them love to trade, while others prefer catching *iwak* (fish). During drought season, they can make so much money from fishing."[6]

Marriage

In addition, the multicultural practice among Trans-Dalam community was seen in inter-ethnic marriages, which were quite common among the community members. This was evident, for example, in the case of Wahyu, a Javanese, and Sri Wahyuni, a Dayak. Sri Wahyuni said:

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[5] Interview with Norman (53 years old), 11 August 2013.
6 Interview with Tohari (53 years old), a Muslim Javanese leader, 25 December 2013.

I am married to Pak Wahyu, a gentleman from local transmigration settlement, an employee of the ministry of transmigration. He is from Bojonegoro, Java. He was previously a temporary worker in *Unit Pemukiman Transmigrasi (UPT*; Transmigration Resettlement Unit). I got a diploma here, then participated in transmigration projects in 1982. We have been here (Trans-Dalam) since 1982. Previously we were in Kuala Kapuas… [7]

This kind of marriage was evidence that Trans-Dalam community was committed to a collective life, which was supported by their socio-religious values. Wahyu, Sri Wahyuni's husband, was a civil servant who didn't have a university degree. The couple was always gratitude for the harmonious marriage they had though they came from different cultural backgrounds in hand. Their family life was embellished with bright and diligent sons whose university studies were completed in less than 8 semesters. Their sons then got jobs easily. Sri believed that marriage of a man and a woman who have no family relationship or have different ethnic groups may result in children who are smart, persistent in pursuing their goals and devoted to their parents. She remarked:

Our first son graduated from the faculty of economics at University of Palangka Raya. He got a job at the office of public works in Palangka Raya. Then, he was married to a Banjarese Muslim who works at the same office.

The same case holds true for the case of Subandi, an East Javanese Muslim who was married to Kristy, a daughter of a Catholic leader from Kapuas. Subandi said:

My wife (Kristy) converted to Islam at the time of our marriage preparation. She had an approval from her parents to marry me. At that time, Kristy was an elementary school teacher. We have three children: the first and second children are boys and the third one is a girl. They went to study at a modern Islamic boarding school in East Java. The boys pursued their undergraduate studies at English department at a university in Malang, East Java. Then, they continued to do master program in English at *Sarjana Wiyata* University Yogyakarta. We have a good relationship and good communication with Kristy's parents and relatives though we have different faiths.[8]

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[7] Interview with Sri Wahyuni and her husband, Wahyu, 11 August 2013.

[8] Interview with Subandi (53 old years) and Kristy (50 years old) in Trans-Dalam, 20 December 2013.

Moreover, to some extent, multicultural practice changed the way Trans-Dalam communities plan marriage. For example, community members with Javanese backgrounds no longer used a Javanese tradition of taking the birthday of potential bride and groom into consideration in deciding the time of marriage and choosing one as wife or husband. This was seen in the case of the marriage of Wahyu and Sri's son. Their son and his future wife were married on their own choice as they loved each other, disregarding their different ethnic groups. Their parents and extended families supported their marriage without any problems. Wahyu said:

> My son was married to Mariah Qibtiah according to Islamic law of marriage. He took her as his wife by himself and we gave them our support to build a better future. We are Christians, but my parents in East Java are Muslims, and my daughter in law is a Muslim. This is not a source of conflict in our lives.[9]

The multicultural practice was also seen in the case of Petrus Sukarmin. Due to financial difficulties he experienced, he converted to Christianity. But, he then converted back to Islam when he was about to get married to a Muslim girl who graduated from an Islamic boarding school. He said:

> I am a teacher at at a middle school. I was married to Siti Rahmini, an orphan with three brothers. Siti is a Javanese woman who graduated from Darul Hijrah Islamic boarding school. We live in harmony. My wife told me about Islamic teachings. Frankly, I tell you, I have a unique experience; I converted to Christianity when I studied at senior high school in Pandih Batu and was given a name Petrus Sukarmin.[10]

Funeral

Lastly, the practice of multicultural life among Trans-Dalam community was identified in the way they responded to the funeral procession of a dead community member. Regardless of their religious backgrounds, Banjarese, Javanese and Dayak people worked hand in hand in conducting the funeral of a dead fellow community member. During this funeral procession, Muslims visited and offered assistance to non-Muslim family of a dead person and *vice versa*. A community member reported:

> I am from Kapuas and am a Dayak. I work at Community Health Centre and stay in a house which was provided by the centre. We are surely

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[9] Interview with Wahyu (53 years) in Trans-Dalam, 20 December 2013.

[10] Interview with Petrus Sukarmin, 23 December 2013.

in grief when one fellow is dead. As Muslims, we arrange the funeral procession without taking into account his or her religious background. I don't think there is any dispute in this matter. We take the dead person to the cemetery and bury it there. [We do this] though the number of Christians in our neighbourhood is decreasing at the moment.[11]

The same is true when a Muslim dies. People from the neighbourhood were involved in preparing and conducting the funeral regardless of their religious background. A Muslim community member said:

In the funeral process of a dead Muslim, such as saying prayers for the dead person in the seventh, fortieth and hundredth day after their death, it is common that the dead person's neighbors come and lend their hands regardless of their faith or ethnic backgrounds. Some cook food, while others give donation.[12]

Moreover, this multicultural practice was seen in the way they manage the burial place for the dead person. The Muslim and Christian cemeteries were separated by a kind of border, but located in the same piece of land. A Muslim said:

Muslim and Christian cemeteries are located in a piece of land, but both are separated by a simple border as seen in Kantan Muara village; on one side is Muslim cemetery, and on another one is Christian cemetery.[13]

MULTICULTURAL PRACTICES AND SOCIO-RELIGIOUS VALUES

The multiculturalism practices as described above did not work alone, but rather were closely connected to socio-religious values adopted by the people of Trans-Dalam. Therefore, it is important to reveal what socio-religious values which contributed to the multiculturalism practiced by Trans-Dalam communities. As the communities consist of members with various ethnicity, social and cultural backgrounds and came from different regions of origin, these social-religious values should be found within each of these ethnic groups in Trans-Dalam. Accordingly, these values are reflected in proverbs, expressions or sayings which are shared and lived by each community. As Bonvillain (1997:48) emphasizes, lived expressions constitute a community's cultural modes of mentality, attitudes, perception, ethics, morality, and social-religious values.

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[11] Interview with Norman in TransDalam, 11 August 2013.
[12] Interview with Abdul Ghofur in Trans-Dalam, 1 Desember 2013.
[13] Interview with Abdul Ghofur in Trans-Dalam, 1 Desember 2013.

My findings revealed that Trans-Dalam community members of Javanese origin developed certain values as its local wisdom to create and maintain a harmonious multicultural life. This is seen in the Javanese proverbs and expressions shared by the Javanese community members in Trans-Dalam in their daily lives. These include the expressions *giri lusi janna kena ingina* (one never insults another), *aja adigung, adigung, adiguna* (do not be an arrogant self)*; ngono ya ngono, ning aja ngono* (you may make a mistake, but do not repeat it)*; tuna satak bati sanak* (brotherhood); and *aja kumingsun* (one never shows of force and degrade another). They also lived social wisdom which guide community elders and leaders how to lead their people and get along with other people of different groups in proper ways, as expressed in the saying of *ing ngarsa sung tulada, ing madya mangun karsa, tut wuri handayani* (elders should be exemplary models, motivate and inspire their people). All these shared and lived expressions of local Javanese wisdom played an important in providing the Trans-Dalam community of Javanese background norms and values of how to live with other communities in a harmonious way.

The Trans-Dalam community of Balinese background also developed and maintained social-religious values in their attempt to live a multicultural life as expressed in the proverbs of local wisdom such as *desa kala patra* (place, time and situation). This teaches them that they should live in accordance with shared local customs of the place where they live and the situation they are engaged with as well as with their religious teachings of Hinduism. Among the community with Banjarese backgrounds, there were proverbs and expressions of social-religious values shared and lived by its members in their practice of multicultural life. These include *berelaan* (accepting each other and being thankful to God), *bisa-bisa maandak awak* (adapting oneself to a new environment), *bubuhan* (friendship)*, bedingsanakan* (family bond)*, batutulungan* (one helps another)*, bakalah bamanang* (win-win solution), *gawi manuntung* (do your work well), and *dalas balangsar dada* (hard work). This wisdom provides the Banjarese community with values of deliberation, brotherhood, helping each other, adjusting to local culture and customs, and maintaining good relationship between people and God, and among people.

Moreover, there were various expressions of shared local wisdom that provided guidance to Trans-Dalam community of Dayak background in its interaction with other communities in peaceful ways. These include *hapahari* (togetherness), *handep* (helping each other), *pandohop* (providing aid), *belom bahadat* (living in accordance with shared ethics and customs), *hapakat kula* (deliberation), *sama keme, sama mangat, sama susah* (living together in good and bad), and *hatamuei lingu nalata* (one should know, share ideas

and experiences with another). Undoubtedly, these expressions and sayings of social-religious values and wisdom shared and lived by Trans-Dalam communities with different social and cultural backgrounds reflected their views, perceptions of themselves and attitude towards each other. At the same time, these played an important role as guidance for the communities in living their lives and building connection with each other in multicultural ways.

CONCLUSION

This article has contributed to the studies of multiculturalism of education by empirically showing that as seen in the case of Trans-Dalam villagers migrant communities with various social, cultural and ethnic groups were able to maintain and implement multicultural practices in their day-to-day lives as they were motivated and inspired by social-religious values which were seen in the expressions and proverbs shared and lived by each community with different ethnic backgrounds. Trans-Dalam villagers preserved multicultural ideas and conducted multicultural practices. This was intrinsically derived from understanding and applying the shared social values and religious teachings that commanded everyone to cooperate with one another in every good matter. They interpreted and implemented these values in a broad sense, as seen in their willingness to work together and help each other in ways that benefit their common interests.

Understanding multiculturalism has not been well achieved unless one takes factors related social, cultural, and religious values shared and lived by a community into consideration. Inspired by their own expressions of shared social-religious values, each community of different ethnic background developed multicultural practices in its social and religious interaction including marriage, funeral and religious festivities. Confirming Maslow's theory of human needs, this finding was closely connected to the communities' need for security as settlers with diverse social-cultural backgrounds that made them aware of the importance of living in harmony, mutual respect, and solidarity regardless of their differences in ethnicity, place of origin or religion.

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POPULAR PIETY AND THE MUSLIM MIDDLE CLASS BOURGEOISIE IN INDONESIA

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the passion of Islamization of the New Order, at the same time the mainstream of this power is based on economic development that provides opportunities for the growth of the Muslim middle class. Patronage model used by the New Order gives an indication that the power built by this regime wants to instill a strong influence in society. At the same time, the New Order is depoliticizing the political attitudes of Muslims. This has implications for the marginalization of the interests of Muslims on the national stage. In this study will also be affirmed the influence of the New Order's power on the presence of the Muslim middle class. On the one hand their birth was the result of the economic development that the New Order echoed. On a different aspect, the presence of the middle class gives strong legitimacy that they are part of the dominating class structure in a country. Also will be reviewed about middle-class interference with the trend of Islamic populism that actually occurred in the era of the 80s, but re-spread after post-reform. Popular Islamic culture becomes a trend that spread through various media such as, internet, magazines, newspapers and so forth. This has received considerable response from middle-class Muslims and led to commodification. Religion facilitates to interact with modernity. Materialistic and hedonistic interests intersect with obedience in the practice of religion. On the one hand, the mode of consumption of the Muslim middle class changes with the adaptation of piety values in the public sphere.

Keywords: Popular, Islam, piety, middle class, bourgeoisie, Indonesia

INTRODUCTION

The early birth of the New Order regime was motivated by a very complex economic and political crisis. The national economy at that time was in a very poor condition. As Harold Crouch described, in 1965 inflation reached 500 percent, and rice prices soared 900 percent (Crouch,1986:67). It started on March 11, 1966 when he succeeded President Sukarno. With the current support of ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces), Soeharto stabilized the direction

of domestic political policy by controlling almost all aspects of government including economic, political, social aspects creating good economic growth and domestic stability (Vatikiotis,1993: 1, ix-x).

In the unfavorable economic and political situation, whoever leads should prevent the crisis from getting worse by implementing a strategy of political and economic stability. Soeharto with all his convictions convinced the people that the new regime he built was the legitimate and constitutional heir of President Sukarno. According to Salim Said (2016:10), Seoharto's capital actually comes to power in addition to harnessing military power. He used the "anger" of the people in the communist party (PKI). He realized that despite his lack of charisma and political experience over his predecessors, but with a keen sense of power instinct, Suharto was sure his rule would be lasting. The political reference used by Soerharto is free-active, which tends to follow America. The New Order's interest in the aspects of economic development altered Suharto's view of western capitalism. In addition to the economic issues that became the jargon of the New Order, domestic politics of Suharto's main concern also needed attention. Some countries that become relations of Indonesia such as, Autralia, Japan and other Asian countries get special attention. On the other hand, the New Order's strong desire to develop the national economy, and the welfare of the people's life, are characteristic of this regime (Ricklefs,2008: 587-589).

DEPOLITICIZING THE REGIME AGAINST MUSLIMS

The authoritarianism adopted by the New Order received the attention of Saiful Mujani, by adopting some western scholars opinions such as Anderson (1972) which explains that because Suharto was a man of Javanese tradition, the source of authoritarianism that he embraced came from Javanese political culture which did not recognize democracy. Another case with Samson (1973), in fact the modernist Muslim elite has a strong fighting spirit for the Islamization of the country. However, on the other hand it does not seem to get a good reception on the power elite so that it has a difficulty in realizing a moderate political climate during the New Order (Mujani, 2007:30).

The Muslim's desire to re-take does not seem to be welcome, Soerharto not only got rid of the PKI but also removed the Muslims. This is based on the unilateral interests of the New Order in running the government, the background of Suharto who is an abangan Islam and a worldview against Islam gives influence to the model of government that it runs (Hefner & Horvatich,1997: 77-79). So that Muslims suspect that the New Order government has been infiltrated by certain parties who aim to achieve the hidden interests (Hefner

& Horvatich,1997: 77-79). Considering the reading of Ariel Heryanto, the Soeharto government is rich in sharing political maneuvers that tend to be patrimonalism (Heryanto & Mandal, 2003: 4-5).

Since the beginning of 1966, Soeharto's desire to obstruct the wishes and aspirations of Muslims is clear. The perception of the New Order regime when the country wanted to be built using Islamic conceptions. The failure of Masyumi leaders to rehabilitate his own party and other wishes such as the application of Islam as the basis of the state; the wishes of former Vice President Mohammad Hatta along with the HMI exponents and the PII established the PDII (Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia Indonesia) party; aspirations of Muhammadiyah leaders to reactivate the PII party (Partai Islam Indonesia) were strongly banned by the New Order regime. Even more frontal, Suharto with his "hands-on" politics suppressed radical Islamic groups potentially against the government (Alfian,1980:2-3).

The gait of Muslims in the political arena from the Old Order to the New Order experienced ups and downs. The tendency of the New Order to conduct political bureaucracy with the emasculation of the aspirations of Muslims seems to be a shortcut done. So that gave birth to a new awareness among Muslims that the political field is not the right path (Tebba, 1993: 4-5). The fear of the New Order with Islam according to Din Syamsudin is an attempt to depolitise and desbolize Islam. This is an attempt to get rid of Islamic symbols from the political stage, the elimination of Islamic ideological parties (Syamsuddin,2001:66-68). The large project implemented by the New Order wants to remove the awareness and attention of the underclass and deliberately alienate their leaders from the frenetic atmosphere that carries a critical pattern of Islam towards the state.

Suharto considers the political parties to be the source of the chaos and political instability that had occurred in the period of liberal democracy. This is what underlies Soeharto's "nervousness" towards political parties. Suharto's actions were regarded as an intervention in the bureaucracy of political parties, including Islamic parties (Crouch,1986:276). The New Order's treatment of Islam gained the attention of scholars, one of whom was Hamka (Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah) a modernist from West Sumatra. He criticized the New Order regime for putting forward national development and economic strengthening but did not take into account the moral and ethical aspects of society. When religion is kept out of society, the resulting effect destroys the social order. He is a brave cleric that the New Order regime has legalized prostitution and gambling because it is easier to sell and the benefits gained (Bourchier &Hadiz,2014: 83).

When the state can control religion, the phenomenon that occurred during the New Order according to Schwarz (1999) in the reading of Robert W. Hefner, "Islam is seen as a safe alternative to a very strict political structure" (Hefner,2000:5-6). Although the penetration of the New Order against Islamic parties is so strict, anyone can engage in public spheres but is restricted by strict rules. For example, in 1978 the government began to impose restrictions on organizing campus politics. Then in the years 1984-1985 the government required religious organizations and mass organizations to incorporate Pancasila ideology into its articles of association, if it refused the regime would make a ban.

Toward the end of the 1980s the tension between Muslims and the New Order began to improve, Suharto no longer worried about Islam. Although at the beginning of the New Order period, Islam was seen as political enemy number two after the communist (Anwar,2009: 355). The openness of Suharto's attitude toward Islam is reflected in the ratification of educational law, which includes clauses of every public school should provide religious instruction to his students, establish the Law of Religious Courts, establish Board of Zakat, Infak and Sedekah (BAZIS), for female students in public schools are allowed to wear the hijab (An-Na'im, 2007:437). This period of establishment of various institutions increasingly vibrant, ranging from the integration of Islamic education into the system of public education, the establishment of ICMI by B.J Habibie, establishment of Muamalat bank as the first Islamic bank in Indonesia and the Bank of Credit Sharia and so on (Azra,2006:12).

PROSPERITY, ISLAMIC BOURGEOISIE, AND THE APPEARANCE OF MIDDLE CLASS MUSLIMS

The appearance of the New Order as a supporting deity in the era of the early 1960s over the leadership of the Old Order which at that time was ostracized by the United States, European countries and Japan provided opportunities for the New Order to display its "power" in saving Indonesia at that time. At the end of Seokarno's leadership, Indonesia was plagued by a very severe poverty that had an impact on the slow pace of domestic economic growth. To create development stability which has an impact on creating stable economic stability, at least the New Order uses the concept of Development Trilogy: (1) Economic growth; (2) Political stability; (3) Equity. These three things are the foundation for the New Order's economic technocrats supporting the regime at that time. Furthermore, this ekomini growth can be well established when political stability is achieved perfectly. Therefore, to create a good economic stability is entrusted to the military. So that economic and military technocrats

into a dual-world vehicle that can not be separated (Budiman,2002:21).

The power of the New Order which always prioritized the economic and political sector development strategies contributed to the creation of Indonesia's domestic conditions. The New Order claimed that the power he created was called a domestic stabilizer and dynamizer that had unlimited control functions. This is addressed by the New Order as a task that has been mandated by the state ideology of Pancasila in bringing prosperity to the people of Indonesia (Rinakit,2005:27-29). On the other hand, the New Order's patrimonalism is so strongly exploit the patron relationship between subordinates and superiors. Political isolation is used to avoid political influence from outside the loyalists. This patrimonial policy is used to protect the power that has been institutionalized (Aspinall:2005,132).

At the time of the Old Order came to power, the people felt lied to by the accommodating of communist interests in the government. By Max Weber this patrimonial model was introduced as a term to explain how a ruler governs wealth and power based on traditional authority, not based on a system of rule of law and order (Aspinall:2005,133-136). Suharto was able to maintain this patrimonial model well until near the end of his rule in 1998. Patrimonialism is also called by Van Leur as a political capitalism or trade capitalism that wants to benefit certain parties, this can be a synthesis of the culture of patrimonialism adopted by the New Order. The state plays an important role in various sectors such as food production, education, public infrastructure and so on (Amir,2013:35).

John Meuleman describes the liberalization and economic globalization that took place in Indonesia as the New Order regime that began in the late 1970s had an impact on improving the economic condition of the Muslim population as a whole. In the late 1980s an increasing number of Muslim communities were able to perform Hajj and after that Indonesia was known as the country that sends the world's largest pilgrims outside of Saudi Arabia. Throughout that era mosque construction has mushroomed everywhere; the establishment of majlis taklim residing in luxury hotels and so on, as well as the development of Islamic schools and pesantren in urban areas. The rate of economic growth contributes to the increasing number of middle-class Muslims, of whom they are able to go abroad, and many also take part in social, political, and economic performances. So they become a symbol of the middle class establishment (Azra in Meuleman,2002:25).

This regime is smart enough to grasp the opportunities that make political stability necessary to overcome the backwardness of economic development. In such a situation the state benefits from the presence of the middle class

who sometimes becomes anti-system sponsors, so controlling the middle class means controlling state stability (Denny,2006:33). The opposite situation will occur when the development of the economic sector cannot be read well by the state which has an impact on economic instability and social inequality. Of course Indonesia as a Muslim-majority country has an interest in adjusting the conditions and situations that cause the appearance of the Muslim middle class in public areas (Burhanuddin, 2013:179).

On the other hand, because the middle class is pseudo, sometimes difficult to see as part of social-political-cultural structure of Indonesian society. However, if it is agreed that the definition of the middle class from the economic aspect with all its diversity is through the consumption pattern (Dick in Tanter,1990: 64). Solvay Gerke explained that the consumption pattern of the middle class has changed from meeting basic needs (basic needs fulfilled approach) to meeting the needs of symbols, status and lifestyle (symbolic consumption approach). Therefore, the shift in the pattern of consumption fulfillment is not based on needs, but rather to strengthen the status of the class that prioritizes secondary and tertiary needs (Gerke in Huat, 2000:135:158).

TRENDY, POPULAR PIETY: MUSLIM MIDDLE CLASS IDENTITY AFTER THE FALL OF SOEHARTO

After ICMI was well instituted with the election of B.J Habibie as chairman, there was an interesting phenomenon after that in 1991 to coincide with the 70th anniversary of Suharto performing the pilgrimage and his extended family. This was a public concern, for Suharto this was the first time he went on pilgrimage. He is often regarded as an abangan Muslim, thick with the practice of kejawen which is far from Islamic Orthodoxy and not so religious. Coming back from Makah, in addition to the title of Hajj, he added the name of Muhammad as a symbol that he was trying to be a pious Muslim. There is a growing assumption, when Suharto was elderly (growing older in Javanese terms) he increased his religiosity rather than before (Barton, 2008:218). Another opinion stated that Suharto's departure to the holy land was considered a political act designed to convey a message to conservative santri Muslims from now on he could be a trustworthy person and with him they could work together. The truth is that since 1987 he has been thinking about embracing conservative Muslims who are used as a political counterweight other than the military (Barton, 2008:218). Later, Suharto's trend was imitated by the middle class to perform Hajj and Umrah with luxury or plus facilities (Mufid, 2006:269).

Things that need attention also regarding the dynamics of economic growth

affect the process of mobility of certain community structures. In this case it is the class of santri to the higher grade class. They were previously a group based on the rural environment. They then migrated to the city, becoming an educated middle class that filled big cities like Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabata, Padang, Medan, Ujung Pandang and so on. Which by Giddens, they are classified as middle class people who do not enjoy the property in the means of production, but belong to those who have the qualifications of education, skills, and technological skills (Hasbullah,2017: 112-116). Political dynamics in Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto era in the early 2000s, at that time Abdurrahman Wahid issued Inpres No.6 of 2009 which instructed the permissibility of ethnic Chinese to organize religious activities. The impact of this Presidential Instruction on Chinese society has the opportunity and freedom to carry out their religious activities. The Chinese New Year celebration is prohibited, with the Inpres every year they are free to celebrate and also affect the actualization of religious freedom in general.

In the midst of shock situations that test the existence of religious in Indonesia as described above, emerged a more universal and modern Islamic expression. Muslim Preacher's Abdullah Gymnastiar who is more familiarly called with Aa Gym has nourished the da'wah content that can be accepted by the wider community. The concept of qolbu management popularized has brought a new da'wah model in the community. Not only did the Muslim community accept their da'wah, the non-Muslim community also received the da'wah that they carried. In addition, Ary Ginanjar Agustian also appeared with his ESQ (Emotional Spiritual Questient). The idea that he stretches integrates the concept of modern Islam that can be accepted by all circles. The training he held extended to all people, especially the upper middle class. In every training he held, he always set costs up to millions of rupiah. The combination of Islamic character with Western spiritual management is the hallmark of Ary Ginanjar in every session (Agustian, 2016).

The rise of national films became the spirit of displaying Islamic film identity. After the reforms, films were filmed by young filmmakers such as Hanung Bramantyo (2008) in his film "Ayat-Ayat Cinta" (2008), "Wanita Berkalung Sorban" (2009), "Sang Pencerah" (2010), then Chaerul Umam's work " Ketika Cinta Bertasbih "(2009). The films are making tremendous profits and are very popular among Muslims. The films are adapted from the novel by Habiburrahman el-Shirazzy, so that the characters raised into the films are a struggle between Muslim identity and piety that is becoming a trend, and is favored by young people. In addition, the existence of these films became social criticism and became anti-theses to the onslaught of Westernized

popular culture. And the filmmakers want to prove that Islam can synergize with modernization without having to leave the foundation of its teachings (Sasono in Daniels,2013:45-69). Religious music also enlivened the popular market, which in fact the early generation of religious music was seen in the Bimbo era in the 80s which incorporated the kasidah and gambus models into pop music. In 2004 the beginning of the Gigi music group released the album Raihlah Kemeaengan, which combined rock lyrics with religious lyrics. After that began to appear religious songs from various music bands such as, Ungu, Wali, Nidji, ST 12, Radja, and Coklat.

The non-educational spectacle is the reason for the creators to display the messages of Islam in the soap opera. The characterization of a pious person (shaleh) becomes the main topic in its cultivation, no longer highlight scenes such as relations between men and women who are not mahram, which looks at soap operas in general. Such symbols would present a popular culture of piety to the center of society, which would later become a populist alternative in the Muslim community (Subijanto,2013:73-86).[1] In addition, Muslim fashion trends and Muslim magazines are increasingly diverse, such as Annida, Muslimah, Scarf, MusMagz, Alisha, Hijabella, Paras and so on. In addition to the emergence of an Islamic band (nasyid) inspired by overseas bands, they sang religious songs. Widespread salons are reserved for Muslim women, then the Hajj and Umroh Bureau, whose customers come from the urban middle class. Certainly in contrast to the lower-class, they have to register the hajj through the government. For Jean Gelman, the phenomenon fosters capitalism and showcased commercialism, reinforcing the identity of the middle class based on their religious experience (Taylor, 2013:181).

The mid-2000s social media revolution was so rapid, with the birth of Facebook (2004), Flickr (2004), BlackBerry Messenger (2005), Twitter (2006), WhatsApp (2009), Instagram (2010). The wide range of social media options has an impact on Muslim middle-class expression to their social environment. Until finally the development of smartphones using Android (2008) became the choice of the middle class which until 2016 the total downloads from the Google Play application reached 65 billion. The digital revolution does not stop there, but there are still new players. *Gojek* who stood in 2010 became a pioneer *ojek* online in Indonesia. Its success in 2015 has inspired similar services into Indonesia such as, Grab and Uber that established itself as a mass

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[1] After the fall of Soeharto's rule, many television shows displayed a pious identity as part of popular culture. This cannot be separated from the changing situation in placing Islam as a post-Soeharto cultural and political arena. On the other hand, the rise of Islamic shows on television as an interpretation of the creators to offer quality shows as a "form of resistance" to the influence of Western popular culture. Islamic television shows how religious discourse in public sphere, at the same time triggers popular piety in public sphere.

service that so rapidly.

The shift of middle-class orientation of Muslims after the fall of the New Order created its own dynamics. In addition to the emergence of a variety of popular cultures that influence the Muslim middle-class perspective, the change in the mode of religiosity affects their behavior. Increased religiosity is not only visible in the worship performed. In consuming any product they pay attention to the functional and emotional benefits of a product. In addition they also care about the spiritual benefits of the product. Their knowledgeable and technology-savvy dominance combines with the growing understanding of religiosity that when they consume or intersect with various products must be in line with compliance with Islamic values and teachings. This is in contrast to the West, as they move forward, the more secularized they do not even believe in the existence of God (Yuswohadi, 2012). The compliance of the Muslim middle class in carrying out the teachings of Islam by placing the elements of religiosity is not merely a desire, but it becomes manifest in obeying God's command and away from His prohibitions. In consuming products and services, not just seek functional and emotional benefits like before. Spiritual benefits become part of the "enable" in their lives, especially in strengthening Islam and belief in Allah SWT.

CONCLUSION

The awareness of the Muslim middle class towards the symbols of Islam that are trying to be shown to the public sphere is followed by a shift in their Islamic orientation which is based on the process of new model Islamization. However, in different aspects the emergence of the Muslim middle class also results in changes in the mode of consumption of society. Such phenomena cannot be denied, because commodification in public space has become a necessity. The New Order, which had been in power for years, was not enough to arouse optimism for the Muslim middle class. In the beginning their efforts in contesting national politics were hampered by the regime. Later, when the New Order rule was over they were given the opportunity to take part in various fields. Popular Islamic culture is present as part of reculturation of Islam in the public sphere. This is as a resistance to Western culture which is feared to damage the nation. Therefore, the effort to display modern piety has always been the routine of the Muslim middle class in negotiating with globalization.

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BOOK REVIEW

Resistance and Change in West Kalimantan
THE KINGDOM OF SINTANG (1822-1942)
Yogyakarta: Penerbit Ombak, 2015.

By Helius Sjamsuddin

Reviewed By
Bibi Suprianto
*(Pontianak State Institute of Islamic Studies)*

The presence of the book written by Helius Sjamsuddin shows the important of the studies of history in the academic atmosphere, not only global history but also local history in the studies of global history. By publishing the book entitled **Resistance and Change in West Kalimantan THE KINGDOM OF SINTANG (1822-1942** the author tries to tell the world that such a remote area in the middle of the Borneo jungle has something very important to learn and share, the history of the Kingdom of Sintang in the context of Indonesian history of colonial time. The support by the Toyota Founation that the author got for the very important research project also indicates that the history of the Kingdom of Sintang has a significant influence in the Indonesian history, especially on the issue of resistance to the colonialism and social change within the Indonesian society. The author has provided a very interesting analysis and data collection supporting the book publication.

As mentioned by the author in Chapter One page 3, the book is intended to provide studies on understanding social and political changes happening in the long history of the Kingdom of Sintang. It is important to provide the history of the Kingdom of Sintang without neglecting the existence of the neighboring kingdoms in the area since they must have had very important influences of the social and political changes. The author also mention in his book that the book is intended to get a more visible historiography of the Kingdom of Sintang based on a serious research project. The author tries to employ the descriptive-narrative approach in collecting the data and providing historical analysis.

This 467 page book, despite its richness with historical data, is a very readable book for those who have interests in history studies in relation with the struggle of people who have religious background in doing struggle for their independent. This book is also based on socio-political perspective research

project that emphasizes on the participation of local people to the dynamics of political movement in Indonesia. As an important note, tThis book is part of a writer's perspective (Helius Sjamsuddin), a scholar who as a strong interest in local history in Indonesia from the perspective of political sciences.

AL-ALBAB

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